Castle v. Eurofresh Inc

William W. Castle, Plaintiff,

v.Eurofresh, Inc., et al., Defendants.

No. CV 09-8114-PCT-MHM (DKD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dated: January 7 , 2011

ORDER

Plaintiff William W. Castle filed this civil rights action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as various state-law claims, against Eurofresh Farms, Inc. (Eurofresh); the State of Arizona; the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC); Dora Schriro, former Director of ADC; and Charles Ryan, current Director of ADC (State Defendants).¹ The remaining Defendants—the State of Arizona, ADC, Schriro, and Ryan—move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 70.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 72, 78.)

The Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. Background

In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted generally that he is a disabledveteran, who is unable to walk for extended periods of time. (Doc. 58 at 3 and ¶ 14.) On July 27, 2008, State Defendants contracted out his labor to Eurofresh, which Plaintiff described as a private, for-profit corporation. (Id. at 3, and ¶¶ 1, 5.) This was done through the Arizona Correctional Industries (ACI) Program, which is a program pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1622(B). (Id. at 3, and ¶ 1.) He alleged that Defendants were his employers within the meaning and scope of Title I of the ADA and were federally funded public entities under Title II of the ADA and the RA. (Id, ¶ 1.) On or about October 15, 2008 and November 10, 2008, Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability, stating that he could not walk for extended periods of time. The requests were denied, and Plaintiff was constructively discharged. (Id at 3.)

The Second Amended Complaint raised five Counts as follows:

Count I: All Defendants violated Title I of the ADA when they denied Plaintiff reasonable accommodation for his disability;

Count II: All Defendants violated Title II of the ADA when they denied Plaintiff access to the ACI Program;

Count III: All Defendants violated § 504 of the RA of 1973;

Count IV: Eurofresh's actions violated the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA); and

Count V: Eurofresh violated its contract with State Defendants by failing to comply with the ADA and federal and state employment laws.

The Court screened the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and dismissed Counts I, IV, and V, and all claims against Eurofresh. (Doc. 61.) The Court directed the State Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to Counts II and III. (Id.)

Defendants now move to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the individual Defendants are not proper parties; (2) Plaintiff is not a qualified individual under the ADA or RA; and (3) Plaintiff cannot show intentional discrimination because he has no federally protected right. (Doc. 70.)

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Preliminary Matters

In his response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that the Court has already screened Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and found that it met the pleading threshold of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and directed Defendants to answer the Complaint.

As noted in the Order granting the first Motions to Dismiss made by Eurofresh and State Defendants, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate where, as here, the claims are complex and the moving papers assist the court in evaluating the applicable authorities. (Doc. 38 at 2-3.) See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ("The court shall on its own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility if the court is satisfied that the action... fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted...."). Moreover, Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint was 25 pages long and had over 90 pages of exhibits. The Court will consider the motion.

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Eurofresh has been under investigation and fined for various immigration law violations but that ADC continues to do business with Euroresh. (Doc. 72 at 2.) These allegations are unsupported and irrelevant to the issues before the Court. Plaintiff's allegations of retaliation are also irrelevant as are his complaints about efforts to obtain his medical records. (Id at 4, 5.)

B. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

To state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires " a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, " in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Id., citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"). In other words, while Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. Dismissal may be based either on the lack of cognizable legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

A "complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] 'must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Hebbe v. Pliler, — F. 3d —, 2010 WL 4673711, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2010) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 611 F. 3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010).

Although courts will not normally look beyond the pleadings in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), a "court may consider material that the plaintiff properly submitted as part of the complaint or, even if not physically attached to the complaint, material that is not contended to be inauthentic and that is necessarily relied upon by the plaintiffs complaint." Id. And a court may disregard allegations of the complaint that are contradicted by attached exhibits. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 1998); Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, the court is not required to accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticed facts. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may consider matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)). "The court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged." Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor must the court accept unreasonable inferences or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

2. Title II of the ADA and the RA

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a "qualified individual with a disability"; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A "public entity" includes "(A) any State or local government; [and] (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C. §12131(1). The term "qualified individual with a disability" means

an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). A disability within the meaning ofthe statute is a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

"The Rehabilitation Act is materially identical to and the model for the ADA, except that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance...." Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 862 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled after § 504 of the RA.² Zuckle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999) ("there is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act").

C. Individual Defendants

1. Parties' Contentions

a. Defendants

Defendants argue that in the Ninth Circuit, only an employer can be liable for violation of the ADA; individuals...