Caskey v. Fenton

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TERRY SCOTT CASKEY, Plaintiff, v. NATHAN FENTON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-1549

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

July 12, 2023

Kimberly A. Jolson, Magistrate Judge

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, CHIEF JUDGE

This matter is before this Court on the parties' cross Motions in Limine. (ECF Nos. 120; 133) and Plaintiff's Motion for Jury View (ECF No. 111). For the following reasons Plaintiff's Motion in Limine is GRANTED in part DENIED in part (ECF No. 120), Defendants' Motion in Limine is GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and HELD IN ABEYANCE in part (ECF No. 133), and Plaintiff's Motion for Jury View is DENIED. (ECF No. 111).

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of November 11, 2018, Defendant Officers Fenton and Harshbarger were patrolling Columbus' 8th precinct. (ECF No. 55-1 at 4). Officer Harshbarger was driving, and Officer Fenton was in the passenger seat. (Id.). Around 7:15pm, Defendants observed a blue 2009 Nissan Altima, license plate HDU2365, stopping ahead at the intersection of Dana and Union Ave with only one working brake light. (ECF No. 12, ¶ 6 (citing ECF No. 57-1 at 2-3)). After the driver turned “quickly” westbound on Union Ave without signaling, the Officers “initiated their lights and audible siren . . . [to] conduct a traffic stop for the traffic violations” of Columbus City Code (“C.C.C.”) § 2131.14, Failing to Signal, and C.C.C. § 2137.24, Motor Vehicle Lights. (Id.).

The Officers reported the vehicle then turned “northbound onto S. Central Ave and [] quickly accelerate[d] into the furthest left-hand lane of vehicles traveling southbound on S. Central Ave. in order to flee ” (Id.). Defendant Officers contend this act “caused a substantial risk of physical harm to anyone traveling southbound on S. Central Ave. and to property in the furthest left-hand lane ”^[1] (Id.). As the vehicle turned southbound, the Officers represent they were able to identify the driver as “an older male, white, short hair and medium build.” (Id.). The vehicle then took off “northbound in the southbound lane of travel until it reached the intersection of Sullivan Ave. and S. Central Ave.” (Id. at 2-3). At this point, the Officers ended their pursuit. (Id.). They then watched the Nissan turn southbound onto the ramp of 70 East, and “estimated . . . [it] was traveling was around 90[mph] in a 55mph zone” in heavy traffic. (Id.).

The Officers then looked up the license plate and found it was registered to Plaintiff, Terry Caskey. (Id.). The Officers looked up Plaintiff's photograph on the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (“OHLEG”) and determined he was the same “older male, white, short hair and medium build they witnessed driving.” (Id. at 3). Based on this alleged identification, “the Officers felt they had probable cause to believe Plaintiff was the driver of the vehicle that was fleeing from their audible and visible signals to pull over and creating a substantial risk of physical harm to persons or property.” (ECF No. 58 at 6). Defendant Fenton submitted a police report requesting the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office indict Plaintiff for violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.331, Failure to Comply with the Order or Signal. (ECF No. 57-1 at 3).

The Country Prosecutor presented Officer Fenton's report to a grand jury, where a Columbus Police Department liaison was called to testify. (ECF No. 58 at 7 (citing ECF No. 56-1 at 3)). Neither Defendant testified before the grand jury. (Id.). On November 21, 2018, the grand jury indicted Plaintiff for violating O.R.C. § 2921.331 and the County Prosecutor requested the issuance of a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. (ECF No. 56-1 at 4). Plaintiff was arrested outside his residence on November 22, 2018 (ECF. No. 42-1 at 4) and was released on his own recognizance on November 27, 2018 (ECF No. 58-5). Thereafter, on December 17, 2018, Plaintiff entered a not guilty plea. (See ECF No. 58-6). On April 24, 2019, the case was dismissed due to “insufficient evidence to prove identification.” (ECF No. 58-7; ECF No. 42-1 at 7).

Plaintiff represents “[t]he actual driver of the Nissan on the night in question was Robert Taliaferro, who later admitted” as such. (ECF No. 12, ¶ 11). His “admission was captured on video by [Plaintiff] after he was released on bail . . . [and] was then given to the prosecuting attorney's office.” (Id.). This disclosure, says Plaintiff, is the true reason his case was dismissed. (ECF No. 57 at 8). Defendants, meanwhile, maintain the dismissal of Plaintiff's case “does not indicate Mr. Taliaferro, or any other person, was the actual person who committed the crime, it only states there was insufficient evidence to prove” Plaintiff was the driver.^[2] (ECF No. 58 at 7).

During discovery, the parties filed a series of motions: (1) Plaintiff sought to exclude Defendants' rebuttal expert Officer David Cornute (ECF No. 40); (2) Defendants moved to exclude the testimony and photographs of Jim Shively (ECF No. 67); and (3) in August 2021, the Plaintiff brought a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57) and Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 58). On February 1, 2022, this Court issued an Opinion & Order ruling that the Motions to exclude the testimony of Officer David Cornute and Plaintiff's expert Jim Shively were denied (ECF Nos. 40; 67). This Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the Fourth Amendment seizure without probable clause claim and malicious prosecution claim as there remained a genuine question of material fact as to whether the officers would have been able to see the driver on the night in question. (ECF No. 85 at 23, 25). This Court also rejected Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that Defendant Harshbarger was not involved in the identification of the driver, that intervening acts by the county prosecutor exempts Defendant Officers from liability for the malicious prosecution charge, and that the officers would have definitively been able to see the driver of the vehicle. (Id. at 22-23, 25). Further, it concluded that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but dismissed the City of Columbus on the state malicious prosecution claim. (Id. at 15-18, 30).

Defendant officers appealed the decision, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling. (ECF No. 97). Therefore, this matter is ready for trial and two claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remain: (1) false arrest; and (2) malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 120 at 3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motions in Limine

The purpose of a motion in limine is “to narrow the issues remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999). “It is well established that “[w]hether or not to grant a motion in limine falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, No. 2:07-cv-568, 2012 WL 5878873, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2012) (citing Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 2012)). The guiding principle is “to ensure evenhanded and expeditious management of trials.” Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004).

Courts should “exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when that evidence is determined to be clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Delay, 2012 WL 5878873, at *2.

Thus, “[w]hen a court is unable to determine whether or not certain evidence is clearly inadmissible, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice can be resolved in the proper context.” Id. Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should seldom be employed. The better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility as they arise. Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Morrison v. Stephenson, No. 2:06-cv-283, 2008 WL 343176, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2008) (“Courts ... are generally reluctant to grant broad exclusions of evidence in limine, because a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.”). “Whether or not to grant a motion in limine falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Delay, 2012 WL 5878873, at *2. Additionally, “[a] ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory, opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.” United States v. Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 1983)). Thus, this Court “may change its ruling at trial for whatever reasons it deems appropriate.” Id.

B. Applicable Rules of Evidence

Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant, and therefore generally admissible, so long as it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable,” and so long as “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid 401. It is well established that “[t]he standard for relevancy is ‘extremely liberal' under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). “[A] piece of evidence does not need to carry a party's evidentiary burden in order to be relevant.” Id. at 401. Additionally, evidence can be relevant even if it does not relate to a fact in dispute, provided the evidence supplies background information about a party or issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 Advisory Committee's Notes (“Evidence which is essentially background in nature can scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is universally offered and admitted as an aid to understanding.”). Assuming evidence is relevant, Rule 403 nonetheless grants trial...