Cates v. Sandoval

JACK NORMAN CATES, Plaintiff, v. JESUS SANDOVAL, Individually and as an Officer of the Durham Police Department;THE CITY OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA; THE DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT;and THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA, Defendants.

1:20cv200

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

September 22, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

Plaintiff Jack Norman Cates brings this action against Defendants Jesus Sandoval and the Durham Police Department, the City of Durham, and the City Council of the City of Durham (collectively "City of Durham" or "City Defendants") alleging multiple counts stemming from an investigation of Cates in January 2017. (Doc. 3.) Before the court are motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Sandoval (Doc. 7) and the City of Durham (Doc. 9), as well as a motion to amend the complaint filed by Cates (Doc. 21). The motions are fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, Cates's motion to amend his complaint will be granted, Sandoval's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, and the City of Durham's motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the court grants Cates's motion to amend his complaint, the court recounts the facts as set out in the proposed pleading in the light most favorable to Cates.

Cates was an agent with the Alcohol Law Enforcement ("ALE") branch of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI") when, in January 2017, a woman alleged he and other ALE agents raped, kidnapped, and sexually assaulted her. (Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 8, 10.) Defendant Jesus Sandoval, a Durham Police Department officer, investigated the sexual assault complaint against Cates, ultimately applying for and obtaining a search warrant as to him. (Id. ¶¶ 12-15.) According to Cates, the sexual assault allegations against him were false. (Id. ¶ 11.) Moreover, Cates alleges that Sandoval and the Durham Police Department "knew or should have known that there was no legal basis" for the search warrant, because a surveillance videotape that Sandoval allegedly viewed before applying for the warrant showed there was no sexual assault. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.) As a result of the search warrant, Cates claims he was "detained by the North Carolina SBI at SBI headquarters" where he "was not permitted to leave on his accord" and was "humiliated by being exhibited to colleagues and co-workers." (Id. ¶ 16.)

Cates filed a five-count complaint on January 10, 2020, inthe General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division in Durham County, North Carolina, alleging false imprisonment and arrest (Count I); assault and battery (Count II); violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (Count III); violations of Article I, Sections 18 and 20 of the North Carolina Constitution (Count IV); and "infliction of emotional distress" (Count V). (Doc. 3.) On March 2, 2020, Defendants filed their Notice of Removal with this court. (Doc. 1.) On March 9, 2020, both Sandoval and the City of Durham filed motions to dismiss. (Docs. 7, 9.) In response, on April 29, 2020, Cates moved to amend his complaint (Doc. 21), and Sandoval has responded to that motion (Doc. 24).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Amend Complaint

Because Cates moved to amend his complaint in response to the pending motions to dismiss, the court must decide whether the dispositive motions have been rendered moot. While this is true in some cases, here the proposed amendments are minor and the parties have addressed the merits of the new allegations in the combined briefing. Judicial efficiency therefore warrants addressing all motions at this time, starting with the motion to amend the complaint.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, once 21 days elapses from service of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff may amenda pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave should be freely given "when justice so requires." Id. Leave to amend will be denied only if (1) the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, (2) there is bad faith on the part of the moving party, or (3) the amendment would be futile. Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Here, more than 21 days elapsed since Defendants filed their motions to dismiss Cates's original complaint. And it is unclear if Cates has the consent of the parties to amend.¹

The proposed amendments are relatively minor. Cates has essentially added limited facts to his prior complaint. For example, he alleges that the sexual assault allegations against him were false, that Sandoval should have known they were false, that he was detained by the SBI as a result of the allegedly improper search warrant Sandoval obtained, and that he was falsely arrested on or about January 12, 2017, at North Carolina SBI headquarters. (See Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 11, 12, 16, 21.)

There are no allegations of bad faith on the part of Cates,²nor would amendment be futile. There is also no prejudice. See Laber, 438 F.3d at 427 (prejudicial amendment is one that raises a new legal theory right before trial, as opposed to an amendment that merely adds a new theory of recovery before any discovery); Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Because defendant was from the outset made fully aware of the events giving rise to the action, an allowance of the amendment could not in any way prejudice the preparation of the defendant's case."). Given the early stage of litigation, the fact that Defendants would have been on notice of the general nature of Cates's allegations from his original complaint, and the strong policy in favor of granting leave to amend, the court will grant Cates's motion to amend. (Doc. 21.)

B. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is meant to "test[] the sufficiency of a complaint" and not to "resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive such a motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In considering the motion, a court will "assume as true all . . . well-pleaded facts and drawall reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017). "Rule 12(b)(6) protects against meritless litigation by requiring sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level so as to nudge the claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Sauers v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 544, 550 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (alterations and quotations omitted). Mere legal conclusions are not accepted as true, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

1. Defendant Jesus Sandoval

Sandoval first raises a defense of public official immunity as to Cates's common law tort counts. (See Doc. 8 at 5-6.) Sandoval is being sued in both his official and individual capacities. As for official capacity immunity, "a municipality and its officers or employees sued in their official capacities are immune from suit for torts committed while the officers or employees are performing a governmental function." Mullins by Mullins v. Friend, 449 S.E.2d 227, 230 (N.C. App. 1994). "A police officer in the performance of his duties is engaged in a governmental function." Id. While a city can waive its official immunity, see id., the plaintiff has to allege waiver, which Cates has not done. Accordingly, Cates failed to state a claim againstSandoval in his official capacity.

Turning to individual immunity, "[t]he general rule is that a public official is immune from personal liability for mere negligence in the performance of his duties, but is not immune if his actions were corrupt or malicious or if he acted outside and beyond the scope of his duties." Id. Police officers are public officials. Shuping v. Barber, 365 S.E.2d 712, 716 (N.C. App. 1988). As Sandoval acknowledges, public official immunity can be overcome when a police officer is alleged to have acted with malice by want of probable cause. See Doc. 8 at 6; Fowler v. Valencourt, 423 S.E.2d 785, 788 (N.C. App. 1992), rev'd in part, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993) ("[M]alice can be inferred from the want of probable cause alone."). Here, Cates has alleged that Sandoval knew the sexual assault allegations against Cates were false because he watched the surveillance tape showing as much. (Doc. 21-1 ¶¶ 11-12.) To the extent that Sandoval allegedly saw the tape and knew that no sexual assault had occurred, and with no other facts in the record before the court at this time, it is plausible that Sandoval lacked probable cause to support the search warrant for Cates. Accordingly, accepting as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint for the purposes of the present motion, the court finds that Sandoval cannot be determined to have individual public official immunity at this time.

Having addressed the immunity issues, the court turns to thefive counts in Cates's amended complaint.

Count I alleges false imprisonment and arrest. "A false arrest is an arrest without legal authority and is one means of committing a false imprisonment." Marlowe v. Piner, 458 S.E.2d 220, 223 (N.C. App. 1995). Cates has alleged that he was "falsely arrested and imprisoned on one or more occasions, and specifically on or about January 12, 2017 at North Carolina SBI headquarters." (Doc. 21-1 ¶ 22.) The complaint provides minimal details, and elsewhere refers to Cates being merely "detained" on this same...