Casler v. West Irondequoit School District

563 F.Supp.3d 60

Destin K. CASLER, Plaintiff,

v.WEST IRONDEQUOIT SCHOOL DISTRICT and Jeffrey B. Crane, Defendants.

6:20-CV-07050 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 27, 2021

Jeffrey Wicks, Jeffrey Wicks, PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.

Michael P. McClaren, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Destin K. Casler ("Plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants West Irondequoit School District (the "WISD") and Jeffrey B. Crane, the former superintendent of the WISD (collectively, "Defendants"), violated his First Amendment rights when they suspended him from school due to postings Plaintiff made on the social media messaging platform "Snapchat." (Dkt. 1). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 6). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. 1). As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual allegations as true.

Plaintiff was a student at Irondequoit High School. (Id. at ¶ 6). Although enrolled at the school, Plaintiff attended school only sporadically during the Fall 2018 term. (Id. at ¶ 7). On September 18, 2018, Plaintiff posted several messages to his "Snapchat" account. (Id. at ¶ 8). Snapchat is a messaging application which allows cell phone users to exchange pictures and videos, or "snaps," that are intended to disappear after they are viewed. (Id. at ¶ 9). Snaps can only be viewed by individuals who subscribe to a user and are not available for viewing by the general public. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff posted the following to Snapchat:

In one of the snaps, Mr. Casler is seen in a photograph with an accompanying message saying "Keep ya cams ready for Monday. I'm going viral."

In the second snap, Mr. Casler posted "Fuck feelings. Ion gotta heart no more. Summer when nobody helped. I'm me bruh."

In a third snap, Mr. Casler posted "Don't get mad when u regret it."

(Id. at ¶¶ 11-13).¹ Plaintiff alleges that he is an aspiring rap artist and the aforementioned messages were "direct quotes from rap songs he had written and publicized approximately six months previously." (Id. at ¶ 14).

Thereafter, on or about September 20, 2018, a person who observed the snaps took a screen shot of them and sent them to employees of the WISD. (Id. at ¶ 15). The employees contacted the Irondequoit Police Department, as they believed that the snaps were threats against the school. (Id. at ¶ 16). Members of the police department interviewed Plaintiff on September 22, 2018, and concluded that he had not violated any New York Penal Law provisions, and did not arrest him or bring any criminal charges against him. (Id. at ¶ 17).

On September 24, 2018, as a result of the snaps he posted, Plaintiff received a five-day school suspension from Douglas Lauf, the Principal of Irondequoit High School. (Id. at ¶ 18). Principal Lauf also requested a Superintendent's Hearing ("the hearing") pursuant to N.Y. Education Law § 3214² , based on charges of insubordination and endangering the health, safety, and welfare of students and others. (Id. at ¶ 19). The hearing was conducted on October 4, 2018, and on December 20, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 20). Following the hearing, defendant Crane found Plaintiff guilty of the disciplinary infractions alleged, and directed that he be suspended from school for a period of 40 weeks, which was the entire school year. (Id. at ¶ 21).

Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants on December 8, 2020, which includes one cause of action for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff alleges that his snaps did not constitute a threat to the high school, were not likely to cause a disruption to school activities, and that he has been deprived of educational and social opportunities which would have been available to him had he not been suspended. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-26). Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result, he has suffered extreme anxiety, depression, and mental anguish, and he seeks both compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of two million dollars. (Id. at 4-5).

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 19, 2021. (Dkt. 6). Plaintiff filed his response on February 23, 2021 (Dkt. 9), and Defendants replied on March 2, 2021 (Dkt. 10).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the [pleading], documents attached to the [pleading] as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the [pleading]." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court should consider the motion by "accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the [claimant]." Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt. , 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

"While a [pleading] attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a [claimant]’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the [pleading]’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint is required because: (1) Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because he previously litigated this claim during his suspension proceedings; (2) Plaintiff's speech materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline of the district; (3) defendant Crane is entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim for municipal liability against the WISD. (Dkt. 6-4 at 5-13).

A. Collateral Estoppel

In support of their argument that Plaintiff's claim is barred by collateral estoppel, Defendants point to the April 21, 2020 decision issued by the Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner's decision"), to whom Plaintiff had appealed the decision by defendant Crane imposing a 40-week suspension. (Dkt. 6-4 at 5; see also Dkt. 6-2 at 2-14). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint "is clearly an attempt to circumvent the decision of the Commissioner, which already addressed and determined that the discipline did not infringe on Plaintiff's freedom of speech." (Dkt. 6-4 at 5). In response, Plaintiff argues that he did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his claim because he did not have counsel during the first day of the hearing (Dkt. 9-1 at 5), and because he was not advised of his right to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's decision by way of an Article 78 proceeding (id. at 6). Finally, Plaintiff contends that even if the Court finds that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, the Court should exercise its discretion and not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, given that Plaintiff was under the age of 18, he was not represented by counsel on the first day of the hearing, and he was not advised that an Article 78 proceeding was available to review the Commissioner's decision. (Id. ).

"The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ " Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan , 853 F. Supp. 2d 400, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Swiatkowski v. Citibank , 745 F. Supp. 2d 150, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd , 446 F. App'x 360 (2d Cir. 2011) ); see also Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon , 310 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties or their privies from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue of fact or law that was fully and fairly litigated in a prior proceeding."). "Dismissal under [ Rule] 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a defendant raises claim preclusion ... as an affirmative defense and it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law." Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l , 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000) ; see also Swiatkowski , 745 F. Supp. 2d at 168 ("A court may dismiss a claim on ... collateral estoppel grounds on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment"). "The burden of proving identity of the issue rests on the proponent of collateral estoppel, while the opponent bears the burden of proving that he or she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue." Gonzalez v. City of New York , 845 F. App'x 11, 16 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

"It is well-settled that collateral estoppel may bar a plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Shell v. Brun , 362 F. Supp. 2d 398, 400 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ; see Ha...