Carter v. State

JASON NATHANIEL CARTER v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 290

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

April 2, 2018

HEADNOTES:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REASONABLE LENGTH OF DETENTION FOR TRAFFIC STOP

Where law enforcement officer had not completed citations for traffic violations by the time a canine search produced a positive alert to the presence of a controlled dangerous substance, and officer did not delay in processing the traffic citations, the traffic stop was still ongoing at the time of the canine search. The officer's temporary pauses from processing the traffic citations to brief other officers and to ask the driver to exit the vehicle so that the canine scan could take place neither constituted abandonment of, nor impermissibly delayed, the traffic stop.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROBABLE CAUSE - SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST

Search met the requirements of the search incident to arrest exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches where the positive alert of a drug-sniffing canine on the appellant's automobile provided probable cause to arrest and the search of his person was essentially contemporaneous with his arrest.

CRIMINAL LAW - MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, DISPENSING, OR POSSESSION OF SPECIFIED AMOUNTS OF CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES - ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

To establish a violation of § 5-612 of the Criminal Law Article, the plain language of the statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or possessed one of the specified controlled dangerous substances; (2) in the requisite quantity established by the statute. The offense does not require an intent to distribute.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - INTERPRETIVE WEIGHT OF CAPTIONS AND CATCHLINES

In determining the meaning of a statute, we look to the language of the statute itself, not a caption or catchline. Captions or catchlines, whether added by the General Assembly or by publishers, have no interpretive weight.

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 124874

REPORTED

Graeff, Fader, Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Fader, J.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the appellant, Jason Nathaniel Carter, of possession of crack cocaine and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine,¹ but acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Mr. Carter challenges the circuit court's: (1) denial of his motion to suppress more than 70 grams of crack cocaine and more than three grams of cocaine that police seized from him during a traffic stop; and (2) refusal to instruct the jury that "intent to distribute" is an element of the offense of possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.² We find no error in the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress or in its jury instruction, and so affirm.

BACKGROUND

In a challenge to a ruling on a motion to suppress, we are limited to considering the facts presented at the motions hearing, Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648, 659 (2002), and we must view those facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, Belote v. State, 411 Md. 104, 120 (2009). Our discussion of background facts adheres to both of these principles.

In the early morning hours of April 4, 2014, Montgomery County Patrol Officer Michael Mancuso observed a car being driven by Mr. Carter fail to make a complete stop at a stop sign while driving in a high-crime area known for drug activity. Officer Mancusofollowed the car, pacing its speed at approximately 48 miles per hour in a 40 miles-per-hour zone. At approximately 12:52 a.m., Officer Mancuso pulled Mr. Carter over and obtained his license and registration. Mr. Carter displayed signs of being extremely nervous.

Officer Mancuso returned to his car at 12:57 a.m. and promptly: (1) requested a K-9 unit to conduct a scan for narcotics; and (2) ran a records check, which revealed that Mr. Carter's license was valid and that he did not have any outstanding warrants. Officer Mancuso estimated that it took him approximately eight-to-ten minutes to perform the various license and records checks. At 1:00 a.m., after the records check was complete, Officer Mancuso opened the electronic system to write Mr. Carter warning citations for both the failure to stop and speeding violations.³ From that point, it "probably took about five to seven minutes" to write the citations. During that same time, Officer Mancuso also briefed another officer, Officer Gary Finch, who had arrived on the scene at approximately 1:02 a.m.

Officer Jason Buhl of the K-9 unit, along with Konner, his drug-sniffing dog, arrived on scene at 1:07 a.m. At that time, Officer Mancuso had not yet finished writing the citations. At approximately 1:09 a.m., after he had briefed Officer Buhl, Officer Mancuso ordered Mr. Carter out of his car and to stand behind the patrol car so that the canine scancould proceed. Within 15-20 seconds, Konner alerted to the presence of narcotics on the driver's seat of Mr. Carter's car.

After a search of the car yielded nothing illegal, Officer Michael Murphy conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Carter. After Officer Murphy noticed an unnatural bulge in the area of Mr. Carter's groin, Mr. Carter became combative. It took all four officers to place Mr. Carter in handcuffs. The search ultimately produced two plastic baggies containing more than 70 grams of crack cocaine and three grams of cocaine. The officers then placed Mr. Carter under arrest.

Mr. Carter moved to suppress the drugs. After a hearing at which Officers Mancuso and Buhl, along with Mr. Carter, testified, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County made findings of fact, including:

• Upon returning to his vehicle, Officer Mancuso "promptly" called for the K-9 unit and initiated the records checks (including license, warrant, and case search).

• Officer Buhl and Konner "arrived before Officer Mancuso had finished writing the tickets."

• Mr. Carter "was removed from his vehicle so the canine search could be conducted."

• The drug-sniffing dog "more or less immediately alerted."

• "[T]here was no delay, intentional or otherwise, by the stopping officer between the time he began questioning the driver at 12:51:57 and 1:00am."

• "[T]here was no delay by the stopping officer between 1:00am and 1:07:19am when the canine officer arrived."

• This is not a case where the officer engaged in delay and "dilly dallied waiting for the canine officer. That's not this case."

• "[T]here was no delay. This was ordinary course."

The court also concluded that the search was "incident to [Mr. Carter's] arrest," and so denied the motion to suppress.

Mr. Carter was tried before a Montgomery County jury on charges of possession of crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. At the conclusion of a three-day jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury that to convict Mr. Carter of the crime of possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, which the court referred to as "volume dealer," the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Carter "possessed 50 grams of crack cocaine." The trial court rejected Mr. Carter's contention that the jury should also be instructed that "volume dealer" required the State to prove that Mr. Carter intended to distribute the crack cocaine. The jury acquitted Mr. Carter of possession with intent to distribute, but convicted him of both simple possession and possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced Mr. Carter to the mandatory minimum sentence of five years' incarceration for possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.

DISCUSSION

I. THE MOTIONS COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MR. CARTER'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

Mr. Carter argues that the suppression court's ruling must be reversed for two reasons. First, he contends that Officer Mancuso lacked reasonable suspicion to authorize what was effectively a second stop to investigate potential drug activity. Mr. Carter concedes that Officer Mancuso had probable cause to detain him for the traffic offenses. But he contends that Officer Mancuso abandoned that traffic stop when he paused fromwriting Mr. Carter's citations to assist Officer Buhl with the canine search. Thus, Mr. Carter reasons, the traffic stop ended at that point and Officers Mancuso and Buhl needed reasonable suspicion of drug activity to proceed with the canine search. Second, Mr. Carter argues that Officer Mancuso's search of his person was not incident to arrest because Mr. Carter was not yet arrested, and there was no indication that he would be arrested, until after the drugs were found.

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the suppression court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Holt v. State, 435 Md. 443, 457 (2013); Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498 (2007). We only consider the facts presented at the motions hearing, Nathan, 370 Md. at 659, and we view those facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, Belote, 411 Md. at 120. "[W]e review the hearing judge's legal conclusions de novo, making our own independent constitutional evaluation as to whether the officer's encounter with the defendant was lawful." Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 362 (2017). Each of these encounters is unique, and our review looks to the totality of the circumstances on the specific facts of the case before us. Id. at 363; Belote, 411 Md. at 120.

A. The Original Traffic Stop Was Ongoing When the Canine Alert Occurred.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." The Court of Appeals has generallyinterpreted Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to provide the same protections as the Fourth Amendment. Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 465...