Casavelli v. Johanson

Nicholas Casavelli, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Donna J Johanson, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-20-00497-PHX-JAT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

December 23, 2020

ORDER

Pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss (Docs. 87, 90, 101), responses to each motion (Docs. 96, 97, 104), and replies for each motion (Docs. 98, 99, 109). Additionally pending before the Court is a motion to enjoin (Doc. 84), a motion for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) (Doc. 103), a motion to seal (Doc. 111) and a motion to strike (Doc. 112). The Court now rules on the motions.¹

I. BACKGROUND

In short, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have conspired against them in a pending state court action in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 82). Defendants include the parties to that state court action, counsel, Maricopa County Superior Court judges, and a bank. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 82) asserts thirty causes of action, includes 48 numbered paragraphs of allegations that span ninety-seven pages, andcites violations arising from varying sources of law, including the United States Constitution, the United States Code, and Arizona law. (Doc. 82).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint include, among other things, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement "need not contain detailed factual allegations; rather, it must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Rule 8(a) "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a court must accept all factual allegations at the pleading stage, courts may not accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. at 678-79. As such, "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements" are not sufficient to state a claim. Id. Indeed, the short and plain statement required by Rule 8(a) must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Further, "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) ("A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances."). "Where a complaint contains the factual elements of a cause, but those elements are scattered throughout the complaint without any meaningful organization, the complaint does not set forth a 'short and plain statement of the claim' for purposes of Rule 8." Chagolla v. Vullo, No. CV-17-01811-PHX-SPL, 2018 WL 10602297, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2018) (citing Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)).

A complaint may be dismissed where it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All facts are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover,a pro se litigant's pleadings must be liberally construed. See Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). But the liberal construction owed to pro se pleadings is not a form of immunity from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including federal pleading requirements. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995).

When the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the next inquiry is whether amendment can cure the defect. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 926 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (providing that courts should "freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires"). Rule 15(a)(2) establishes a "policy favoring liberal amendment." Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). Nonetheless, leave to amend should be denied if amendment would be futile. See Airs Aromatics, LLC v. Op. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 744 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. ANALYSIS

The Third Amended Complaint includes thirty causes of action. (Doc. 82). Defendants seek dismissal of all of them. (Docs. 87, 90, 101). As will be discussed, Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint fails to meet federal pleading standards as it constitutes an impermissible "shotgun pleading." In addition to the global issues, the individual causes of action in the Third Amended Complaint fail to meet federal pleading standards. The Court will examine those causes of action in turn before discussing the global issues with the Third Amended Complaint.

a. First-Seventh Causes of Action: Forgery

Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Defendants Brian Eastin, Provident Law PLLC, Donna Johanson, the Estate of Gary T. Johanson, Garpdon LLC, and the Johanson Family Revocable Trust for forgery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 82 at 32-45). To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976); Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs fall short on both requirements.

1. Violation of a Federal Constitutional or Statutory Right

Plaintiffs assert that their First Amendment rights "to redress grievances and freedom of speech," Fourth Amendment rights "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," and Fourteenth Amendment rights "to due process and equal protection under the law" were violated by Defendants' alleged acts of forgery. (See Doc. 82 at 32-45) None of these alleged violations, however, satisfy Rule 8(a)'s pleading requirements.

A. First Amendment

Plaintiffs aver that they have been denied their First Amendment right to a forum to redress their grievances. (See Doc. 82 at 32-45). As this Court noted previously though, "based on the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs successfully exercised their right to petition—once in Arizona Superior Court for Maricopa County and, again, before this Court." (Doc. 13 at 5). Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint contains multiple references to their use of the courts. (See, e.g., Doc. 82 at 18 (noting that on February 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion in state court that was subsequently fully briefed and ruled on)). While Plaintiffs may not like the outcomes of their cases, the Constitution provides no guarantee of a successful petition for redress of grievances. See Petersen v. Cazemier, 164 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1225 (D. Or. 2001).

Plaintiffs also argue that their First Amendment rights to free speech were violated. (See Doc. 82 at 32-45). Yet, Plaintiffs do not point to any specific actions undertaken by the Defendants at issue that work to deny Plaintiffs' rights to free speech. Plaintiffs instead argue that their rights to free speech were limited when Judge Duncan refused to let Mr. Casavelli speak during a state court proceeding for "no sound reason." (Doc. 82 at 23-24). Yet, Plaintiffs' own response shows that Judge Duncan only refused to allow Mr. Casavelli to speak after he was argumentative and repeatedly interrupted her. (See Doc. 96 at 25-41); (see also Doc. 87-2 at 4). A court may limit certain of a party's rights to ensure that an orderly proceeding can be conducted. See Escarcega v Frauenheim, No. CV 14-1749-PA (PLA), 2016 WL 9108856, at *25 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016), report andrecommendation adopted, No. CV 14-1749-PA (PLA), 2017 WL 2468772 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2017) (limiting a party's right to represent himself, in part, because he repeatedly interrupted the court); Pantchev v. Martel, No. 2:17-CV-02807-CJC-JC, 2020 WL 4005651, at *20 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-02807-CJC-JC, 2020 WL 4003021 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2020) (holding that it was appropriate to remove a criminal defendant from closing arguments due to his repeated interruptions of the court). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not state a valid claim that their First Amendment rights were violated by any of the Defendants.

B. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiffs additionally argue that their Fourth Amendment rights "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" were violated. (See Doc. 82 at 32-45). While it is not clear from the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seem to argue that the property at issue was their bank records, their litigation costs, and the costs of judgments against them (See id. at 15). To state a claim under the Fourth Amendment regarding their bank records, however, Plaintiffs must show that the Defendants at issue violated Plaintiffs' "reasonable expectation of privacy." Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 40 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). "In general, an American depositor has no reasonable expectation of privacy in copies of his or her bank records, such as checks, deposit slips, and financial statements maintained by the bank." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 40 F.3d at 962 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)). Acquisition of Plaintiffs' bank records did not violate the Fourth Amendment as Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that there was any violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, a "depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person" to others. See id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).

Regarding Plaintiffs' claims that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by their need to pay litigation costs and the costs of judgments against them, Plaintiffs cite no...