Carpender v. Sigel

142 Conn.App. 379

67 A.3d 1011

Anne CARPENDER

v.Kenneth G. SIGEL.

No. 34138.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 12, 2012.

Decided May 7, 2013.

Bruce A. Chamberlain, New London, filed a brief for the appellant (defendant).

Raymond C. Lubus, New Fairfield, filed a brief for the appellee (plaintiff).

BEACH, ROBINSON and ALVORD, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Kenneth G. Sigel, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion for contempt against the plaintiff, Anne Carpender, for her failure to pay educational and extracurricular activities expenses for their minor son. On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the court erred in finding that (1) the plaintiff's withholding of consent to pay for college expenses was reasonable, and (2) laches, waiver and estoppel applied to the reimbursement of extracurricular activities expenses for the child.¹ We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the trial court.²

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The defendant and plaintiff were married on April 7, 1991. One son was born of the marriage. The marriage was dissolved on November 21, 2001, due to an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. As part of the judgment of dissolution, the court incorporated the separation agreement of the parties. The agreement provided in relevant part: “(a) Based upon the ... parenting plan the parties are deviating from the child support guidelines.... That deviation is based on the following: ... (ii) Agreement by the parties to be equally responsible for the following education expenses for the child: Private Secondary Education; College; Graduate School; and Professional School; (iii) The parties' further agreement to be equally responsible for the following expenses of the minor child including, but not limited to: All sports, music, extracurricular programs; Any camp, daycare, after school programs; and Sports Equipment .... (c) The party enrolling any child in a school or an activity under ‘ii’ or ‘iii’ shall be solely responsible for the cost of the school or activity and any related equipment unless the other party agrees that expenses should be incurred for that particular school or activity. Neither party shall unreasonably withhold his or her consent....”

On September 19, 2011, the defendant filed a post-judgment motion for contempt requesting that the plaintiff be held in contempt for her failure to comply with the payment of educational and other expenses. Following a November 7, 2011 hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision, finding that the plaintiff did not unreasonably withhold her consent to the child attending college at Long Island University and, thus, was not responsible for the college expenses, that the defendant had waived his right to seek reimbursement for the college expenses and was estopped from doing so, and that laches, waiver and estoppel barred the defendant's claim for the extracurricular activities expenses.³ This appeal followed.

I

With respect to the college expenses, the defendant claims that the court improperly found that the plaintiff did not unreasonably withhold her consent. We are not persuaded.

“An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Morris, 262 Conn. 299, 305, 811 A.2d 1283 (2003). “We apply that standard of review because it reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dombrowski v. Noyes–Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 132, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).

The court heard testimony and received evidence regarding why and when the plaintiff objected to paying for their son's college expenses. She testified that the defendant had agreed to pay for their son's education on several occasions both in writing and by e-mails. Two e-mails from 2008 and 2011 from the plaintiff to the defendant were entered into evidence that reiterated the plaintiff's belief that the defendant had agreed to pay for their son's college expenses. Another e-mail in 2009 from the defendant to the plaintiff was entered into evidence where the defendant offered to pay for all of their son's schooling, including college, if the son attended Cheshire Academy.

The plaintiff also recounted a conversation that had taken place between the parties in February or March, 2011, when their son had surgery. During lunch, the plaintiff testified, she told the defendant that she did not think that their son was ready for college but that she had not been involved in the college selection process. The defendant reassured her that he would handle everything. On the basis of that conversation, she testified, the plaintiff expected that the defendant would pay for their son's college expenses.

The plaintiff additionally testified that she did not agree to Long Island University because their son was not a good student and he would do the least amount of work possible. In e-mails in 2011, the plaintiff identified Hofstra University and Norwalk Community College as options for their son. Also submitted into evidence was a copy of their son's official high school transcript.

Moreover, the plaintiff testified, she did not know that their son had been accepted and was ready to attend Long Island University until after he had been accepted. When she learned that their son had been admitted to Long Island University and that the defendant wanted payment for tuition, the plaintiff promptly voiced her disagreement.

The defendant also testified about his expectations about reimbursement for their son's college expenses. He testified that he offered to pay for all of their son's college expenses only if he attended and graduated from Cheshire Academy or some other boarding school, and only that one time. According to the defendant, their son never went to boarding school, so the offer was never accepted. When their son was accepted to Long Island University and no longer living with the plaintiff, the defendant testified, he sought the reimbursement to which he felt he was entitled.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the defendant had enrolled the son in college. It further found that the plaintiff was aware that the defendant was enrolling their son in Long Island University and that she did not agree with this decision because she thought he should go to a different school. The court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff's undisputed refusal to provide consent to their son's choice of school because she felt he should go to a different school was not unreasonable. Upon an order for articulation by this court, the trial court further articulated its factual findings, stating: “The plaintiff did not agree with the decision of [their son] to attend Long Island University. [Their son] was not a good student in the period of February–March, 2011. The plaintiff, therefore, believed [their son] was not ready to attend Long Island University. She felt [their son] should attend Norwalk Community College and was willing to help financially for him to attend Norwalk Community College.”

On the basis of the record provided, we cannot determine that there was error in the court's judgment. There was evidence in the record to support the court's factual findings that the plaintiff did not believe that the parties' son was ready to attend Long Island University, that he was not a good student and that a different school would be better. Given the evidence, the court had a reasonable basis on which to conclude that the plaintiff did not unreasonably withhold her consent to their son's enrollment at Long Island University, and, therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.

II

The defendant also claims that the court improperly found that laches, waiver and estoppel applied to the reimbursement of extracurricular activities expenses. He argues that the plaintiff did not present evidence to satisfy all of the elements of these doctrines. We agree.

At the hearing, the court inquired into the dates of some of the extracurricular activities, particularly, Project Exploration, Avery Point Project Oceanology Camp, Mystic Seaport sailing camp, and the Camp Fuller scuba program. After learning that the parties' son had participated in them seven to eight years prior to the filing of the motion for contempt, the court concluded that the claims for those expenses were waived. In its memorandum of decision, the court summarily concluded with respect to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff is responsible to reimburse him for their son's extracurricular activities expenses in accordance with the separation agreement “that based on laches, waiver and estoppel ... the remaining claims of the defendant are barred.” The court made no factual findings with regard to its legal conclusions. The parties, however, testified about the circumstances surrounding their son's enrollment in various after school and summer activities. Specifically, both parties testified that the defendant enrolled their son in various activities, with the plaintiff's consent, that the defendant paid for the activities in full and that the defendant did not seek contribution for the activities until he filed the motion for contempt in 2011.

We begin with the standard of review. “When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our...