Carrick v. Sears Roebuck and Co.

252 F.Supp.2d 116

Richard CARRICK, Plaintiff, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Defendant.

No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-2276.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

March 17, 2003.

Joseph P. Coviello, Coviello & Mariotti, Scranton, PA, Joseph E. Mariotti, Mariotti Law Offices, P.C., Scranton, PA, Todd J. O'Malley, Scranton, PA, Ira Neil Richards Trujillo, Kenneth I. Trujillo, Peter D. Winebrake, Rodriguez & Richards, LLC, Philadelphia, PA, Philadelphia, PA for Richard Carrick.

Douglas R. Cox, Washington, DC, F. Joseph Warin, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Washington, DC, Andrew S. Tulumello, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC for Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc.

MEMORANDUM

CAPUTO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Richard Carrick filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on November 21, 2002 against Defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. alleging various state law claims.¹ Defendant removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for remand to state court. (Doc. 8.) The Court heard oral arguments on February 24, 2003. This matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. Because the Court finds that Defendant has not satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement, the Court will grant Plaintiffs motion to remand. Defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns the rates that Sears charges customers for alignment services. According to the complaint filed in state court, Plaintiff took his Chevrolet S-10 Blazer to Sears for an alignment. Plaintiffs Blazer, like many SUVs and pick-up trucks, is designed so that the rear wheels cannot be adjusted. Aligning a Blazer involves adjusting only the front wheels. Sears charged Plaintiff $49.99 for what the invoice referred to as an "all wheel" alignment. This is the same price Sears charges customers whose vehicles require adjustment of all four wheels.

Plaintiff argues that Sears is essentially charging customers with vehicles requiring adjustment of only the front two wheels for work that is not done; viz., adjustment of the back wheels. Plaintiff states in his state court complaint that he seeks to become representative of a class consisting of:

all customers of Defendant's Auto Centers who, since November 1996, received wheel alignments on vehicles that were mechanically incapable of having their rear wheel alignments adjusted and were nevertheless charged by Defendant's Auto Centers for an "all wheel" or four-wheel alignment.

(Pl.Compl., 1131.) This case has not been certified. It remains a "putative" class action.

Plaintiff brings action under the common law theories of breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff also brings action under 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2, which authorizes a private right of action under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. In addition to seeking class certification, Plaintiffs complaint demands declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory damages under § 201-9.2, monetary damages pursuant to the common law contract theories, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.²

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Questions Addressed First

Plaintiff, in his motion to remand, calls into question the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. 8.) A federal court cannot address a case's merits without first determining that it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir.1995) (federal courts have an "everpresent obligation to satisfy themselves of their subject matter jurisdiction"). Therefore, the Court addresses the motion to remand first.

B. Requirements For Removal

Defendant removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Removal on this basis requires: (1) diversity of citizenship, and (2) an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. Neither party disputes the diversity of citizenship. The sole jurisdictional question is whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.

C. Standard For Determining if Removal Was Proper

When deciding whether removal of a case from state court is proper, it is important to recognize the basic principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Asso.) v. South Acres Dev. Co., 434 U.S. 236, 239-40, 98 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed.2d 501 (1978). Courts must strictly construe all removal statutes and resolve doubts about removal jurisdiction in favor of remand.³ The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently cautioned against "relying exclusively" on the "supposed `presumption' in favor of remand," calling this presumption a "questionable doctrine whose `basis has never been very clearly explained.'" Cook v. Wikler, 320 F.3d 431, 436 n. 6 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 488 (7th Cir.1984)). I interpret the appeals court's words to mean that, when considering motions to remand, courts should not allow adherence to the general presumption to justify the omission of a rigorous "analysis of the text and context of the [removal] statute." Id. Cook does not purport to abolish the long-standing presumption against federal jurisdiction, nor does Cook assert that this presumption lacks any basis in law or logic. Compare Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir.1996) ("[b]ecause lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand").⁴ The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). See also Ariel Land Owners v. Dring, 245 F.Supp.2d 589 (M.D.Pa. 2003).

Moreover, a plaintiff is the master of his own claim. Wilbur v. H & R Block, Inc., 170 F.Supp.2d 480, 481 (M.D.Pa. 2000) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391 & n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)). Although a defendant may remove a case to federal court in certain situations, a defendant's right to remove is not on equal footing with a plaintiffs right to choose his forum. Wilbur, 170 F.Supp.2d at 481. When a plaintiff chooses a state forum, and the defendant seeks to negate that choice by removing to federal court, the defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the case satisfies all of the jurisdictional requirements for removal. See Wilbur, 170 F.Supp.2d at 483; Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 2000 WL 375260, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4602 at *5 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 11, 2000), aff'd, 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir.2002); McFadden v. State Farm Ins. Co., 1999 WL 715162, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13956 at *1 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 13, 1999).⁵ Therefore, in considering Plaintiffs motion to remand, the Court must determine whether Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence—i.e. it is more likely than not—that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

D. Putative Class Actions Treated As Class Actions For Jurisdictional Purposes

Plaintiff states in his state court complaint that he seeks class certification. (Pl.Compl., Doc. 1, 1131.) However, no state or federal court has ruled on whether Plaintiffs case should be certified as a class action. Plaintiffs claim remains a "putative class action."⁶ For the purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts analyze a putative class action as though it were, in fact, already certified. Miller v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 2000 WL 1570732, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15292 at *5 n. 2 (E.D.Pa., Oct. 19, 2000); Garcia v. General Motors Corp., 910 F.Supp. 160, 163-64 (D.N.J.1995); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 525 n. 1 (5th Cir.1995); Eagle v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541, 545 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985).⁷ When applying this rule, courts do not inquire into the likelihood that a court will eventually grant class certification. See Knauer v. Ohio State Life Ins. Co., 102 F.Supp.2d 443, 446 (N.D.Ohio 2000).

E. Separate and Distinct Claims Not Aggregated

It is settled that separate and distinct claims of members of a class action cannot be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969); Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218-22 (3rd Cir.1999); Mclntyre v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2001 WL 893697, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317 (E.D.Pa, August 6, 2001).⁸ Each plaintiff in a class action must independently meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over his or her claim. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973).⁹

F. Application of the Non-Aggregation Principle

The non-aggregation principle, established in Snyder and Zahn, compels the conclusion that when a plaintiff brings a putative class action in state court, and the defendant removes to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the federal court, in determining its own subject matter jurisdiction, must attribute unliquidated damages sought by the plaintiff (viz. attorneys' fees, punitive damages) pro rata to each member of the putative class. Dozens, if not hundreds, of decisions involving facts virtually identical to those in the case at bar have applied this principle. Courts have held, with a few isolated and readily distinguishable exceptions, that the nonaggregation principle requires pro rata attribution of unliquidated damages across the putative class. See Medley v....