Carroll v. CDCR

1

TREMAINE CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. CDCR, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-00005-JLT-SAB (PC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

April 7, 2023

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION

(ECF No. 13)

Plaintiff Tremaine Carroll is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff's complaint in this action was filed on January 3, 2023. (ECF No. 1.)

On February 2, 2023, the Court screened the complaint, found no cognizable claims, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 10.)

Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the Court's February 2, 2023 order. Therefore, on March 14, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is warranted.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

As stated in the Court's January 25, 2023 order, this action is proceeding as to Plaintiff, Tremaine Carroll only. (ECF No. 9.)

On December 24, 2022, at approximately 0800 hours, Plaintiff suffered multiple injuries after falling out of her wheelchair due to a hazardous crack in the pavement in front of the CCWF 80s clinic. CCWF staff had inmate Brown pushing Plaintiff. Plaintiff injured her head, neck, shoulder, back, arms, writs, fingers, knee and ankle. She only received an ice pack and Motrin for the pain.

When Plaintiff arrived at CCWF on August 26, 2021, she immediately noticed them that the prison was out of compliance with federal ADA guidelines that afford mobility impaired inmate patients the right to a paved safe path of travel. Plaintiff filed over 20 complaints about this specific issue, some of which were captured on video with associate warden Dill, but there have been no results.

CDCR, CCWF, and the Secretary and hiring authority, knew or should have known that inmates, like Plaintiff, would face and/or suffer serious physical injury as a result of their unwillingness to fix the grounds, based on all the prior complaints and injuries.

There have been years of complaints and years of multiple inmates at CCWF being injured as a result of the prison's recklessness. The mobility impaired as well as the inmates staff give direct orders to push and assist. Prison officials knew or should have known that inmates would get injured if they did not fix the roads.

Plaintiff is African American, a transgender women, and is mobility impaired under the ADA. Plaintiff is falsely imprisoned as her sentence is racially motivated because she has been imprisoned on a juvenile conviction for over 20 years.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Linkage Requirement

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that (1) each defendant acted under color of state law and (2) each defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. This requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009). In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of his federal rights.

B. Hazardous Conditions of Confinement

“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

Two requirements must be met to show an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which for conditions of confinement claims “is one of deliberate indifference.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials act with deliberate indifference when they know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Id. at 837. The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). Mere negligence on the part of a prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official's conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured from a fall due to a crack in the pavement. However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that any Defendant knew that the crack in the pavement posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health and safety. Even liberally construed, the complaint does not state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, since there are no facts supporting a finding of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges that numerous other inmates complained about the cracks in the pavement and injuries thereby, but there are no allegations sufficiently linking such knowledge to the Defendants named in complaint. Simply stating “Defendants” knew or should have known is not sufficient.

Moreover, a simple claim of negligence is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Thompson v. McMahon, No. 12-cv-1020-FMO (JEM), 2013 WL 5220748 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (explaining that negligence claim arising from prisoner's fall at work did not give rise to a federal cause of action; listing similar cases); Brown v. Brasher, No. CIV S-10-0479-MCE-EFB, 2012 WL 639446 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that a mobility-impaired inmate's claim regarding slipping and falling in a puddle caused by a water leak could only support a tort claim of negligence). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.

C. Supervisory Liability

In a Section 1983 action, a supervisory official cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A supervisor's mere knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate does...