Castro v. United States

ANTHONY CASTRO, No. 02614-029, Plaintiff, v. USA, et al. Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-01331-SMY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

January 5, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Anthony Castro, an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York, brings this action for various incidents that occurred while he was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, which is within this judicial district.

This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

(a) Screening.- The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for Dismissal.- On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that "no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit." Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross "the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

As a preliminary matter, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to correct the typographical error on page 2 of the complaint, where Defendant C/O Humphrey is incorrectly referred to as "Murphrey" (Doc. 6).

According to the complaint, on April 26, 2014, Plaintiff, who is handicapped and uses a wheelchair and walker, was "brutally assaulted" by another inmate without any provocation. Plaintiff fell to the ground and could not defend himself. By coincidence, a correctional officer from another unit interrupted the attack, which was lucky for Plaintiff, because his assailant had a "shank." Plaintiff attributes the attack to the fact that the unit officer, C/O Humphrey, was not in the unit. The failure to protect Plaintiff from harm is also characterized as "cruel and unusual punishment."

Brooks, the officer who stopped the assault, called for assistance, but "in the heat of the moment," Brooks summoned help to the wrong unit. Brooks corrected his mistake and "within seconds" officers arrived. Plaintiff was then taken to the medical unit. Nurses cleaned blood from Plaintiff's head, eyes, neck and torso, but offered no other care. The nature of Plaintiff's injuries is not disclosed in the complaint, but an attached exhibit indicates that Plaintiff had cuts,bruises and abrasions and his eye was swollen (see doc. 1-1, p. 4). Plaintiff claims "there was negligence by health services."

Lt. Butler and Lt. Malcomb took pictures of Plaintiff and then took him to the SHU— segregation. While in the SHU, Plaintiff was deprived of his wheelchair and walker, so he could not go to the showers or go outside for recreation. The SHU is also not handicapped accessible. In addition, when SHU officers transported Plaintiff, they pushed his wheelchair too fast— "play[ing] race car driver." The officers also rolled over "potholes" and cracks on purpose, exacerbating Plaintiff's back pain.

Named as defendants are: the USA, C/O Humphrey; Warden J.S. Walton; Health Services Administrator Winklemeier; Nurse Patrick Trovillion; Nurse Richardson; Counselor Eric Edmister; Physician's Assistant Leslee D. Brooks; C/O Tolbert; C/O Walters; C/O Mowery; C/O Lenon; C/O Quartmous; C/O Hampton; C/O Cook; C/O Hicks; and C/O Morris. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

The complaint does not specify whether Plaintiff is asserting constitutional claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or negligence claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, or claims under the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. Because Plaintiff is pro se, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 only requires "notice" pleading, the Court must surmise what claims Plaintiff is attempting to pursue.

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.

Count 1: C/O Humphrey, in his individual capacity and acting with deliberate indifference, failed to protect Plaintiff from assault, in violation of the Eighth Amendment;

Count 2: The United States, by and through C/O Humphrey, acting negligently, failed to protect Plaintiff from assault;

Count 3: The United States, by and through "Health Services" personnel, negligently denied Plaintiff medical care for his injuries;

Count 4: When Plaintiff was housed in the SHU, Plaintiff was deprived of his wheelchair and walker, and housed in a unit that was not ADA compliant; and

Count 5: When Plaintiff was housed in the SHU, he was denied showers and recreation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The complaint also describes a de minimis delay by "C/O Brooks" in securing assistance after Brooks walked in and stopped the assault upon Plaintiff. No claim regarding the delay has been recognized because, first, C/O Brooks is not a named defendant. Physician's Assistant Brooks is listed as a defendant, but the narrative portion of the complaint specifically describes Brooks as a correctional officer. Second, a tort (even a constitutional tort) requires injury and the Seventh Circuit adheres to the doctrine de minimis non curat lex—meaning the law does not concern itself with trifles. See generally Hessel v. O'Heam, 977 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Williams v. City of Champaign, 524 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2008). The short delay described in the complaint qualifies as a "trifle." Any intended claim(s) regarding the delay caused by C/O Brooks calling help to the wrong unit should be considered dismissed without prejudice.

Although Lt. Butler and Lt. Malcomb are mentioned in the complaint, the Court did not discern any possible claim(s) against them, and they are not named defendants.

Discussion

Count 1

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.CONST., amend. VIII. See also Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). Eighth Amendment protection extends to conditions of confinement that pose a substantial risk of serious harm to health and safety. See Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners "from violence at the hands of other inmates." See Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff's Dep't, 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). Such constitutional tort claims against federal officers are brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 n.1 (7th Cir. 2011). "[F]ederal prisoners suing under Bivens may sue relevant officials in their individual capacity only." Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2005).

The allegations in the complaint regarding Plaintiff being assaulted while C/O Humphrey was out of the unit may suggest an Eighth Amendment "failure to protect" claim. However, a prison official may be liable "only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Proving deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of negligent or even grossly negligent behavior. Id. at 835. Rather, the corrections official must have acted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness. Id. at 836-37. The complaint, as pleaded, does not reasonably suggest that C/O Humphrey acted with deliberate indifference. Therefore, Count 1 will be dismissed without prejudice.

Count 2

Count 2 is premised upon the same general scenario as Count 1 regarding the assault against Plaintiff while C/O Humprey was away from his post.

Federal prisoners may bring suit under the FTCA for injuries sustained through the negligent acts of prison officials. Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir.2003) (discussing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963)). The FTCA is the exclusive avenue for securing monetary damages for the negligence of government employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Couch v. United States, 694 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir.2013). The United States is the only proper defendant to an FTCA case, thus explaining why Count 2 is lodged against the United States, as opposed to C/O Humphrey. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b).

An FTCA claim may be brought for:

[P]ersonal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

P...