Casperson v. Doe

WILLIAM CASPERSON, individuallyand on behalf of a class of persons similarly-situated, Plaintiff, v. AAA SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND,JOHN DOE COMPANIES, 1 through 10, inclusive,and JOHN DOES, 1 through 10 inclusive, Defendants.

C.A. No. PC 2014-6139

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

December 22, 2015

DECISION

SILVERSTEIN, J. Before the Court for decision is Defendant AAA Southern New England's (hereinafter AAA) Motion to Dismiss the class action Complaint for unpaid wages filed by Plaintiff William Casperson (hereinafter Casperson), individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly-situated. In his Complaint, Casperson asks that this matter be certified as a class action with Casperson as the class representative. Casperson asserts that (i) AAA wrongfully denied Casperson, and other similarly-situated employees, wages under the Wage Act by failing to pay them one and one-half (1 ½) times the normal rate of pay for hours worked on Sundays and holidays; (ii) AAA wrongfully denied Casperson, and other similarly-situated employees, wages under the Sunday Pay Act by failing to pay them one and one-half (1 ½) times the normal rate of pay for hours worked on Sundays and holidays; and (iii) AAA has been unjustly enriched by the hours that Casperson, and similarly-situated employees, worked on Sundays and holidays, thus entitling them to such legal and equitable relief as the Court deems proper. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14.

IFacts and Travel

AAA is a Delaware corporation duly registered with the State of Rhode Island, which maintains a principal place of business in the City of Providence. Additionally, AAA employs individuals in the State of Rhode Island and is engaged in the motor vehicle service industry, providing "roadside assistance" services to its customers, including, but not limited to, towing, mechanical adjustments, vehicle fuel delivery, battery replacement, vehicle extrication, and lock-out services. Compl. ¶ 3.

On October 19, 2009, AAA hired Casperson as a part-time tow truck driver. At the time of his hire, Casperson earned $11.50 per hour and worked twenty-four hours per week, including Sundays and holidays. In June of 2011, Casperson became a permanent, full-time flatbed driver for AAA. At that time, he earned $12.50 per hour and worked thirty-nine hours per week, including Sundays and holidays. During Casperson's tenure with AAA, he was required to work at least eight hours every Sunday, as well as some holidays. Casperson was terminated from his position with AAA on March 13, 2014. Id. at ¶¶ 12-16.

On December 15, 2014, Casperson filed this action against AAA alleging that it violated (i) Title 28, Chapter 14 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, entitled the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter the Wage Act); and (ii) Title 25, Chapter 3 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, 1956, entitled Rhode Island Work on Holidays and Sundays Act (hereinafter the Sunday Pay Act). Casperson further alleges that AAA was unjustly enriched by reason of its failure to pay Casperson one and one-half (1 ½) his normal rate of pay for hoursworked on Sundays and holidays. Casperson also asserts that during all relevant time periods he was an "employee" of AAA within the meaning of both the Wage Act and the Sunday Pay Act. Casperson further claims that as an "employee," both Acts entitle him to one and one-half (1 ½) times his normal rate of pay (hereinafter premium pay) for the hours he worked on Sundays and holidays. Casperson contends that AAA wrongfully denied him this premium pay. Casperson further alleges that AAA wrongfully underpaid him, and other similarly-situated employees, in excess of $5000. Thus, Casperson concludes that AAA violated both the Wage Act and the Sunday Pay Act by failing to compensate him premium pay for the work he performed on Sundays and holidays. Further, Casperson asserts that, through this lack of compensation, AAA was unjustly enriched by the work Casperson performed on Sunday and holidays.

AAA has moved to dismiss this action under Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) arguing that (i) Casperson has not asserted a claim upon which relief can be granted as he is not considered an "employee," but instead, is exempt¹ under the Sunday Pay Act; and (ii) his unjust enrichment claim is preempted by the Sunday Pay Act.² In its Motion, AAA chiefly relies on anopinion letter written by Sean M. Fontes, Executive Counsel of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (hereinafter DLT),³ on May 1, 2014 (hereinafter Letter). Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A.

