Carter v. Prison Dir.

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SAMUEL CARTER, #A0247045, Plaintiff, v. PRISON DIRECTOR, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 23-00204 DKW-RT

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

May 25, 2023

ORDER DISMISSING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND

DERRICK K WATSON, CHIEF, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Samuel Carter's Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.^[1] ECF No. 1. Carter alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him with two inmates who should have been quarantined due to COVID, and his First Amendment rights by failing to investigate his reason for not submitting a timely grievance.^[2] Id. at 5-7. After conducting the required screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with partial leave to amend. If Carter wants this action to proceed, he must file an amended pleading that cures the noted deficiencies in his claims on or before June 16, 2023. In the alternative, Carter may inform the Court in writing on or before June 16, 2023 that he would like to voluntarily dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), in which case such a dismissal will not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

I. STATUTORY SCREENING

The Court must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, or in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007) (“Among other reforms, the [Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] mandates early judicial screening of prisoner complaints.”). During this screening, the Court must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)-(b)).

Screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.

In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants' pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, however, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).

II. BACKGROUND^[3]

On or about September 19, 2022, two inmates moved into a cell that Carter had been sharing with one other inmate. ECF No. 1 at 5. According to Carter, the two new inmates moved into his cell four days before their COVID quarantine periods had ended. Id. On the same day, Carter tested positive for COVID-19.

ECF No. 1-1 at 1.^[4] According to Carter, he contracted the virus from one or both of his new cellmates. ECF No. 1 at 5.

Carter asked a “workline” inmate for a grievance form on September 19, 2022. ECF No. 1 at 7. The inmate told Carter that no grievance forms were available. Id.

Carter signed the Complaint on April 28, 2023, and the Court received it on May 5, 2023. Id. at 8. Carter alleges that unnamed “officers on duty” violated his Eighth Amendment rights by housing him with inmates before their quarantine periods ended. Id. at 5. He further alleges that the “Warden” and “Prison Director” failed to “implement a successful isolation plan.” Id. at 6. Finally, Carter alleges that an unnamed “grievance officer” violated his First Amendment rights by “failing to investigate [his] valid excuse” for not filing a timely grievance form. Id. at 7. Carter seeks $700,000 in damages. Id. at 8.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of' law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.'” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).

B. Eleventh Amendment

Carter seeks only money damages, but he names in both their individual and official capacities the OCCC's warden and two unidentified officers. ECF No. 1 at 2, 8. Carter also names as a defendant the DPS Director, but he does not say whether that official is named in his individual or official capacity. ECF No. 1 at 1.

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-03 (1984). It does not bar official-capacity suits against state officials for prospective relief to enjoin alleged ongoing violations of federal law. See Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989). Nor does it bar suits for damages against state officials in their personal capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 491 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because Carter seeks only money damages in this action, any claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, therefore, are DISMISSED with prejudice. See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.”). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar Carter's claims for money damages against Defendants in their individual capacities.

C. Causation

In Count I, Carter alleges that two unnamed officers violated the Eighth Amendment by moving two inmates into his cell four days before their quarantine periods ended. ECF No. 1 at 5 -6. On the same day that the inmates moved into Carter's cell, he tested positive for COVID. Id. at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 1.

“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1150 (9th Cir. 2020) (same). “To meet this causation requirement, the plaintiff must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” Harper, 533 F.3d at 1026. A defendant's “conduct is an actual cause of . . . injury only if the injury would not have occurred ‘but for' that conduct.” White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “The proximate cause question asks whether the unlawful conduct is closely enough tied to the injury that it makes sense to hold the defendant legally responsible for the injury.” Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2018). “Proximate cause is said to depend on whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he touchstone of proximate cause in a § 1983 action is foreseeability.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

According to Carter, he tested positive for COVID-19 on the same day that the two inmates moved into his cell. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Carter has not plausibly alleged, however, that moving the two inmates into his cell was the actual cause of his COVID infection. Carter does not allege that either of the new inmates ever tested positive for the virus and, if they did, when this occurred. Although Carter submitted a laboratory report stating that his test sample was collected at 9:15 a.m. on the morning of September 19, 2022, nothing suggests that Carter was exposed to the new inmates before that time. Id. Indeed, Carter does not say what time the two inmates moved into his cell or how long he was exposed to them. Moreover, Carter does not say if and when he was ever in close contact with other inmates, prison staff, or contractors who may have exposed him to the virus. Carter's claims in Count I, therefore, cannot proceed and are DISMISSED, albeit with leave to amend.

D. Supervisory Liability

In Count II, Carter alleges that two supervisory officials-that is, the DPS Director and OCCC Warden-violated the Eighth Amendment by “fail[ing] to implement a successful isolation plan to keep inmates from catching the COVID-19 virus.” ECF No. 1 at 6.

There is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Vazquez v....