Carter v. Marshall

John J. Carter et al. ^[1] v. John Marshall et al. ^[2]

No. SUCV200504398E

Superior Court of Massachusetts

March 27, 2009

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

March 24, 2009

MEMORANDUM AND DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Linda E. Giles, Justice.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs John J. Carter (" Carter"), Robert Monahan (" Monahan"), Tony B. Gaskins (" Gaskins") Samuel Correa (" Correa"), and MacArthur Denson (" Denson") (collectively, " plaintiffs") brought an action challenging the constitutionality of various conditions of their Departmental Disciplinary Unit (" DDU") confinement.^[3] They asserted that John Marshall (" Marshall"), acting superintendent of MCI Cedar Junction (" Cedar Junction"), and Lisa Mitchell (" Mitchell"), deputy superintendent of Cedar Junction (collectively, " defendants") violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving the plaintiffs of sugar, regular toothbrushes, and nail clippers.

The action is now before this court on the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment. Because the court considered matters outside the pleadings the defendants' motion was deemed to be one for summary judgment. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). After hearing, and for the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED; and the plaintiffs' cross motion is DENIED .

BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the summary judgment record reveals the following facts. The DDU at Cedar Junction was established in 1992 and is designed to house prisoners found guilty of committing the most serious disciplinary infractions while in the custody of the Department of Correction (" Department"), including assault on other prisoners or prison staff. Prisoners may be sentenced to the DDU for up to ten years. See 103 Code Mass Regs. § 430.25(1)(f) (2006). All the plaintiffs have all been sentenced to the Cedar Junction DDU and remain on DDU status.^[4]

Prior to 2004, two policies were implemented in the DDU to prevent prisoners from using certain items as weapons or escape tools. One policy prohibited the use of regular toothbrushes by DDU prisoners and replaced them with " thumb-grip toothbrushes" approximately two inches in length. The other prohibited DDU prisoners from using nail clippers, substituting emery boards. Beginning in September 2005, a new policy prohibited DDU prisoners from using sugar with their food. Instead, prisoners were given Sugar Twin, a sugar substitute containing saccharin. The policy was intended to prevent prisoners from making " homebrew, " an alcoholic beverage that can be made from sugar but not saccharin.

Carter, Gaskins, and Denson are Muslims, whose faith prohibits them from knowingly ingesting " poisonous" foods and requires them to groom their nails. Due to the no-sugar policy, the plaintiffs have not been eating several of the breakfast items served to them in the DDU, including oatmeal and cold cereal. All of the plaintiffs have abstained from eating these food items because they claim that such foods require sugar as a condiment and that the saccharin in Sugar Twin causes cancer, rendering the breakfasts inedible because " poisonous" (to the Muslim plaintiffs) or harmful to their health (to all the plaintiffs). Monahan and Correa also allegedly require sugar to help them digest certain foods because they are lactose intolerant. The plaintiffs claim to have lost weight as a result of their not eating certain breakfast items. Since implementation of the policy banning nail clippers and replacing them with emery boards, Carter and Correa allegedly have experienced ingrown toenails; Monahan's nails cut into his skin; and Denson was treated for and continues to have an infected toenail.^[5]

In October 2005, the plaintiffs commenced this action, seeking equitable relief from the three policies described above and monetary damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The plaintiffs cross moved for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is properly granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Nashua Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 420 Mass. 196, 202, 648 N.E.2d 1272 (1995); Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422, 456 N.E.2d 1123 (1983); Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating affirmatively the absence of a triable issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17, 532 N.E.2d 1211 (1989). This burden may be met by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of its case at trial. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991). " If the moving party establishes the absence of a trial issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat [the motion]." Pederson, 404 Mass. at 17. Furthermore, in determining whether a genuine issue of material facts exists, the court must draw all inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Attorney Gen. v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 371, 436 N.E.2d 139 (1982).

II. Analysis

The plaintiffs claim that the deprivations of sugar, regular toothbrushes, and nail clippers constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as applied to Massachusetts via the Fourteenth Amendment. " The Constitution 'does not mandate comfortable prisons, ' but neither does it permit inhumane ones . . ." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Prison officials must provide prisoners with " adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.' " Id., quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).

To prove that the want of sugar, regular toothbrushes, and nail clippers each constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiffs must show that (1) the deprivations present a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2) Marshall and Mitchell acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' health or safety in carrying out the deprivations. See Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 613-14, 695 N.E.2d 200 (1998), citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); see also Sabree v. Conley, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 901, 904, 815 N.E.2d 280 (2004). " [R]estrictive and even harsh" conditions may not violate constitutional principles, but conditions that " involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or are " grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime" are considered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Libby v. Commissioner of Correction, 385 Mass. 421, 431, 432 N.E.2d 486 (1982), quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346, 347. Whether prison conditions are sufficiently harmful to establish an Eighth Amendment violation is a legal question for the court. See Torres, 427 Mass. at 614.

Based on an analysis of each of the three challenged policies and on the judicial deference generally granted to prison policies, this court concludes that the policies are valid and constitutional.^[6] See Libby, 385 Mass. at 431, quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (" [P]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline . . .").

A. Whether the Deprivation of Sugar Violates the Eighth Amendment

The plaintiffs' claim that the no-sugar policy and the substitution of Sugar Twin violates the Eighth Amendment is based on their assertion that Sugar Twin, which contains saccharin, causes cancer. Carter, Gaskins, and Denson also assert that, as Muslims, they are prohibited from intentionally ingesting so-called " poisonous" foods. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, they cannot use Sugar Twin and consequently cannot eat most of the breakfast items served in the DDU, because, in their view, those items--which include oatmeal, grits, and cold cereal--require the use of sugar. Therefore, they assert that they are being deprived of adequate food, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment places limits on the privation of adequate food in prisons because such want may rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See Cooper v. Sheriff Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991) (characterizing deprivation of adequate food as " form of corporal punishment"). It is clear, however, that the defendants have not deprived the plaintiffs of adequate food simply by implementing the policy that requires DDU prisoners to use a saccharin product, not sugar. First, the plaintiffs do not submit any affirmative evidence to support their assertion that saccharin causes cancer, as is required by the summary judgment standard. See Pederson, 404 Mass. at 17. Second, even if the plaintiffs could show...