Carrollton Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA)

77 So.3d 975

CARROLLTON PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

v.The PRESBYTERY OF SOUTH LOUISIANA OF the PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA).

No. 2011 CA 0205.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 14, 2011.Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 2011.

John Anthony Dunlap, Russell L. Foster, Harry M. Barton, New Orleans, LA, E. Wade Shows, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, The Presbytery of South Louisiana of the Presbyterian Church (USA).

Eugene R. Groves, Lloyd J. Lunceford, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Carrollton Presbyterian Church.

Before CARTER, C.J., PARRO and HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.

CARTER, C.J.

[1 Cir. 2] This matter is before this court on appeal by the defendant, the Presbytery of South Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as “the Presbytery”), from a judgment in a suit for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction rendered in favor of plaintiff, Carrollton Presbyterian Church (hereinafter referred to as “Carrollton”), and from an order of contempt.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Carrollton and the Presbytery are constituent members of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (hereinafter “PCUSA”). The PCUSA's governing document is its constitution, comprised of two books, one of which is the Book of Order. The Book of Order outlines the PCUSA's organizational structure, pursuant to which, the Presbytery (one of the PCUSA's governing bodies) exercises certain supervisory powers and authority over Carrollton (a local church), subject to review by the next higher governing body.

Carrollton was organized in 1855 and incorporated as a Louisiana corporation in 1894. Over the course of years, Carrollton acquired property in its name, including the immovable property in New Orleans that is the site of Carrollton's sanctuary. Carrollton also sold property it held in its name. In recent years Carrollton's membership had declined, and there was some talk of Carrollton dissolving, although Carrollton did not formally petition to do so. Carrollton also began investigating a potential sale of its sanctuary property.

The declaratory judgment portion of this dispute raises the issue of whether Carrollton holds, in full and exclusive ownership, property held in its name, and therefore, may sell its property as it desires. The Presbytery maintains that Carrollton is subject to the Book of Order's express trust provision, which creates an express trust in church property in favor of the PCUSA. Carrollton argues that the trust provision of the Book of Order does not comply with Louisiana trust law [1 Cir. 3] and further contends that the provision is inapplicable here, as Carrollton timely exercised its option to exempt itself from the trust provision.

After Carrollton amended its petition, the district court granted a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) prohibiting the Presbytery from establishing an administrative commission to take jurisdiction over Carrollton's “session.” ¹ After finding that Carrollton set forth a prima facie showing that it would prevail on the merits of the suit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction effective against the Presbytery and pertaining to all property held by or for Carrollton, enjoining the Presbytery from filing documents in the mortgage and conveyance records of Orleans Parish that would create a cloud on Carrollton's title to its property, or interfering with Carrollton's right to determine ownership, use, control, or disposition of its property. The preliminary injunction further enjoined the Presbytery from: changing the church locks; initiating disciplinary action against Carrollton's ministers or members in relation to the subject matter of this litigation; dissolving Carrollton or appointing or initiating processes leading to appointment of an administrative commission to assert jurisdiction over Carrollton to assume control over its governance of or control of the subject property; or interfering with Carrollton in any way pertaining to ownership, control, use, or disposition of church property.

The district court then granted Carrollton's motion for summary judgment, declaring that all property held by, for, or in Carrollton's name is held and owned by Carrollton, which holds and owns all property in its name in full, complete, and unfettered ownership in accordance with Louisiana law and further, that the express trust provisions relied on by the Presbytery are unenforceable and without legal effect as to the subject property. Additionally, the district court issued a permanent injunction enjoining the Presbytery from asserting ownership, use, [1 Cir. 4] control, or a trust over any property titled in. Carrollton's name and also from taking any action that could affect Carrollton's property rights, which specifically included, but was not limited to, the actions enumerated in the preliminary injunction.

The Presbytery now appeals.

JURISDICTION

After lodging of the appellate record, this court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed, as it appeared that the motion for appeal was untimely filed. The matter was briefed and the record corrected, in part, by the district court. Having examined the record herein, we are satisfied that a motion and order for appeal were timely filed with the district court. Although the order of appeal was not signed within the delays for perfecting a suspensive appeal, it is apparent that this was due to ongoing litigation regarding the amount of the suspensive appeal bond. Thus, the fault for the order not being timely signed is not clearly imputable to the appellant. Since the motion and order were timely filed, the appeal will not be dismissed because the order was not timely signed. See Traigle v. Gulf Coast Aluminum Corp., 399 So.2d 183, 186 (La.1981); Hill v. Hill, 412 So.2d 1156, 1157 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). Accordingly, the rule to show cause is hereby recalled and the appeal maintained as qualified herein. ²

Unrelated to the rule to show cause, Carrollton filed a motion to partially dismiss this appeal. While these matters were proceeding below, the parties were engaged in numerous discovery disputes that prompted court-ordered production of [1 Cir. 5] documents and motions for contempt and sanctions. On the same date that the district court rendered the summary judgment at issue in this appeal, it signed an order (“the order”) granting a motion for contempt filed by Carrollton and ordering the Presbytery to pay all costs, fees, and expenses reasonably incurred with the motion for contempt, and making other rulings pertaining to the production of certain documents. The order of appeal purports to grant the Presbytery a suspensive appeal of both the summary judgment and the order. Carrollton contends that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the order at this time, as it is interlocutory and unrelated to the merits of the final judgment appealed. The Presbytery argues that the order constitutes a final judgment under La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915 A(6), which provides for the finality of judgments imposing sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 191, 863, or 864 and La.Code Evid. Ann. art. 510 G.

The order does not purport to be a judgment imposing sanctions or disciplinary action pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. arts. 191, 863, or 864, or La.Code Evid. Ann. art. 510 G. Rather, the order holds a party in contempt and orders that party to pay an unspecified amount. We do not find that this falls under the rubric of La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1915 A(6). See Succession of Bell, 06–1710 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/8/07); 964 So.2d 1067, 1072.

The order is interlocutory since it does not determine the substantive merits of the case and is not separately appealable. Succession of Bell, 964 So.2d at 1072. In general, when an unrestricted appeal is taken from a final judgment determinative of the merits, the appellant is entitled to seek review of all adverse and prejudicial interlocutory judgments, in addition to the review of the final judgment. State ex rel. Div. of Admin., Office of Risk Mgt. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 10–0689 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/11/11); 56 So.3d 1236, 1242, writ denied, 11–0849 (La.6/3/11); 63 So.3d 1023. In the case of a restricted [1 Cir. 6] appeal, an appellant may also appeal an interlocutory judgment involving the same or related issues. Id.

The appeal herein is restricted to the merits of the declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction. At the time this appeal was taken, Carrollton's motion for sanctions remained outstanding.³ Our review of the record convinces us that the order relates to the motion for sanctions, rather than to the merits of the declaratory judgment or permanent injunction. The documents at issue in the order were ordered to be produced after the merits of the declaratory judgment or permanent injunction were decided. Thus, we find that this interlocutory ruling is not subject to review on appeal of the unrelated judgment on the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. Accordingly, the motion for partial dismissal is granted and appeal of the order is dismissed.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The character of the underlying action herein is one for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction; however, the judgment before the court on appeal was rendered pursuant to a motion for summary judgment. Thus, our review is pursuant to the summary judgment standard. See La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 1877; Bonvillian v. State ex rel. Department of Insurance, 08–0591 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/08); 5 So.3d 233, 235.

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Bozarth v. State, LSU Medical Center/Chabert Medical Center, 09–1393 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/12/10); 35 So.3d 316, 323. The motion should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and...