Cates v. City of Waller

GRACIE CATES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WALLER, ET AL., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-22-118

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

April 19, 2022

MEMORANDUM & OPINION

Lee H Rosenthal Chief United States District Judge

Seth Samsel was convicted in Waller County, Texas, for sexually assaulting Gracie Cates in 2017, when she was 16 years old.^[1] Samsel was 19 at the time. He received no jail time, but he has to register as a sex offender. Cates, who is now 20 years old, has sued Samsel; his father, Matthew Samsel, a City of Houston police officer; the City of Waller; Waller County and the detectives who investigated Cates's sexual assault allegations against Samsel. Cates alleges that the defendants “conspired to obstruct the investigation [of Seth Samsel], ” to “assure that [he] would not be prosecuted or convicted of the rape of the Plaintiff or that a meaningful investigation would be conducted, ” because Samsel was the son of a Houston police officer. (Docket Entry No. 20, at 4-5). Despite this alleged obstruction, Samsel was prosecuted and convicted, and he is meeting his registration obligations.

The City of Waller and Waller County have moved for judgment on the pleadings on Cates's federal claims under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983 and 1985. (Docket Entry No. 24). Based on the motion, the response, and the applicable case law, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. Cates's claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 are dismissed with prejudice. Because the federal claims provided the only basis for federal jurisdiction, Cates's remaining state-law claims are dismissed, without prejudice.

I. Background

Cates's sexual assault allegations were investigated by two Waller County detectives, Nanci Anderson and Bryan Dasher. (Docket Entry No. 20, at 6). Cates alleges that Anderson and Dasher “conspired to obstruct justice by failing to conduct any meaningful investigation” into the sexual assault allegations, “in an effort to prevent [Matthew Samsel's] 19-yr-old son from being prosecuted.” (Id., at 4). Specifically, Cates alleges that:

• Anderson “fail[ed] to allow [Cates] and her mother to make statements to officers that would assist the investigation”;

• Anderson and Dasher “failed to collect any physical evidence from the victim, ” including a “green towel associated with the criminal case, ” even though Cates and her mother had “saved the towel and made multiple attempts to get the towel to Anderson”;

• Anderson and Dasher “concealed and destroyed evidence, ” by destroying Seth Samsel's recorded interview, and by “fail[ing] to record interviews with witnesses”;

• Anderson did not contact Cates after her initial report and interview until “the day before Anderson was scheduled to testify at Seth Samsel's criminal trial, two years later”;

• Anderson “ignored [Cates] and the investigation” because “she did not approve of [Cates's] boyfriend, her boyfriend's behavior, of [Cates] being around the boyfriend's parent's home”;

• Anderson did not “contact[] the DPS lab about the collection of evidence” until “days before the trial . . . after it was too late”;

• Anderson repeatedly ignored phone calls from Cates's mother;

• Anderson “refused to collect DNA that would have been present on [Cates's] bedding”;

• Anderson and Dasher “shared critical information with the Samsels about the investigation that suspects should not be privileged to”; and,

• Anderson, Dasher, and other officers “allowed and encouraged . . . Matthew Samsel to illegally participate in the investigation and the grand jury proceedings.”

(Id., at 3-7).

Despite this alleged interference, Seth Samsel was prosecuted, and successfully. A jury convicted him of the sexual assault charged. Cates alleges that during the trial, the prosecutors “put Anderson on the stand [at trial], as essentially an adverse witness, [to] have her explain why she botched the investigation and her failures and why the evidence was not collected, destroyed, or missing.” (Id., at 9). Anderson's response was that she did not believe Cates to be credible. (Id.).

Cates alleges that the actions by Anderson and Dasher to obstruct the investigation have “disturbed” her ability to bring civil claims against Samsel because “the same evidence that was not collected, tested, and or [sic] destroyed by defendants to support the criminal charges is the same evidence [Cates] could use to support her civil claims.” (Id., at 10). Cates also appears to suggest that Samsel did not receive a prison sentence because of the lack of “evidence that was never collected or investigated to use against him.” (Id., at 5).

Cates also alleges that the “City of Waller failed to properly supervise, train, or discipline Anderson [and Dasher].” (Id., at 11). Anderson was “later terminated due to her failure to properly investigate crimes, ” and Dasher “is currently on bond after being indicted for a third-degree felony alleging [that] he misused official information for personal reasons.” (Id., at 5, 11).

The City and County have moved for judgment on the pleadings, alleging that Cates has failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 because she has not pleaded facts showing a policy or practice “by City or County officers in covering up crimes or performing deficient investigations to protect a suspect” and has not alleged any “constitutional violation by a city or county actor.” (Docket Entry No. 24). The City and County also assert that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because “Cates has no standing to complain of how her criminal complaint was investigated and prosecuted.” (Id., at 15).

The motion to dismiss and the parties' arguments are addressed below.

II. The Legal Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff has the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. “Courts may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three different bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986).

A court lacks power to decide a claim when a plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claim. Standing requires: “(1) an ‘injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.” Croft v. Governor of Tex., 562 F.3d 735, 745 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). As “the party invoking federal jurisdiction, ” the plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. They must meet this burden “with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation, ” which means that “on a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege facts that give rise to a plausible claim of . . . standing.” Cornerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 134 (2009).

B. Rule 12(c)

“A motion brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). The Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards are the same. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010).

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. Analysis

Cates's allegations are far from clear. Cates alleges in her complaint, as a single cause of action, a “civil conspiracy to obstruct justice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, First Amendment violation, Equal Protection, and Violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1985 [and] 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.” The City and County have moved to dismiss Cates's federal claims based on what she “appears to allege.”

(Docket Entry No. 24, at 11). Cates's response does not sufficiently clarify the allegations. Cates, who is represented by counsel, describes her claims in at least three different ways. First, Cates writes:

In addition to the Civil conspiracy claims to obstruct [j]ustice[, ] plaintiff brings claims for equal protection under the 14th amendment. Defendants[] Waller County, The City of Waller, William Llewellyn, and Elton Mathis, failed to supervise officers Nanci

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