Carter v. AgAm. AV1, LLC

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DEBRA CARTER, Appellant v. AGAMERICA AV1, LLC, Appellee

No. 11-22-00127-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Eleventh District

April 25, 2024

On Appeal from the County Court Comanche County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 3449.

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN M. BAILEY, CHIEF JUSTICE.

Debra Carter appeals from a jury trial that resulted in her eviction from a Comanche County ranch property that was formerly owned by Brazos Valley, LLC. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

In July 2020, Brazos Valley secured a loan from AgAmerica AV1, LLC (AgAmerica), using the funds to purchase a ranch property in Comanche County.

The loan was secured by a deed of trust that was executed by Carter on behalf of Brazos Valley. Several months later Brazos Valley defaulted on the loan. Following a non-judicial foreclosure on the property, AgAmerica served a notice on Brazos Valley, Debra Carter, and Crockett Carter,^[1] demanding that they vacate the property. However, Carter did not comply with the demand.

AgAmerica then initiated an eviction proceeding against Brazos Valley and Carter in the Comanche County Justice Court. Although they were served with process, neither Carter nor Brazos Valley filed an appearance in the Justice Court. As such, the Justice Court rendered a default judgment against Carter and Brazos Valley, awarding immediate possession of the property to AgAmerica. Carter then appeared as a pro se litigant and appealed the default judgment to the Comanche County Court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.9.

While the eviction appeal was pending, Carter filed a separate lawsuit against AgAmerica and others in the 220th District Court of Comanche County, seeking to enjoin AgAmerica from proceeding with the eviction. The district court denied Carter's application for injunctive relief. Thereafter Carter's claims in the district court were amended to include multiple causes of action relating to AgAmerica's foreclosure on the property.^[2]

Carter also filed a series of motions in the county court, including a request for written discovery, and an "Emergency Motion to Show Authority." Carter claimed that the latter motion was brought pursuant to Rule 12 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12 provides a mechanism for a party to challenge the authority of counsel to represent another party. Tex.R.Civ.P 12. However, rather than challenging counsel's authority to bring suit on behalf of AgAmerica, the "motion to show authority" challenged the factual basis for AgAmerica's claim to possession, alleging that the trustee's sale never took place.

Additionally, Carter filed a counterclaim petition in the county court, asserting causes of action for injunctive relief, together with a wide array of other contractual and tort theories centered on AgAmerica's alleged wrongdoing in repossessing the property. In response, AgAmerica filed a motion to dismiss Carter's claims. AgAmerica's motion was granted by the Honorable Stephanie Lynn Davis, the presiding judge, the day after it was filed.

Following the dismissal of her claims, Carter sought to recuse Judge Davis, in part on the grounds that she had acted with partiality when she granted AgAmerica's motion to dismiss without notice or a hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b. Following a hearing, the motion to recuse was denied by the Honorable Roy Sparkman, the judge that was sitting by assignment.

The eviction case was tried to a jury in April 2022. After the case was submitted, the jury rendered a verdict finding that AgAmerica had a superior right to immediate possession of the property and that Carter had committed a forceable detainer.

Following trial, the county court signed a judgment granting immediate possession of the property to AgAmerica. The judgment also awarded AgAmerica $120,000 for attorneys' fees, plus additional fees relating to potential, subsequent appeals.

Necessary Joinder/Jurisdiction

In her first and second issues, and as a part of her third issue, Carter asserts that the trial court should have dismissed the case and/or directed a verdict in her favor because Crockett, who also resides on the property, was not named in the eviction proceeding. Similarly, in her second issue, Carter maintains that this court does not have jurisdiction because Crockett is not a party.

A failure to join an indispensable party does not void a judgment because "there could rarely exist a party who is so indispensable that [their] absence would deprive the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties who are before the court." Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985); see also Jimenez v. McGeary, 542 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied). AgAmerica's failure to join Crockett in this case is no exception.

Because this was an eviction action, the only issue before the county court was whether AgAmerica had a superior right to immediate possession over and against Carter. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e) ("The court must adjudicate the right to actual possession and not title."); see also Jimenez, 542 S.W.3d at 812. It was not necessary for Crockett to be a party to the proceeding before the trial court proceeded to such a determination. For that reason, we overrule Carter's first and second issues, as well as the portion of Carter's third issue that concerns the joinder of Crockett.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Brazos Valley

In her fourth issue, Carter asserts that the trial court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over Brazos Valley.

"Generally, a party lacks standing to assert a due process violation based on improper service of another party." In re Guardianship of V.A., 390 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, pet. denied); Sw. Const. Receivables, Ltd. v. Regions Bank, 162 S.W.3d 859, 864 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied) ("Generally, only the entity that has not been properly served has standing to challenge the lack of due process."). Carter does not offer any reasons why the general principle should not apply in this instance. For example, Carter does not stand in a relationship with Brazos Valley that is similar to that of an insurance company and its insured. Sw. Const., 162 S.W.3d at 864 ("One exception to that general principle is that an insurance company may challenge the propriety of service as to the company's insured."). Additionally, because Brazos Valley has not filed an appeal, we cannot alter the judgment rendered against it. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c) ("A party who seeks to alter the trial court's judgment . . . must file a notice of appeal. . . . The appellate court may not grant a party who does not file a notice of appeal more favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause.").

Because Carter lacks standing to challenge the trial court's judgment against Brazos Valley, we overrule Carter's fourth issue.

Motions for Directed Verdict and New Trial

In her third issue, Carter complains that she was entitled to a directed verdict and/or a new trial because AgAmerica never provided a "reinstatement amount" on the loan, and because of her claim that the foreclosure sale of the property never took place. These complaints relate to factual matters that Carter attempted to introduce into evidence during trial. Those same facts were also central in her argument to the jury.

Carter's complaint relating to these matters is best characterized as a request to review the legal and factual sufficiency of the verdict in light of the evidence that Carter has described. Such circumstances would ordinarily compel us to proceed with an assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence based on a liberal construction of Carter's briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. However, in this instance, we do not conduct a sufficiency review because Carter has failed to preserve the issue.

In order to preserve an issue for review based on the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a party may, among other things, submit the complaint in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in a motion for new trial. Steves Sash & Door Co., Inc. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Tex. 1988); Tex. Animal Health Comm'n v. Miller, 850 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1993, writ denied). Similarly, to preserve an issue for review based on the factual sufficiency of the evidence, a party must submit the issue in a motion for new trial. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1)(B); Tex.R.Civ.P. 324(b); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1991).

Carter filed a document that was captioned as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and another document that was captioned in part as a motion for new trial. However, neither of these documents challenged the findings of the jury. Instead, they primarily contained complaints relating to the jurisdictional matters that we have already addressed. Accordingly, because Carter's motions did not call the trial court's attention to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury's findings, they did not operate to preserve error. See Sierra Club v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 188 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) ("[M]otions are judged by their substance rather than their titles.") (quoting City of McAllen v. Ramirez, 875 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1994, orig. proceeding)).

We overrule the remainder of Carter's third issue.

Evidentiary Rulings

In her fifth issue, Carter complains that the trial court erred when it refused to allow her to introduce documents into evidence. Similarly, in her ninth issue, Carter asserts that the trial court "erred in sustaining every objection raised by plaintiff and overruling every objection raised...