The Letter was in response to a request from AAA, in which AAA inquired about the status of both its company and its roadside service technicians under the Sunday Pay Act. According to the Letter, the DLT stated that it had "reviewed the issue of whether or not AAA is required to pay its emergency roadside service technicians premium pay" and concluded that "AAA is not required to . . . because [these technicians] perform a service that is 'ancillary' to a 'telephonic delivery of customer service' pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 25-3-1(3)(viii)." Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A. In the Letter, the DLT reasoned that, "[b]ased upon the facts presented by [AAA], AAA has a call center operation which receives calls for emergency roadside assistance. The call center operators then contact the roadside service technicians who provide the assistance" and that such assistance "is 'ancillary' to the call center operations, since emergency roadside service technicians could not perform their work without the operations of the call center." Id. The DLT based the Letter entirely on facts submitted by AAA and concluded that AAA emergency roadside service technicians, such as Casperson, are not "employees" under the Sunday Pay Act and therefore are not entitled to receive premium pay for work performed on Sundays and/or holidays. Casperson objected to AAA's Motion, asserting that the Letter is not legally binding on this Court.

At issue is whether (i) the Court may take judicial notice of the Letter that AAA attached to its Motion; (ii) the Letter—if capable of judicial notice—is legally binding on the Court, therefore warranting dismissal of Casperson's Complaint; and (3) AAA was unjustly enriched as a result of its failure to provide Casperson with premium pay for the hours he worked on Sundays and holidays.

IIStandard of Review

The criteria that the Court considers in determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss is well settled in this jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "test[s] the sufficiency of the complaint." Domestic Bank v. Urbaez, 2011 WL 282334, at *2 (R.I. Super. Jan. 25, 2011) (citing Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 905 (R.I. 2002)). Although generally a court's review on a motion to dismiss is confined to the four corners of the complaint, Rhode Island law allows courts to "consider not only the complaint . . . but also . . . matters susceptible to judicial notice." R.I. Res. Recovery Corp. v. Van Liew Trust Co., 2011 WL 1936011, *5 (R.I. Super. May 13, 2011).⁴ A complaint is only required to "give the opposing party fair and adequate notice of the type of claim being asserted." Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 848 (R.I. 1992). Consequently, a "plaintiff is not required to plead the ultimate facts that must be proven" in order to survive a motion to dismiss, but instead, must only assert any set of facts that the plaintiff could prove to support his or her claims for relief. Id.; see e.g., Chhun v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 n.5 (R.I. 2014); Collins v. Fairways Condos. Ass'n, 592 A.2d 147, 148 (R.I. 1991). Furthermore, the Court must "assume that all allegationsin the complaint are true, and resolve any doubts in a plaintiff's favor." R.I. Affiliate, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989); see also Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Lapan, 103 R.I. 163, 170, 235 A.2d 866, 871 (1967) ("in order to justify a dismissal of a complaint under this rule the trial justice ... [must] accord[] the plaintiff the benefit of every inference in viewing the allegations of his complaint in their most promising light"). Therefore, the Court may only grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim." Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149-50 (R.I. 2008). As a result, "[t]he standard for granting a motion to dismiss is a difficult one for the movant to meet." Pellegrino v. R.I. Ethics Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1119, 1123 (R.I. 2002).

IIIDiscussion

ACasperson's Misplaced Reliance on the Wage Act

Casperson claims that AAA violated the Wage Act by failing to pay him premium pay for the work he performed on Sundays and holidays. See Compl. ¶¶ 41-46. In response, AAA does not assert any defense to, or acknowledge, these alleged violations within its Motion. See Mot. to Dismiss.

The Wage Act is a Rhode Island statute, administered by the DLT, regulating certain aspects of employee compensation. See §§ 28-14-1, et seq.⁵ It is evident, upon review of the Wage Act, that not a single provision within the Act requires employers to pay their employees premium pay for hours worked on Sundays and/or holidays. See id. Instead, Rhode Island's Sunday Pay Act requires employers to compensate "employees" premium pay for hours worked on Sundays and holidays. See §§ 25-3-1, et seq. (stating that "[w]ork performed by employees on Sundays and holidays must be paid for at least one and one-half (1 1/2) times the normal rate of pay" and defining holidays as "Sunday, New Year's Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, Victory Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving, and Christmas"). Casperson's reliance on the Wage Act is therefore misplaced....