Castro v. Knowlton Manners Apartments

JUAN CASTRO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KNOWLTON MANNERS APARTMENTS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

B298000

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

March 15, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC622707)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.

Samuel O. Ogbogu for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Proctor, Shyer & Winter and Lisa N. Shyer for Defendants and Respondents.

____________________

INTRODUCTION

Juan Castro appeals from the adverse judgment entered in his personal injury action after the trial court granted a motion by Hallmark Realty and Kirby Manor Corporation for summary judgment. Because the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.) bar Castro's action, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Castro Files This Action Against Hallmark and Kirby

In 2014 Castro sustained injuries when he fell out of a tree he was trimming at an apartment complex owned by Kirby and managed by Hallmark. Kirby and Hallmark had an agreement that identified Hallmark as both an independent contractor hired by Kirby and Kirby's agent. Hallmark had hired Marcos Patino to provide landscaping services, including tree-trimming, and Patino, in turn, had hired Castro to help him trim the trees.¹

In May 2016 Castro filed this negligence action against Kirby (sued erroneously as Knowlton Manners Apartments) and, after amending the complaint, Hallmark. Castro alleged that he was an employee of the defendants, that he sustained his injuries in the course of his employment, and that during his employment the defendants "failed to secure any worker's compensation insurance coverage whatsoever to cover any workplace injuries suffered by" him. Castro alleged the defendants' failure to obtaina worker's compensation policy entitled him to bring a civil action for negligence under Labor Code section 3706.²

B. The Trial Court Grants Hallmark and Kirby's Motion for Summary Judgment

Hallmark and Kirby filed a motion for summary judgment. Hallmark conceded Castro was its employee, but contended that it had workers' compensation insurance when he suffered his injury and that therefore Castro's exclusive remedy was through the workers' compensation system. Hallmark submitted a declaration by Mark Len, the president of both Hallmark and Kirby, stating Hallmark "maintained workers' compensation insurance at the time of the incident." Hallmark also submitted what Len declared was a true and correct copy of Hallmark's workers' compensation insurance policy in effect at the time of Castro's accident.

Kirby, for its part, contended there was "no circumstance under which [it] could be held liable for [Castro's] injuries because [Kirby] was not [Castro's] employer and there is no basis for liability against [Kirby]." In particular, Kirby argued that Castro was an employee of Hallmark, which Kirby hired as an independent contractor to manage the apartment complex, and that under Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689 (Privette) "the hirer of an independent contractor is generally not liable for work-related injuries to the contractor's employees."

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment Castro argued Hallmark had not met "its burden of producing admissible and material evidence that the workers' compensationremedy applies in this case." Objecting to Len's statement about Hallmark's coverage and to the copy of the policy Hallmark submitted, Castro argued Hallmark had "produced no competent evidence of workers' compensation insurance." And, Castro argued, even assuming "there was a valid workers' compensation policy," Hallmark had not produced evidence Castro "met the minimum number of hours required to qualify for workers' compensation coverage." Castro also argued, and purported to cite evidence showing, Hallmark negligently failed to provide him appropriate training and supervision for tree-trimming. Finally, Castro argued Kirby was not immune from liability under Privette because Hallmark was not merely an independent contractor but was also Kirby's agent.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Overruling Castro's objections to Len's statement that Hallmark had workers' compensation insurance coverage at the time of the accident and to the copy of the policy Hallmark submitted, the court ruled that Hallmark "met its moving burden to show it had a workers' compensation policy in place at the time of the accident" and that Castro "failed to raise a triable issue of material fact concerning the existence of workers' compensation insurance that covers his injuries." The court rejected Castro's argument Hallmark was obligated and failed to produce evidence its policy applied to him because Castro "did not advance this theory in his complaint." Similarly, the court rejected Castro's argument "Hallmark was negligent" because "the complaint does not allege Hallmark was negligent" and because "the entire purpose of the workers' compensation doctrine is to preclude a lawsuit for negligence."

Concerning Kirby, the trial court ruled: "[T]he sole theory advanced in the complaint is that 'Defendants' lacked workers' compensation insurance and are therefore presumed negligent. The complaint does not allege Kirby, as the landowner, retained control over [Castro's] work or that Kirby's negligence affirmatively contributed to [Castro's] injuries. [Castro] argues, instead, that there is a triable issue as to whether Hallmark was Kirby's agent, such that Hallmark's negligence can be imputed to Kirby. [Citations.] This argument cannot be considered in opposition to the motion as the complaint does not allege any facts to establish that either Defendant was negligent or that Kirby is responsible under the [Privette] doctrine. Even were the argument considered, Defendants submitted sufficient evidence regarding Kirby's lack of supervision and control of [Castro's] work which was not refuted by [Castro]." Castro timely appealed from the ensuing judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

"Summary judgment is appropriate only 'where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 423, 433.) "To meet its initial burden in moving for summary judgment, a defendant must present evidence that either 'conclusively negate[s] an element of [each of] the plaintiff's cause of action' or 'show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,' evidence necessary to establish atleast one element of [each] cause of action." (Henderson v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1116; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853-854.) "Once the defendant satisfies its initial burden, 'the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.'" (Henderson, at p. 1116; see Aguilar, at p. 849.)

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 338.) We consider "'"'"all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained."' [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party."'" (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347; see Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286.) "'We affirm the trial court's decision if it is correct on any ground the parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court, regardless of the reasons the trial court gave.'" (Wolf v. Weber (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 406, 410.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Hallmark

"'Ordinarily, when an employee sustains a worksite injury, the exclusive remedy against his or her employer is provided by the workers' compensation law, and the employer is immune from a suit for damages.'"³ (Jones v. Sorenson (2018)25 Cal.App.5th 933, 941; see People ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 801, 829 [workers' compensation "'"provides an employee's exclusive remedy against his or her employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment"'"].) Courts refer to this as "the workers' compensation exclusivity rule." (People ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb, at p. 829; see Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 105.)

One exception to that rule appears in section 3706, which provides that an injured employee may bring a civil action for damages against "any employer [who] fails to secure the payment of compensation" under the Act, as required by section 3700. An employer complies with its obligation under section 3700 "'to "secure the payment of compensation"'" by "'either purchasing workers' compensation insurance[ ] or self-insuring.'" (Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Tutor-Saliba Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 632, 638; see Hollingsworth v. Superior Court (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 927, 930 ["All employers are required to 'secure the payment of compensation by obtaining insurance from an authorized carrier or by securing a certificate of consent from the Director of Industrial Relations to become a self-insurer.'"].) "'[I]f the employer has not secured workers' compensation...