Catalano v. City of Trenton

DANIEL CATALANO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TRENTON, MICHAEL PALINCZAR, PROSECUTOR WILSON, MARC McKITHEN, PARKING OFFICER OLIVER, DISPATCHER JACKSON, OFFICER CRUZ, EUNICE LEWIS, and SGT. HARRIS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-11646 (FLW) (DEA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

May 31, 2019

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, Chief United States District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, filed by Defendants the City of Trenton; Officer Michael Palinczar; Municipal Prosecutor Wilson; Municipal Court Judge Marc McKithen; Parking Officer Oliver; Police Sergeant Harris; Police Officer Cruz; Police Dispatcher Jackson; and a court staff member named Eunice Lewis (collectively, "Defendants"). Pro se Plaintiff Daniel Catalano ("Plaintiff") brought this suit against Defendants, alleging that they violated certain of his Constitutional rights when he was detained and charged with a disorderly conduct offense after attempting to file a citizen's complaint against various officials involved in a parking ticket hearing at municipal court.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on various grounds, including that the claims against Judge Mckithen and Prosecutor Wilson, respectively, are barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and that, in the alternative, qualified immunity bars all of Plaintiff's claims.

For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part. In sum, all of Plaintiff's claims are dismissed, except for Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and Fourth Amendment false arrest/false imprisonment claims against Officer Palinczar.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 11, 2018, Plaintiff, a resident of Ewing, New Jersey, appeared for a hearing at the Trenton Municipal Court to contest the two parking tickets that he had recently received. FAC at ¶¶ 1-2. While the FAC contains allegations related to the merits of the parking ticket dispute, those facts are generally not relevant to Plaintiff's claims.¹ Plaintiff alleges that, at the hearing, Judge McKithen refused to hear certain of Plaintiff's arguments, including barring Plaintiff from giving a closing argument, and that Prosecutor Wilson allegedly "suborned perjury," by attempting to "cover[ ] up" a witness's—Officer Oliver—inaccurate testimony. Id.at ¶¶ 3-12. Ultimately, Plaintiff was found to have violated a parking ordinance, and ordered to pay a $65.00 fine. Id. at ¶ 13.

The following day, Plaintiff went to the Trenton Police Station to pay the fine and also to file a citizen's complaint against several officials involved in the parking ticket hearing, including Judge McKithen, Prosecutor Wilson, and Officer Oliver. Id. at ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, the court clerk, Lewis, began to provide Plaintiff with the necessary paperwork, but "then when she realized [Plaintiff] was filing charges against a co-worker [she] refused to provide [him] with the paperwork." Id. at ¶ 14. At this point, Plaintiff began recording the exchange on his camera. Id. at ¶ 15. Lewis allegedly then told Plaintiff that recording was not permitted, but apparently backed off when Plaintiff refused to stop. Id. at ¶ 16.

Soon after, Officer Palinczar, who had allegedly been present at Plaintiff's parking ticket hearing the day before, arrived and told Plaintiff that he was "wasting the courts [sic] time over $65.00." Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Officer Palinczar then allegedly left to "run [Plaintiff's] name through [the National Crime Information Center, or NCIC]...hop[ing] a warrant would pop up in NCIC." Id. at ¶ 21. Minutes later, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Palinczar returned, yelling that there was an outstanding warrant against Plaintiff for violating parole, and ordered that Plaintiff be handcuffed. Id. at ¶ 23. After Plaintiff was handcuffed and had his phone taken, Officer Palinczar allegedly took Plaintiff to a back room, where he "mocked [Plaintiff] about how stupid he is." Id. at ¶ 24. However, while waiting in the back room, Plaintiff allegedly overheard that there had been "a mistake" and, in fact, no warrant existed against Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 25. Officer Palinczar then allegedly placed Plaintiff into a cell and handcuffed Plaintiff to a bench while he discussed with other officers (it is unclear who the other officers are) how to charge Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 26. Officer Palinczar returned and handed Plaintiff a ticket for "improper behavior," but, accordingto Plaintiff, would not explain to Plaintiff the basis for the charge. Id. at ¶ 26. After being given the ticket, Plaintiff was released, and he attempted to return to the clerk's window to both pay his $65.00 fine and get the paperwork to file a citizen's complaint; however, Officer Palinczar allegedly forced him to leave the police station without being able to pay the fine or file a complaint. Id. at ¶ 33.

Plaintiff brought suit on July 16, 2018, alleging that Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as separately asserting claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and "criminal conspiracy to cover up wrongs by T.P.D." Complaint at p. 4. On September 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed the FAC, this time naming all the present defendants and asserting the same claims. On October 26, 2018, Defendants filed the present motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment. In relation to their summary judgment motion, Defendants have included only one exhibit: the FAC in this case. Thus, "because the documents submitted in connection with Defendants' motions are pleadings prepared by Plaintiff and other judicial documents well within the scope of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the Court need not convert Defendants' motions into motions for summary judgment and will, instead, consider these motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)." Great W. Min. & Mineral Co. v. ADR Options, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 749, 760 (D.N.J. 2012), aff'd, 533 F. App'x 132 (3d Cir. 2013).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint inthe light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Under this standard, the factual allegations set forth in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).

However, Rule 12(b)(6) only requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint must include "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element. This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citation and quotations omitted); Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A] claimant does not have to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. The pleading standard is not akin to a probability requirement; to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint merely has to state a plausible claim for relief." (citation and quotations omitted)).

Under the current pleading regime, when a court considers a dismissal motion, three sequential steps must be taken: first, "it must take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotationsomitted). Next, the court "should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. (quotations omitted). Lastly, "when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (quotations and brackets omitted).

Additionally, it is well recognized that the pleading standards required by pro se plaintiffs in a complaint are less stringent than the formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 596 (1972). Therefore, "[c]ourts are to construe complaints so "as to do substantial justice," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally. Alston v. Parker, 363 F. 3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F. 3d 365,369 (3d Cir. 2003)).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss on the following grounds: 1) judicial immunity as to Judge McKithen, 2) prosecutorial immunity as to Prosecutor Wilson; 3) failure to state a claim as to all of Plaintiff's constitutional claims; and 4) qualified immunity.² I will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Judicial Immunity

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims against Judge McKithen should be dismissed due to judicial immunity. "The Supreme...