Carson v. Artus

WILLIE CARSON, Petitioner, v. DALE ARTUS, SUPERINTENDENT OF ATTICA CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Respondent.

16-CV-6639 (CJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

January 27, 2020

DECISION AND ORDER

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner:

Willie Carson, pro se

12-B-2304

Attica Correctional Facility

Box 149

Attica, NY 14011

For Respondent:

David Anthony Heraty

Donna Milling

Erie County District Attorney's Office

200 Erie County Hall

25 Delaware Avenue

Buffalo, NY 14202

INTRODUCTION

The petitioner, Willie Carson ("Carson" or "Petitioner"), is currently incarcerated and brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Carson challenges his conviction on one count of Burglary in the First Degree, one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, and one count of Attempted Robbery in the Second Degree. For the reasons explained below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

BACKGROUND

The crimes for which Carson was convicted occurred on Monday, April 6, 2009. At approximately 11:00 a.m. that morning, Kalela Carter was seated on her couch playing a video game in the living room of her first floor apartment at 362 Huntington Avenue in the city of Buffalo, New York. Trial Tr. vol. 4, 423 Feb. 2, 2012. Her boyfriend, Sam Rose, was suffering from the flu and was asleep in the bedroom at the rear of the apartment. Id. at 423-424. Suddenly, Carter's door was kicked in and two black males entered. Id. at 424. One of the males was taller, and wore "cargo sweatpants" and a dark hoodie; and the other male was shorter, and wore designer "Coogi" jeans and a dark hoodie. Id. at 425-427, 437, 450.

The taller intruder immediately moved towards Ms. Carter, held an object that appeared to be a gun to the back of her neck and had her get down on the ground. Id. at 425-426. The shorter male continued through the house searching for money and drugs. Id. at 427, 431. At some point, Ms. Carter began struggling with the taller intruder, managed to wrestle the apparent gun from his grip, and realized it was actually just a snow brush. Id. at 429-430. Ms. Carter then reached for her phone to call for help, and the taller intruder pulled out a real gun. Id. at 434. A shot was fired into the ceiling, at which point Carter's boyfriend awoke and began to emerge from the back room. Id. at 435. The intruders fled the apartment, and Ms. Carter chased them out into the street screaming for her neighbors to help. Id. at 410, 440-441. Multiple neighbors called 911. Id. at 398-399, 416. As Ms. Carter recalls it, the entire episode lasted some twenty to twenty-five minutes. Id. at 436.

Lieutenant Dawn Kent of the Buffalo Police Department was on patrol that day, and proceeded toward the scene upon hearing the radio dispatch. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 359 Feb. 1, 2012. The dispatch stated that a home invasion had occurred, and that suspects "had fled and maybe headed towards Depew Avenue." Id. The suspects were described as "two black males wearingdark jeans or pants and dark hoodies." Id. On Depew Avenue, just a few blocks away from the scene of the home invasion, Lieutenant Kent saw Carson sprinting across the street dressed in a white t-shirt with mud splatters and dark pants. Id. at 360-361, 372. Lieutenant Kent thought this was suspicious as a t-shirt was inappropriate for the weather. Id. She immediately exited her patrol vehicle and ordered Carson to stop. Id. Carson complied, and Lieutenant Kent transported him back to the scene of the crime to conduct a "show-up" identification with Ms. Carter. Id. at 368; Wade Hrg. Tr., 59, Jul. 2, 2010. It is unclear what instructions Ms. Carter was given prior to the "show-up," but at the scene Ms. Carter was given the opportunity to see Carson and identify him as one of the intruders, which she did. Wade Hrg. Tr. at 61.

Prior to trial, Carson filed at least two motions. First, Carson moved to suppress Ms. Carter's identification on the grounds that the "show-up" identification procedure used by the police was unduly suggestive. Wade Hrg. Tr., 21, Oct. 13, 2010. The trial court agreed with Carson that the show-up identification was unduly suggestive, but ultimately allowed Ms. Carter's in-court identification testimony because it found an adequate independent basis for a reliable identification, namely the ample opportunity she had to observe the perpetrators during the home invasion. Id. at 23; Mem. and Order, 1, Aug. 16, 2011. Second, Carson moved to dismiss the indictment due to lack of "probable cause" for his detention and arrest by Lieutenant Kent. Mem. and Order at 1. The trial court found that, under the particular circumstances, Lieutenant Kent properly formed a reasonable suspicion that Carson was one of the fleeing suspects. Id. at 5-7.

On February 6, 2012, Carson was convicted after a jury trial on one count of Burglary in the First Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § 140.30; one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § § 110/160.15; and one count ofAttempted Robbery in the Second Degree, in violation of New York Penal Law § § 110/160.10. On July 23, 2012, the trial court sentenced Carson to thirteen years of incarceration.

Carson timely filed a direct appeal raising six issues: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the identification testimony because it was the product of an unduly suggestive police procedure; (2) the trial court should have granted Carson's motion to suppress where there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause for his stop, detention and arrest; (3) the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence; (4) prosecutorial misconduct deprived Carson of his constitutional right to a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred in denying Carson's state law claim of juror misconduct; and (6) Carson's sentence was harsh and excessive. People v. Carson, 997 N.Y.S.2d 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department ("the Appellate Division") affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. Carson then applied for a certificate granting leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, but the application was denied. People v. Carson, 25 N.Y.3d 1161 (N.Y. 2015).

Carson is now before this Court pro se seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Court is in possession of, and has reviewed, the state record, including transcripts of the hearings and trials, and Petitioner's direct appeal to the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not challenged the record below as inaccurate. Accordingly, the Court finds an evidentiary hearing unnecessary.

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides a one-year statute of limitations for review of federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners. Where a habeas petitioner does not file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner's state court conviction becomes final, for purposes of triggering the one-year limitations period in which to seek habeas relief, 90 days after the application for leave to appeal to the relevant state's highest court is denied. McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13, "Reviewon Certiorari: Time for Petitioning"). In the instant case, because Petitioner did not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court, his conviction became final on September 16, 2015, i.e., 90 days after the June 16, 2015 denial of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas petition, filed on September 7, 2016, is timely.

LEGAL STANDARD

Carson brings his habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The general legal principles applicable to such a claim are well settled. Federal courts are obliged to give deference to state courts' decisions. See Chrysler v. Guiney, 806 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214). For claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus only when the state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . ." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).

A principle is "clearly established Federal law" for § 2254 purposes when it is embodied in a Supreme Court holding framed at the appropriate level of generality. Washington v. Griffin, 876 F.3d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting, inter alia, Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2578. A state court decision is "contrary to" such clearly established law when the state court either has arrived at a conclusion that is the opposite of the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or has "decided a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Washington, 876 F.3d at 403 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)). An "unreasonable application" of such clearly established law occurs when the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case such that "the state court's ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood andcomprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Washington, 876 F.3d at 403 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).

DISCUSSION

In his petition, Carson argues (i.) that Ms. Carter's identification testimony should have been suppressed due to an unduly suggestive police procedure; (ii.) that the arresting officer lacked probable cause for stopping him; (iii.) that his rights were violated by juror misconduct; and (iv. and v.) that he was deprived of his rights to a fair trial both by numerous acts of prosecutorial misconduct during summation, and by his attorney's failure to properly object to ...