Cary v. Ne. Ill. Reg'l Commuter R.R.

COUNTESS CARY, Plaintiff, v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION d/b/a METRA RAIL, Defendant.

Case No. 19 C 03014

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

March 22, 2020

Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Countess Cary used to work for the Chicago-area suburban railroad company known as Metra. She was the Senior Director of EEO and Diversity Initiatives for Metra, but alleges that her former employer engaged in a campaign of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation against her after a leadership change in September 2015. This persistent harassment allegedly caused Cary to develop an anxiety disorder that left her temporarily unable to work. After Cary returned from medical leave, Metra allegedly forced her to quit. Cary then filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et. seq., the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, 740 ILCS 23/1 et. seq., the Illinois Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174 et. seq., and Illinois common law. R. 1, Compl.¹ Metra has moved to dismiss all the claims. R. 19,Mot. Dismiss. For the reasons explained below, Metra's motion is granted as to the disparate treatment and retaliatory discharge claims, but is otherwise denied.²

I. Background

For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the allegations in the Complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Countess Cary is an African American woman who worked for Metra from 1998 until October 2018. Compl. ¶ 1. Metra first recruited Cary in 1998 to serve as its Director of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Employee Relations. Id. ¶ 6. In 2009, she was promoted to Senior Director of EEO and Diversity Initiatives. Id.

Around September 2015, Metra hired Michael D. Jones as its new Chief Human Resources Officer, despite allegations that he had engaged in discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while employed at Dallas Area Rapid Transit. Compl. ¶ 7. Metra's Human Resources department deemed Jones unqualified, and likewise, the outgoing-Chief HR Officer, Brenda Smith, rejected his candidacy. Id. Nonetheless, Metra's CEO directed Smith to interview Jones for the job. Id. ¶ 8. When Cary then tried to intervene in Jones's hire through her role as EEO Officer—citing a Federal Transit Administration Circular requirement that she concur in hires and promotions—she was blocked by Metra's Deputy Executive Director. Id. Metra then hired Jones without the full vetting or participation of either Human Resources or the EEO Officer (that is, Cary). Id. ¶ 9.

As the new Chief HR Officer, Jones was hostile to Cary and her EEO staff and exhibited homophobic, sexist, and racist views. Compl. ¶ 9. Together with other executives, Jones continued to restrict Cary's role in the hiring and promotion process. Id. Some of the HR employees who were suffering from a hostile work environment, unlawful discrimination, and retaliation under Jones turned to Cary for support and also wrote anonymously to the Metra Board. Id. ¶ 10. Yet, when Cary vocally opposed Jones's unlawful behavior and incompetence, Metra executives, rather than investigate Jones, subjected Cary to discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment for siding with the employees. Id. ¶ 11. Metra's executives perceived Cary as disloyal for failing to support management's efforts to quash employee concerns. Id. Eventually, Metra excluded Cary from the Executive Team, which is a 15-member group of Metra executives. Id. Jones's hiring also marked a turning point in Metra's view of Cary's performance. Before, Metra had respected Cary's knowledge in EEO matters and given her strong performance reviews. After, Metra executives openly challenged Cary's competence, both at Jones's urging and also in retaliation for Cary's acknowledgment of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct against Metra employees. Id. ¶ 12. According to Cary, Metra's goals shifted from investigating and addressing discrimination and retaliation to suppressing inquiries and attacking anyone who interfered in the effort to refute complaints. Id.

Even after Jones eventually left the company, Metra allegedly continued to subject Cary to abuse, micromanagement, hostility, unwarranted criticism, racial stereotypes, and bullying. Compl. ¶ 13. When she complained that Metra had violatedfederal transit laws by excluding her department from EEO functions, she and her department were subjected to harassment, abuse, investigation, bullying, and false allegations. Id. In fact, in an apparent effort to stifle debate on the EEO complaints and further harass and embarrass Cary, Metra combined Cary's department with another and installed a department leader who had neither the law degree nor decades of EEO experience that Cary had, further diminishing Cary's role. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Cary alleges that she continued to be treated with hostility, accused of misconduct, marginalized, berated, excluded from job-related meetings and communications, publicly defamed, and otherwise abused. Id. ¶ 16.

Eventually, Cary retained outside counsel and met with the head of the legal department to seek relief. Compl. ¶ 17. That did not work. Id. Rather than address the problems, Metra retaliated against Cary by limiting her access to executives, which ended up diminishing her responsibilities even more. Id. Plus, Metra started to review and set goals for Cary's staff without her, micromanaged her work, steered work away from her department, and constantly watched and documented Cary's daily activities. Id.

Ultimately, the discrimination and harassment caused Cary to suffer from extreme anxiety, all the way to the point that she sought out medical treatment and was temporarily unable to work. Compl. ¶ 18. In 2018, Cary took around three months of protected medical leave at the recommendation of her doctor. Id. ¶ 19. Even during the time off, Metra harassed her by sending her emails and requests questioning the legitimacy of her condition. Id. On the eve of two holiday weekends,July 4 and Labor Day, Metra notified Cary that her leave would be cut short, forcing her to rush to reach her doctor over each of the holiday periods. Id.

When her doctor finally approved Cary's return from medical leave, the doctor imposed a condition: Cary should avoid stress. Compl. ¶20. But when Cary returned in early October 2018, Metra—despite full awareness of Cary's anxiety disorder and her need for accommodation—isolated Cary in a room and ordered her to draft responses to a document criticizing her and her department by the end of the day, and to do so without access to either her notes or her team. Id. ¶¶ 21, 29. She was also told that the document discussed her "disgruntled attitude toward Metra (and certain Metra officers)." Id. To Cary, it was clear that Metra had used her medical leave to set her up to be fired. Id. ¶ 21. She experienced a "massive anxiety attack" and resigned the next working day. Id. Because Cary resigned right before her imminent pension-eligibility date, the resignation cost her around $20,000 per year in lifetime pension benefits. Id. Cary also seeks damages for lost wages and other benefits, emotional distress, and irreparable career and reputational damage. Id. ¶ 22.

Cary now brings claims against Metra for violating her rights under the federal Rehabilitation Act, the Illinois Civil Rights Act, the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and Illinois common law for discriminating against her on the basis of race and disability, retaliating against her, intentionally inflicting emotional distress, and constructively discharging her from the company upon her return from medical leave. Compl. ¶¶ 23-54.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (cleaned up).³ The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to 'focus litigation on the merits of a claim' rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).

"A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

In the employment-discrimination context, the pleading requirement is minimal. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[A] plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII may allege these claims quite generally."). All the plaintiff must include in the complaint is the "type of discrimination the plaintiff thought occurred," "by whom," and "when." Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (saying that "I was turned down for a job because of my race" is all that a complaint has to say to make out a...