Carter v. Aramark

835 A.2d 262

153 Md. App. 210

Gail CARTER, et vir v. ARAMARK SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT SERVICES, INC., et al.

No. 2358, Sept. Term, 2001.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

November 6, 2003.

Marcia Stephenson (Norris C. Ramsey, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.

Robert H. Ingle, III (Kimberly S. Grimsley, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, L.L.C., on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, HOLLANDER and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Ret'd, Specially Assigned), JJ. RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR., Judge (Retired, Specially Assigned).

Appellants Gail Carter and her spouse appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's grant of summary judgment in this multi-count tort action in favor of both corporate and individual defendants, the appellees, and dismissing all of the counts in the Third Amended Complaint. The Carters sued Aramark Sports and Entertainment, Inc. (Aramark), and two individuals, Sabrina Knouse and David Milburn, bringing in their Third Amended Complaint allegations of malicious prosecution, interference with economic relations, abuse of process, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, aiding and abetting as to Ms. Knouse, as well as related counts for punitive damages and loss of consortium.

Issues

Appellants raise myriad issues in their appeal but, at bottom, they contest the circuit court's entry of summary judgment, which dismissed their complaint in its entirety. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court in all respects.

Summary Background and Course of Proceedings

This litigation has as its genesis certain events which took place on July 27, 1999. Appellant, Gail Carter, was employed as an usher by the Baltimore Orioles at the Oriole Park at Camden Yards Stadium for the 1999 baseball season, and was at work that day. Appellee Aramark supplies concession services to the stadium. Both Ms. Knouse, Aramark's human resources director, and Mr. Milburn, an Aramark security officer, also were working that day.¹

On that date, prior to the first pitch of the Oriole's game, Ms. Carter was accused of participating with an Aramark vender, Ruth Brunson, in a "scheme" to reuse discarded Styrofoam yogurt cups for the sale of frozen yogurt. According to the allegations, Ms. Carter would collect discarded Styrofoam and plastic "helmet" cups, take them home to wash them, and then return the items to Camden Yards for resale by Brunson.²

When certain Aramark managers became aware of rumors of this activity, they investigated. Ms. Brunson's yogurt stand was audited on the spot, an employee dispatched to a nearby women's restroom to look for a supposed cache of Styrofoam cups, and Ms. Carter was told to report to an Aramark office at the stadium where she was confronted by these allegations. She was immediately suspended by the Orioles pending an investigation.

The allegations of the scheme ripened into criminal charges, when a complaint, accusing Ms. Carter of theft, was filed by David Milburn, a Baltimore City Police Officer moonlighting with Aramark as a security officer. The criminal case went to trial in the district court after Ms. Carter refused an offer to have her case placed on the Stet docket. She was acquitted by the court on a motion for judgment of acquittal after the close of the State's case. In entering the acquittal, the district judge found:

Okay. I've taken a look at the State's Exhibit, these 50-or-so cups that Ms. Knouse introduced. Of course, I read the statement of charges and the application for the statement of charges, and I'm very curious about the circumstances of the case.

* * *

The Court finds that these cups are actually new.... But these cups are not used cups.

* * *

The statement of charges says, "did steal frozen yogurt of Aramark, Incorporated." The application for the statement of charges is filled with a great deal of speculation not proven in court today, indicates that the defendant, Ms. Ruth Brunson, would receive Styrofoam cups collected after a baseball event. Those cups were then taken home, presumably by Ms. Carter, washed out and the same—"washed out same and give cups to defendant to resell. As customers would approach Defendant Brunson, Defendant Brunson would fill the cups with frozen yogurt, property of Aramark, Incorporated, keep $3.25 for each cup of yogurt sold that way. After the event, defendant and codefendant would divide the profits."

Well, let's go it in reverse. We've never heard anything about commingling of monies between either of the defendants. That's an allegation that's not been proved. We've never [heard] anything about any cups being filled with any frozen yogurt, another allegation also not shown today.

We haven't heard anything about Ms. Carter having taken these cups home and/or washed those out, another allegation, again speculative, not shown by any testimony today.

We do have testimony, according to one witness, and that's Mr. Sachs, that he saw Ms. Carter with a sleeve of cups in a duffel bag. Those cups were given to Ms. Brunson, but they're not the theft of the cups, and I do believe that they are ARA cups, and I have a sneaking suspicion that something was under foot with these cups, but the defendant, both of them, are charged with having stolen frozen yogurt. I haven't heard anything whatsoever about frozen yogurt having been stolen. I do believe that that may have been the plan involved, and I think it's a legitimate suspicion or speculation on the part of the state, but there's not been one scoop of yogurt discussed in this case whatsoever, and the defendants have only been charged with having stolen yogurt.

It may very well have been their intention. Their intention also could equally have been to make some type of mobile out of the Styrofoam cups, although that's stretching it and certainly not my belief or speculation.

But suffice it to say, there's been no yogurt stolen in this case....

For that reason, I find both of you ladies not guilty of the offense.

In the wake of this acquittal, Ms. Carter filed the first of three complaints against these defendants in connection with the above events. After the usual pre-trial skirmishes, she lodged a "Third Amended Complaint" alleging all the above-referenced counts. Following a hearing on the defense's dispositive motion for summary judgment, the circuit court ruled in favor of Aramark on all counts. The court denied appellants' motion to reconsider.

Although appellants have framed a variety of issues, which will be addressed below, all their contentions on appeal implicate the propriety of the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to all counts of their Third Amended Complaint.

We will recite additional facts and procedural landmarks of this case as will be necessary for the resolution of the issues before us.

Discussion

I.

The logical starting point for our analysis, therefore, lies with the language from the Maryland Rule governing this manner of summary disposition. That Rule dictates that "[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Md. Rule 2-501(e). See Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665, 683, 824 A.2d 107 (2003); Sterling v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 145 Md.App. 161, 167, 802 A.2d 440, cert. denied, 371 Md. 264, 808 A.2d 808 (2002).

Our review over a circuit court's decision on summary judgment is plenary. Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 533, 826 A.2d 443 (2003); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 145 Md. App. 256, 282 n. 30, 802 A.2d 1070, cert. granted, 371 Md. 613, 810 A.2d 961 (2002), appeal dismissed, 374 Md. 81, 821 A.2d 369 (2003); Sterling, 145 Md.App. at 168, 802 A.2d 440. Pursuant to this de novo inquiry, we must discern whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists and will review the circuit court's legal conclusions for correctness. Hagley, 374 Md. at 683, 824 A.2d 107. "When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts, including all inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Sterling, 145 Md. App. at 167, 802 A.2d 440 (quoting Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 676, 766 A.2d 617 (2001)). Accord, Hemmings, 375 Md. at 535, 826 A.2d 443.

"`A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.'" Sterling, 145 Md. App. at 168, 802 A.2d 440 (quoting Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206 (2001) (quoting King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608, 614 (1985))). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). And, as Chief Judge Bell recently observed:

The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must produce admissible evidence to show that a genuine dispute of material fact, i.e., one "the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case," ... does exist.... This requires more than "general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision."

Hagley, 374 Md. at 684,824 A.2d 107 (citations omitted). Indeed, "`conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment[,]'" and an "`opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, spurious, irrelevant, gossamer inferences, conjectural, speculative, nor merely suspicions.'" Opals On Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 370 n. 3 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 n. 14 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.15(3) at 56-486 to 56-487 ...