Carter v. Gautreaux

WALTER CARTER v. SID J. GAUTREAUX, III, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION 19-105-SDD-EWD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

July 1, 2021

RULING

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss¹ filed by Defendant, CorrectHealth East Baton Rouge, LLC ("CorrectHealth"). Plaintiff Waiter Carter ("Plaintiff") filed an Opposition,² to which CorrectHealth filed a Reply.³ For the following reasons, CorrectHealth's Motion shall be granted in part and deferred in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court previously granted in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by CorrectHealth.⁴ Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint⁵ which CorrectHealth now moves to dismiss.⁶ The salient facts were described in the prior Ruling,⁷ but Plaintiff added some allegations to the Second Amended Complaint worth noting here.

Plaintiff entered East Baton Rouge Parish Prison ("EBRPP") on or about April 2, 2018 as a pre-trial detainee, and CorrectHealth conducted a medical screening on orabout April 4.⁸ Plaintiff alleges that he repeatedly requested medical attention for the fourth finger of his left hand on the date of his entry and over the next 17 days.⁹ Plaintiff claims that his finger was painful, swollen, tender, and emitting discharge.¹⁰ Somewhere between April 9 and April 12, Plaintiff underwent an x-ray on his finger in response to his complaints that he could not move it and thought it was broken.¹¹ He was offered over-the-counter medication.¹² By April 17, Plaintiff's condition had worsened as was noted during a "med pass," and while he was scheduled to receive treatment on that day, for whatever reason, he did not.¹³ Finally, on April 19, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center where he was diagnosed with a bone infection and his finger was amputated.¹⁴

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "[t]he 'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'"¹⁵ The Court may consider "the complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice."¹⁶ "Tosurvive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"¹⁷

In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court set forth the basic criteria necessary for a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."¹⁸ A complaint is also insufficient if it merely "tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'"¹⁹ However, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."²⁰ In order to satisfy the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show "more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully."²¹ "Furthermore, while the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it will not 'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.'"²² On a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."²³

B. Section 1983 Generally

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a private right of action forredressing the violation of federal law by those acting under color of state law.²⁴ It provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured....²⁵

"Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'"²⁶

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.²⁷ A § 1983 complainant must support his claim with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations.²⁸

C. Private Entity Liability under § 1983

"For a plaintiff to state a viable claim under § 1983 against any private defendant, the conduct of the private defendant that forms the basis of the claimed constitutional deprivation must constitute state action under color of law."²⁹

CorrectHealth does not dispute that it is a state actor. Accordingly, the Court will apply Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York.³⁰

D. Episodic-Acts-or-Omissions Claims

A plaintiff asserting an episodic-acts-or-omissions claim must show that appropriate medical care has been denied or delayed and that the state actor who denied or delayed care did so with "deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff's] serious medical needs."³¹ "Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet."³² It requires (1) knowledge that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious bodily harm, and (2) failure to take reasonable measures to abate the risk.³³ In the context of medical care, this may be met by showing that the defendant "'refused to treat [the plaintiff], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly,' or otherwise 'evince[d] a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.'"³⁴ Further, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind: "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."³⁵ "Mere negligence, neglect, or medical malpractice" does not constitute deliberate indifference,³⁶ nor does "gross negligence."³⁷ Rather, "subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law" is the appropriate standard for "deliberate indifference" under the Fourteenth Amendment.³⁸ The mere delay of medical care can also constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation but only "if there hasbeen deliberate indifference [that] results in substantial harm."³⁹

If a plaintiff establishes that an individual acted with deliberate indifference, and the plaintiff seeks to hold that individual's municipal actor-employer liable, the plaintiff must satisfy additional requirements. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must identify: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy (or custom)."⁴⁰ The definition of "policy" includes:

A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority.⁴¹

A policy sufficient to satisfy Monell can be found where there is "systemic maladministration of the laws."⁴² But Monell liability presupposes a "conscious adoption of a course of action" and requires a practice that is "so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law."⁴³

"Actual or constructive knowledge of [a] custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-making authority."⁴⁴ Elaborating on these requirements, the Fifth Circuit has stated:

Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as discussions at council meetings or receipt of written information. Constructive knowledge may be attributed to the governing body on the ground that it would have known ofthe violations if it had properly exercised its responsibilities, as, for example, where the violations were so persistent and widespread that they were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high degree of publicity.⁴⁵

Finally, "[t]o succeed [in alleging 'moving force' causation], 'a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.'"⁴⁶ "That is, 'the plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision.'"⁴⁷

Applying the law to the facts Plaintiff alleges, the Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations undermine his claim for deliberate medical indifference. Plaintiff alleges that, on or about April 4, he underwent a medical exam which noted swelling in finger.⁴⁸ He avers that several days later, medical staff saw Plaintiff again and ordered an x-ray, which was negative for broken bones, and provided him with over-the-counter medication.⁴⁹ CorrectHealth staff noted the condition of his finger again on April 17 during a "med pass."⁵⁰ He was transported to a hospital on April 19.⁵¹

CorrectHealth cites Morales v. McCulloh, another deliberate indifference case this Court recently decided.⁵² The plaintiff in Morales was a carrier of the Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus ("MRSA") virus, and she repeatedly informed prison officials ofthat diagnosis during her four-day incarceration.⁵³ On the first day of her incarceration, she was treated with an antibiotic ointment that...