Cater v. Sanders

1

CHARLES O. CATER Plaintiff v. BRIAN SANDERS, et al. Defendants

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-P675-RGJ

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

February 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge United States District Court

This matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff Charles O. Cater's pro se civil-rights complaint [DE 1] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff's claims and allow others to go forward.

I.

Plaintiff a federal pretrial detainee when he filed this lawsuit, names as Defendants Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Agent Brian Sanders; Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Scott Davis Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD) Detectives Jason Clapton and C. King; LMPD/DEA Task Force Officer Daniel Evans; and U.S. Attorney Russell M. Coleman. He alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments stemming from the search of his house and his arrest in February 2018. He indicates on the complaint form that all Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff attaches to his complaint an 18-page “Declaration and Affidavit,” [DE 1-1], which the Court also considers in conducting its initial review. That declaration describes an investigation into a drug-trafficking organization by the Louisville Field Division of the DEA beginning in November 2016. According to the declaration, after the investigation began, a third-party buyer was killed in January 2018 by two members of the drug-trafficking organization. Plaintiff's declaration states that the DEA, “upon learning of [Plaintiff's] involvement, . . . conducted surveillance of [Plaintiff] on multiple occasions” and, thereby, located Plaintiff's residence.

Plaintiff alleges that on February 23, 2018, a search of his home occurred, resulting in damage to his residence. He alleges that Defendants Sanders, Clapton, and Evans violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and also violated his Eighth Amendment rights “by threatening [him] with cruel, inflicted punishment” on that date. He also alleges that Defendants King, Coleman, and Davis violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects on that date but does not further elaborate.

According to Plaintiff, the search took place pursuant to a search warrant sought by Defendants Sanders, Clapton, Evans, which he alleges was “boilerplate” and “based upon no probable cause.” In his declaration, he explains that the offense description for the search warrant was “Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine.” It was signed by a Magistrate Judge of this Court and lists Defendant Sanders as the affiant. In his declaration, Plaintiff names Defendants King and Evans as taking part in the search.

Also on February 23, 2018, Plaintiff was arrested by “LMPD” and taken to the “Federal Building in Louisville.” Plaintiff states in his declaration that he arrived at the Federal Building between 9:20 to 9:30 a.m. and that he was questioned from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. by Defendants Sanders and Clapton even though his “rights” were not read to him until 11:30 a.m. He further alleges that at that time Defendant Coleman violated Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right that no one should be held to answer for a capital crime unless on a “presentment” or “grand jury indictment,” as well as his Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He further alleges that on that day Defendant Davis violated (1) the Fifth Amendment by holding him to answer to a capital or otherwise infamous crime; (2) the Eighth Amendment; and (3) Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.

On February 26, 2018, according to Plaintiff's declaration, a hearing was held; the charges against him were read to him (a charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and a charge of use/possession/discharge of a firearm during and relating to a drug-trafficking crime causing the death of another person); and the court appointed him a lawyer, but not his preferred lawyer. The complaint alleges that, also on that date, Defendants Clapton and Sanders violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by “involuntary servitude.” Plaintiff additionally appears to allege that his equal-protection rights were violated.

Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief of a “protection order for family” and to “freeze all assets until outcome of suit[]/appoint special master.”

The Court takes judicial notice that the criminal charges and prosecution which Plaintiff's complaint concerns is United States v. Cater, 3:18-cr-46-RGJ-3. After Plaintiff filed his complaint, a jury trial was held in his criminal case, and the jury convicted Plaintiff on charges of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, violent crime/drugs/machine gun, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury found him not guilty on counts of use/possession/discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime resulting in murder and conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness tampering). United States v. Cater, 3:18-cr-46-RGJ-3, DE 395. Sentencing is set for March 22, 2023. Id. Post-trial motions are currently under consideration in that case.

II.

When a prisoner seeks relief from governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, the trial court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

III.

A. Requested injunctive relief

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief of a “protection order for family” and to “freeze all assets until outcome of suit[]/appoint special master.” He does not explain what he means by his requested relief. For example, he does not explain which “family” needs a protection order, although he presumably means his own family, and he does not indicate from what his family needs protection. Similarly, he does not explain what or whose assets he wants frozen, or why, and his request for a “special master” presumably belongs in his criminal, not this, case. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss his requests for injunctive relief.

B. Official-capacity claims

First, the Court notes that some Defendants are federal employees and some are employed by local government. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code is the operative statute for civil-rights claims against Defendants employed by a state or local government, whereas civil-rights suits against federal employees are brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Section 1983 actions and Bivens actions are analogous. See King v. Fuller, No. 4:08-cv-36, 2008 WL 4613076, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 15, 2008) (finding “a Bivens action is analogous to an action under § 1983” and noting that “the decisional law developed under § 1983 generally applies in Bivens-type actions”).

The law recognizes a difference in whether official-capacity claims may be brought against federal versus state or local government employees. Federal employees sued in their official capacity are immune from suit unless sovereign immunity has been expressly waived. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 870 (6th Cir. 2002). “Bivens did not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the United States or that of a federal agency.” Scott v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 2:21-CV-11146, 2021 WL 2895293, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2021). The Court, therefore, will dismiss the Bivens claims against Defendants Sanders, Davis, Coleman, and Evans (to the extent that he was acting as a DEA Task Force Officer) in their official capacities for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The official-capacity claims against Louisville Metro employees Defendants Clapton, King, and Evans (to the extent that he is a metro police officer) fail to state a claim for a different reason.

“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., ...