Carter v. White

1

CHARLES KENZELL CARTER, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN RICK WHITE, et al., Defendants.

No. 7:21-cv-00484

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division

June 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael F. Urbanski, Chief United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Charles Kenzell Carter, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is a Wyoming inmate housed within the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact contract between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Wyoming. On September 8, 2022, Carter filed an amended complaint against ten defendants, asserting violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as violations of state law. Nine of the defendants- Warden Rick White, Regional Administrator Carl Manis, Hearing Officer K.D. Ramey, Hearing Officer J. Adams, Lt. M.J. Williams, Sgt. Bentley, Harold Clarke, Kyle Rosch, and the VDOC (collectively, the “VDOC defendants”)-have filed a partial motion to dismiss to which Carter has responded. ECF Nos. 48 and 53. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, and the claims asserted against the tenth defendant, Correctional Officer P. Maggard, are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

I. Background

Carter is incarcerated at Red Onion State Prison. His amended complaint stems from a series of incidents that occurred at that facility in 2021. The court will summarize each incident and the corresponding claims in turn.

A. Placement in Ambulatory Restraints

Carter first alleges that on June 3, 2021, Sgt. Bentley intentionally placed him in ambulatory restraints that were so tight that he suffered “lasting pain and physical bruises” to his upper and lower extremities. Am. Compl., ECF No. 46, at 4. Carter also alleges that Bentley threw him into a cell where he was forced to urinate while lying on the floor. Id. at 4-5. When a supervisor instructed Bentley to reapply the leg restraints, Bentley claimed that he could not get the key to work. Id. at 5-6. Carter alleges that Bentley “left the shackles tight, forcing [him] to remain and endure physical pain and tightness of the restraints [as they] cut into [his] flesh.” Id. at 6.

Based on these allegations, Carter claims that Bentley used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Claims 1 and 2). Id. at 12-13. Carter also asserts a claim of negligence under Virginia law (Claim 7).

B. Disciplinary Charges

Carter next alleges that Bentley charged him with intentionally destroying state property (Disciplinary Offense 111A) on June 4, 2021. Id. at 7. Carter asserts that Hearing Officer Ramey found him guilty of the charge and imposed a fine of $15.00. Bentley also charged Carter with spitting or throwing bodily fluids (Disciplinary Offense 124). Carter alleges that he accepted a penalty offer of $10.00 for that offense, which was deducted from his spending account by Hearing Officer J. Adams. Id. at 9.

On July 17, 2021, Correctional Officer Maggard charged Carter with aiding and abetting to commit murder (Disciplinary Offense 100/198). Id. Carter alleges that Maggard “was unlawfully in possession of contraband (chewing tobacco)” at the time he issued the charge. Id. On July 17, 2021, Carter “accepted the penalty that was offered by [Lt.] M.J. Williams of loss of all special good time.” Id. at 10.

Carter asserts a variety of claims based on the foregoing allegations. In Claim 3, Carter asserts that Ramey, Adams, and the VDOC violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”) contract by imposing “a penalty that exceeds the amount allowed under Wyoming Disciplinary laws.” Id. at 13. In Claim 4, Carter asserts that Ramey, Adams, and Williams violated the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing “a penalty of loss of all good time.” Id. at 14. In Claim 5, Carter asserts that Ramey, Adams, and the VDOC violated the Fourteenth Amendment by deducting disciplinary fines from his spending account. Id. In Claim 6, Carter asserts that Maggard violated the Fourteenth Amendment by possessing chewing tobacco during the course of issuing a disciplinary charge against Carter. Id.

C. Catch-All Claim

Carter's amended complaint also contains a catch-all claim. In Claim 8, Carter seeks to recover for “[a]ny and all claims, causes, and arguments not specifically and/or artfully raised in the amended complaint.” Id. at 15.

II. Standard of Review

The VDOC defendants have moved to dismiss Claims 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.^[1]They also argue that Claim 6, asserted against Correctional Officer Maggard, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (granting authority to sua sponte dismiss any claim brought by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (granting authority to sua sponte dismiss any claim brought with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff's allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While a complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations,” merely offering “labels and conclusions,” “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

Where, as here, a complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). “Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). A pro se complaint “must still ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Sakyi v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 770 Fed.Appx. 113, 113 (4th Cir 2019) (quoting Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014)).

III. Discussion

A. Claims under § 1983

Carter filed suit against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of state law, deprives another person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff ‘must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'” Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011)).

Carter seeks relief under § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Without a protected liberty or property interest, a plaintiff “cannot invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Claims 3 and 5

The due process claims asserted in Claims 3 and 5 arise from the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the imposition of a fine of $15.00 and a fine of $10.00. Carter alleges that he has a liberty interest in the application of Wyoming disciplinary procedures and that the disciplinary fines were imposed and deducted in a manner that violated Wyoming law. See Am. Compl. at 8.

“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Nonetheless, “constitutional procedural due process protections extend to prison disciplinary proceedings that could adversely impact an inmate's liberty interests.” Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 268 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555). “In the carceral context, a prisoner claiming a violation of his right to procedural due process must show: (1) that there is a state statute, regulation, or policy that creates such a liberty interest, and (2) that the denial of such an interest imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“While neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has specified the threshold at which the Due Process Clause is implicated when it comes to monetary fines, several Judges in this district have held that small fines routinely assessed at disciplinary hearings do not trigger federal due process...