Cartwright v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

NAKENYA CARTWRIGHT PLAINTIFF v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY;STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES;and VALERIE SPROULL DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-cv-00057-GHD-JMV

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION

December 8, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND

Presently before this Court is Plaintiff's motion to remand the ease to state court [11]. Upon due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied in part and granted in part based on the following reasoning.

A. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 26, 2014, Plaintiff Nakenkya Cartwright ("Plaintiff) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, First Judicial District, against Defendants State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Insurance Companies ("State Farm"),¹ as well as Defendant Valerie Sproull ("Defendant Sproull") (collectively, "Defendants") to recover for injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained as the result of an automobile accident. Plaintiff alleges that she was a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Defendant Sproull when Defendant Sproull proximately caused an accident by "traveling at excessive speed, fail[ing] to keep a proper look out, and fail[ing] to control her vehicle[,] among relatedacts of negligence." Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2] ¶¶ 7, 9. Plaintiff further alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the subject accident she suffered serious and permanent bodily injuries, which required extensive medical treatment. Id. ¶ 10. In addition, Plaintiff's complaint presents claims for breach of contract, negligence, breach of legal duties, and related liability against State Farm, her under-insured motorist insurance carrier. See id. ¶¶ 13, 17, Plaintiff avers that despite notifying State Farm of the subject accident and her claims for damages and injuries suffered as a result, State Farm failed to pay Plaintiff benefits owed under her insurance policy, failed to promptly and adequately investigate the claims made by Plaintiff and perform duties under the policy/contract, failed to comply with the terms of the subject policy/contract, and committed other breaches of contract and failure to perform. Id. ¶¶ 12-17. Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants "in no amount less than $200,000.00." Id. ¶ 17.

On April 21, 2014, State Farm filed a notice of removal [1] on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Defendant Sproull did not join in the notice of removal. Subsequently, all Defendants filed answers to the complaint. On May 7, 2014, State Farm filed a motion to sever [9] Plaintiff's claims against State Farm from those against Defendant Sproull; remand the case against Defendant Sproull, if necessary; and permit the claims against State Farm to go forward in federal district court. On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present motion to remand the entire case to state court on the basis of lack of diversity jurisdiction. State Farm filed a response. Plaintiff filed a reply. The matter is now ripe for review.

B. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Epps v. Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Cnties. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 665 F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 1982). A case may be remanded upon a motion filed within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal on any defectexcept subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time by any party or sua sponte by the district court. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. PICC Prop. & Cas. Co., 328 F. App'x 946, 947 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

The removal statute provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The "removal statutes are to be construed strictly against removal and for remand." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S. Ct. 868, 85 L. Ed. 1214 (1941); Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir. 1996). The party who seeks to remove the case to federal court bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000)).

C. Discussion

Federal diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants and an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff contends that removal is improper and remand is warranted because the amount in controversy is less than $75,000 and complete diversity of citizenship does not exist between Plaintiff and Defendants.

1. Amount in Controversy

First, Plaintiff contends that removal is not appropriate because the jurisdictional amount in controversy is likely not met. State Farm argues in response that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met by Plaintiff's prayer for relief, including her specific prayer for damages for "willful conduct and reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff," see Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2] ¶ 17, which State Farm maintains would provide grounds for an award of punitive damages under state law. In addition, State Farm maintains that Plaintiff has failed either to admit or stipulate that she will not accept more than $75,000 in damages and that the amount-in-controversy requirement is met by the $150,000 in stacked uninsured motorist coverage provided by the six automobile policies under which Plaintiff seeks recovery.

Removing defendants who seek to establish diversity jurisdiction must allege that the jurisdictional amount in controversy is met, that is, that "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs[.]" See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The amount in controversy is determined at the time of removal. Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). If a defendant establishes "by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount," a plaintiff may defeat removal only by establishing to a legal certainty that his or her recovery will not exceed the statutory threshold. In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 387 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs "who want to prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaints . . . ." De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1412 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Courts generally begin the amount-in-controversy analysis by " 'look[ing] only to the face of the complaint and ask[ing] whether the amount in controversy exceeds' the jurisdictionalthreshold." Ervin v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 364 F. App'x 114, 117 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1996)). Pertinent to the amount-in-controversy analysis, Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the amount of relief sought, with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees, costs and expenses, would be "in no event an amount less than $200,000.00." Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2] ¶ 17. Keeping in mind that interest, attorney's fees, and costs are not to be considered in the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy analysis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the Court notes that Plaintiff has not parsed her prayer for relief to specify the amount of damages sought exclusive of interest and costs. Nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, it is "facially apparent" from Plaintiff's complaint that her claims exceed the jurisdictional amount.

In her complaint, Plaintiff seeks the following relief from Defendants:

[f]ull and complete payment, reimbursement, compensation[,] and satisfaction for any and all injuries, losses[,] and damages suffered as the result of the subject accident with [Defendant] Sproull and payments under any and all insurance policies/contracts with [State Farm] and all related damages which resulted from any breach of legal duty, breach of contract, negligence, willful conduct[,] and reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff.

Pl.'s State-Ct. Compl. [2] ¶ 17. Plaintiff specifically seeks "[p]ast, present[,] and future medical expenses; [p]ast, present[,] and future lost wages and loss of wage[-]earning capacity; [p]ast, present[,] and future emotional distress; [p]ast, present[,] and future pain and suffering; and [o]ther damages which will [be] fully proven at trial." Id. ¶11. In addition, although Plaintiff's complaint does not explicitly state that she seeks "punitive damages" or that State Farm acted with "bad faith," the complaint does assert that State Farm "wrongfully, negligently[,] and carelessly failed to honor [its] obligations under their insurance policies/contracts and failed to pay Plaintiff benefits owed to her," id. ¶ 12; "wrongfully, negligently[,] and recklessly failed topay [Plaintiff's] medical expenses incurred" which is "a clear disregard for the rights of [Plaintiff]," id. ¶ 15 (emphases added); and that Plaintiff seeks damages for "willful conduct and reckless [dis]regard for the rights of Plaintiff," id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). These allegations support a punitive damages claim under Mississippi law. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1 )(a)-(b) (punitive damages may be awarded if compensatory damages are awarded and claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that defendant "acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a...