Carter v. Rivershell Apartments, LLC

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CEDRIC CARTER, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSHELL APARTMENTS, LLC, et. al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-263

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

July 10, 2023

Hon Janet T. Neff, Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PHILLIP J. GREEN, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 93, 94). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motions be granted and this action terminated.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on March 22, 2021, against Connie Roberts and Rivershell Apartments, LLC. (ECF No. 1). On December 15, 2021, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add three additional defendants: (1) AndMark Investment Fund IV LLC; (2) AndMark Rivershell Apartments, LLC; and (3) Beztak Management Company. (ECF No. 44). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following.

Plaintiff suffers from numerous “serious health conditions” and “disabilities,” which “render him wheelchair bound.” He receives Section 8 housing subsidies, as well as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income benefits. On or about January 25, 2019, Plaintiff signed a lease to reside at Rivershell Apartments. Prior to executing this lease, Plaintiff informed “Defendants” that he required a “wheelchair accessible ramp to be able to access his rental unit.” Plaintiff also disclosed that he required the assistance of “support animals.”

Plaintiff took possession of his apartment in February 2019. Defendants thereafter failed to install a wheelchair accessible ramp. Habitat for Humanity later agreed to install a ramp provided Rivershell provide “proof of insurance.” Rivershell refused, however, to provide this information.

To enter his apartment, Plaintiff must maneuver his wheelchair “hundreds of feet on unpaved common areas, hoist himself from his wheelchair and drag himself (or be carried) to and through his patio sliding glass door.” Plaintiff was forced to leave his motorized wheelchair outdoors where it was damaged. Plaintiff is unable to retrieve his mail and is “essentially a prisoner in his apartment.”

On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights alleging “disability discrimination.” After filing this complaint, “Defendants” retaliated against Plaintiff by “threatening to evict” him, ignoring Plaintiff's complaints regarding “neighbor misbehavior,” selectively applying Rivershell's rules against him, and informing another resident that Plaintiff had submitted a noise complaint against him. The resident against whom Plaintiff made the noise complaint later “physically attacked” Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against him and, moreover, failed to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Rehabilitation Act, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Defendants now move for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to these motions.^[1] The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).

A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the nonmoving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party's position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).

While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant probative evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.” Harden, 2021 WL 1257802 at *4.

ANALYSIS

I. Rehabilitation Act (Counts I and II)

The Rehabilitation Act seeks to “combat discrimination against disabled individuals.” M.J. by and through S.J. v. Akron City School District Board of Education, 1 F.4th 436, 452 (6th Cir. 2021). Specifically, the Rehabilitation Act provides that “a qualified individual with a disability shall not, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Ibid. quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, one of the elements Plaintiff must establish to prevail on his Rehabilitation Act claims is that Defendants were receiving federal financial assistance. See Doe v. Salvation Army, 531 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff's rent is paid using Section 8 subsidies or vouchers does not make any of the present Defendants recipients of federal funds. See, e.g., Reyes v. Fairfield Properties, 661 F.Supp.2d 249, 263-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (under the Rehabilitation Act, “an entity or person who receives housing assistance payments under a housing assistance payments program or a voucher program is not a ‘recipient' of federal financial assistance”) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 8.3).

Defendants have submitted evidence that the Rivershell Apartments are owned by AndMarkRivershell Apartments, LLC, which “does not receive federal funding as that term is defined by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” (ECF No. 95-2, PageID.622). In response, Plaintiff advances two arguments, neither of which are persuasive.

Plaintiff first asserts that, if Defendants received Covid Emergency Relief Assistance, such would make them recipients of federal funds. Plaintiff has failed to identify any authority that supports this argument. Even if such authority existed, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any Defendant received Covid Emergency Relief Assistance. This argument is, therefore, rejected.

Plaintiff next argues that “Defendants' use of Habitat for Humanity for the building of ramps on their property” constitutes the receipt by Defendants of federal funds. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to 24 C.F.R. § 8.3, which provides, in part, that an entity “to which Federal financial assistance is extended for any program or activity directly or through another recipient” is considered, for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, a recipient of federal funds.

Plaintiff interprets this language as standing for the proposition that if an entity employs a recipient of federal funds to perform a discreet task such transforms the employing entity into a recipient of federal funds. Plaintiff has identified no authority supporting this interpretation. Regardless, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Habitat for Humanity is a recipient of federal funds or that federal funds were utilized to perform any work for Defendants. Accordingly, this argument is likewise rejected. In sum, and for the reasons articulated above, the undersigned finds that all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims.

II. Fair Housing Amendments Act (Counts I & II)

Plaintiff asserts three claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), discrimination, retaliation, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation, each of which is analyzed below.

A. Count I

In Count I of his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FHAA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' conduct violated four separate statutory provisions: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); (2) 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); (3) 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1); and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). But, rather than identify the specific conduct which allegedly violated his rights, Plaintiff merely asserts that “Defendants discriminated against and retaliated against [him] in the ways set forth above.”

The Court interprets this vague statement as asserting the following claims: (1) Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by refusing to allow him to install, at his expense, a ramp and by refusing to make the modifications necessary to enable Plaintiff to...