Castaneda v. Cisneros

1

ISAAC SCOTT CASTANEDA, Petitioner, v. THERESA CISNEROS, Respondent.

No. 1:20-cv-00377-JLT-HBK (HC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 24, 2022

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY ^[1]

FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

(Doc. No. 24)

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Isaac Scott Castaneda (“Petitioner” or “Castaneda”), a state prisoner, initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1 “Petition”). In response, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 24). Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and supplemental briefing after being directed by the Court. (Doc. Nos. 18, 27, 29). Petitioner did not file a response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss or the supplemental briefing, and the time for doing so has expired. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the undersigned recommends granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is serving a state prison sentence for his conviction of, inter alia, attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a felon entered by the Kings County Superior Court on February 13, 2014.^[2] (Doc. No. 1 at 1). Petitioner's sentence was enhanced by findings of gang membership and gun possession. (Id.). Petitioner was sentenced to forty-five years to life for the attempted murder conviction, twenty-five years to life on the sentencing enhancements, and a stayed six-year term on the possession of a firearm conviction. (Doc. No. 24 at 1-2).

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which was affirmed on February 4, 2016. (Doc. No. 26-1). The California Supreme Court denied review on April 20, 2016. (Doc. No. 26-3). Petitioner then filed six post-conviction collateral challenges in the state courts, all petitions for writ of habeas corpus, as follows:^[3]

1. Kings County Superior Court

Filed: February 13, 2017

Denied: April 3, 2017

2. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: April 25, 2017

Denied: June 9, 2017

3. Kings County Superior Court

Filed: October 26, 2017

Denied: December 12, 2017

4. California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District

Filed: February 21, 2018

Denied: April 27, 2018

5. California Supreme Court

Filed: December 12, 2018

Denied: May 1, 2019

6. California Supreme Court

Filed: March 15, 20204

Denied: July 22, 2020

(Doc. Nos. 26-4 - 26-15). On March 2, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. Petitioner makes the following claims for relief: (1) newly discovered evidence proves he is innocent of his crimes of conviction; (2) the state court erred when it declined to hold a hearing on the newly discovered evidence; and (3) prosecutorial and trial court errors violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 4-9).

Respondent contends the Petition should be dismissed because it is untimely and the actual innocence exception to the statute of limitations should not apply. (See generally Doc. Nos. 24, 29). Petitioner did not file any response to the Motion to Dismiss or the supplemental briefing. However, in his earlier briefing Petitioner argues that he should be entitled to gap tolling for the periods during which he was seeking state habeas review; equitable tolling due to the ineffectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel; and, in the alternative, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations under the actual innocence gateway described in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) and McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013). (See Doc. Nos. 10, 19).

II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Under Rule 4, if a petition is not dismissed at screening, the judge “must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response” to the petition. R. Governing 2254 Cases 4. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 state that “the judge may want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss based upon information furnished by respondent.” A motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus is construed as a request for the court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 225^[4]Cases. O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990).

Under Rule 4, a district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it “plainly appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 2019); Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998).

A. Petition Not Timely Filed Under AEDPA's Statute of Limitations

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, sets a one-year period of limitations to the filing of a habeas petition by a person in state custody. This limitation period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). For most habeas petitioners, the one-year clock starts to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 42 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In this case, the California Supreme Court denied review on April 20, 2016. Thus, direct review concluded on July 19, 2016, when the ninety (90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. For the purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began running the next day on July 20, 2016. (Doc. No. 24 at 3). Petitioner had until July 19, 2017 to file his federal habeas petition, absent statutory or equitable tolling. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting anniversary method to calculate one-year statutory period). Petitioner filed his federal petition on March 2, 2020. (Doc. No. 1). Thus, absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is barred by the statute of limitations.

1. Commencement of Limitations Period

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitations period shall run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” However,

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides a petitioner with a later accrual date than section 2244(d)(1)(A) only ‘if vital facts could not have been known' ” by the date the appellate process ended. Schlueter, 384 F.3d at 74 (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir.2000)). The “due diligence” clock starts ticking when a person knows or through diligence could discover the vital facts, regardless of when their legal significance is actually discovered. See Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 n. 3;see also Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir.2003).

Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In earlier briefing, Petitioner argued the affidavits submitted in support of his actual innocence claim, discussed in detail below, were not “discovered until the AEDPA 1 -year time limit had already begun to run.” (Doc. No. 13). Petitioner also argued in separate briefing that he is entitled to an unidentified later “trigger date” under § 2244(d)(1)(D) because he continued to exercise due diligence despite the alleged ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel. (See generally Doc. No. 19).

Petitioner's argument that he is entitled to a later commencement date of the limitations period and vague and conclusory. Furthermore, Petitioner fails to specifically identify a date the statute of limitations period should run from pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D), i.e. the date when he “discovered” the purported new evidence in the form of affidavits supporting his actual innocence claim, or the date he “discovered” ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel. Moreover, this evidence was readily discoverable at any time during the trial or immediately thereafter. As discussed below with respect to the affidavits regarding the victim's alleged motivation to falsely identify him as the shooter, Petitioner attempted during his trial to impeach the credibility of the victim by making the same argument - that the victim named Petitioner as the shooter due to a longstanding “grudge” against Petitioner for sleeping with the mother of his child. And Petitioner's own summary of his “due diligence” regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel acknowledges that he was aware of “vital facts” by the date the appellate process ended. See Ford, 683 F.3d at 1235.

Supra under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the statute of limitations runs from the time the facts were known or could have been discovered, not from the time Petitioner discovered, or endeavored to discover through due diligence, a possible legal significance. Petitioner fails to show he exercised the requisite due diligence to justify a delayed accrual date for his claims of actual innocence and ineffectiveness of counsel. Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to a later trigger of the AEDPA statute of limitations pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D). Moreover,...