Cattrell Family Woodlands, LLC v. Baruffi

184 N.E.3d 186

CATTRELL FAMILY WOODLANDS, LLC and Mitchell Cattrell, Successor Trustee of the Katherine F. Cattrell Revocable Trust, Date September 7, 1995, as Amended, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.Chera M. BARUFFI and Linda Lee Ragsdale and Alisa M. Ottaviana and William L. McKeel, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 20 JE 0023

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Jefferson County.

December 27, 2021

Atty. Sean Richard Scullin, Scullin & Cunning LLC, 940 Windham Court, Suite 4, Boardman, Ohio 44512, for Plaintiffs-Appellees Cattrell Family Woodlands, LLC and Mitchell Cattrell, Successor Trustee of the Katherine F. Cattrell Revocable Trust, dated September 7, 1995, as amended.

Atty. Gregory W. Watts, Krugliak Wilkins Griffiths & Dougherty Co., LPA, 4775 Munson Street NW, P.O. Box 36963, Canton Ohio 44735-6963, for Defendant-Appellant Chera M. Baruffi.

Atty. Lawrence T. Piergallini, 131 Third Street, P.O. Box 7, Tiltonsville, Ohio 43963, for Linda Lee Ragsdale, Alisa M. Ottaviano nka Alisa M. Willson and William L. McKeel.

BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, David A. D'Apolito, Judges.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

WAITE, J.

{¶1} In this action involving the Marketable Title Act ("MTA"), Appellants Cattrell Family Woodlands LLC and Mitchell Cattrell, successor trustee of the Katherine F. Cattrell revocable trust, appeal two judgment entries of the Jefferson County Common Pleas Court. In one entry, dated November 18, 2020, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees Chera M. Baruffi, Linda Lee Ragsdale, Alisa M. Ottaviano, and William L. McKeel. In a second entry, also dated November 18, 2020, the court quieted title in favor of Appellees. Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously determined the root of title deed included a specific reference to preserve the mineral interests in favor of Appellees under to R.C. 5301.49(A). Pursuant to Erickson v. Morrison, 165 Ohio St.3d 76, 2021-Ohio-746, 176 N.E.3d 1, and O'Kelley v. Rothenbuhler , 2021-Ohio-1167, 171 N.E.3d 775 (7th Dist.), Appellants’ argument has merit and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the trial court's order quieting title is vacated. Summary judgment is entered in favor of Appellants.

Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} At issue, here, are the mineral interests underlying 12.81 acres of property located in Saline Township, Jefferson County. The property is a part of a larger tract of land that has been the subject of several transfers. On June 16, 1921, William Cox deeded the property to Joseph Veres:

[E]xcepting and reserving therefrom all coal underlying said tracts, and one half of all oil and gas with the right to mine, have and reserve the same and all timber over seven and one-fourth inches in diameter and Interest of the said William Cox a single person, either in Law or Equity, of, in and to the said premises; Together with all the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, and all the rents, issues, and profits thereof[.]

(1/28/20 Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 2.)

{¶3} On March 23, 1940, Roland C. and Amy Francy Bushfield conveyed the property to Jefferson S. Bushfield. The deed was recorded on March 29, 1940. This deed constitutes the root of title in this matter. The deed includes language: "Excepting and reserving all the coal underlying said tracts, and one half of all oil and gas with right to mine, bore and remove the same, more or less, but subject to all legal highways." (1/28/20 Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 5.)

{¶4} On November 13, 1979, a certificate of transfer was filed after the death of Jefferson S. Bushfield. The certificate of title transferred the property to Heritage Bank, Trustee. The certificate of title did not reference the Cox interest.

{¶5} In September of 1991, Bank One Ohio Trust Company, as successor in interest to Heritage Bank, transferred the property to David J. Adams. Neither the certificate of title nor the accompanying deed referred to the Cox reservation.

{¶6} On August 2, 1999, a certificate of transfer was filed following the death of David James Adams. In accordance, the property was conveyed to David C. Adams and Ruth A. Adams. The certificate of title also did not refer to the Cox reservation.

{¶7} On March 30, 2001, a certificate of transfer was filed after the death of David C. Adams. The certificate of transfer conveyed the property to Ruth A. Adams. Again, the certificate of title did not refer to the Cox reservation.

{¶8} On August 25, 2005, a certificate of transfer was filed concerning the estate of Ruth A. Adams. Within the certificate of transfer, the property was transferred to Beckie A. King and Todd S. Adams.

{¶9} On July 7, 2009, Beckie A. King and Todd S. Adams conveyed the property to Chera M. Baruffi. The deed did not mention the Cox reservation.

{¶10} On April 1, 2019, Appellant Cattrell Family Woodlands, LLC, filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Cox interest had been abandoned under the DMA. We note that the complaint involved two separate interests, however, only the Cox interest is at issue, here. Appellees filed an answer. On January 28 and 29, 2020, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. On May 18, 2020, the trial court held a hearing. On June 23, 2020, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

{¶11} On July 16, 2020, the trial court vacated the order after the discovery of an indispensable party. The court allowed Appellant Cattrell Family Woodlands, LLC, to amend the complaint to add any necessary party. Appellees filed an amended complaint, adding as an additional plaintiff Mitchell Cattrell, successor trustee of the Katherine F. Cattrell revocable trust. Appellees filed an amended answer and counterclaim. It appears that the MTA claim arose during these pleadings for the first time. On November 18, 2020, the court again granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. On November 30, 2020 and January 2, 2021, the court ordered quiet title in favor of Appellees. It is from these entries that Appellants timely appeal.

General Law

{¶12} The MTA was enacted to extinguish stale interests and claims in land that existed prior to the root of title, with "the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title." Erickson at ¶ 16.

{¶13} Marketable record title is defined as an unbroken chain of title to an interest in land for forty years or more. R.C. 5301.48. Marketable record title "shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title." R.C. 5301.50. "Marketable record title therefore ‘operates to extinguish’ all other prior interests." Erickson at ¶ 16, citing R.C. 5301.47(A).

{¶14} However, there are several exceptions, which are referred to as "savings events," that act to prevent those interests from being extinguished. These savings events are described in R.C. 5301.49. R.C. 5301.49(A) is relevant, here, and provides:

All interests and defects which are inherent in the muniments of which such chain of record title is formed; provided that a general reference in such muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions, or other interests created prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification be made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates such easement, use restriction, or other interest * * *.

{¶15} R.C. 5301.47(E) defines the "root of title" as "that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person * * * which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined."

{¶16} Whether a reference is general or specific has been the subject of much debate over the years. We previously addressed this issue in Blackstone v. Moore , 7th Dist., 2017-Ohio-5704, 94 N.E.3d 108, aff'd, 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132. In Blackstone , we held that a conveyance need not include the volume and page number of the reference in order to be specific.

{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the ruling and created a three-step inquiry: "(1) Is there an interest described within the chain of title? (2) If so, is the reference to that interest a ‘general reference’? (3) If the answers to the first two questions are yes, does the general reference contain a specific identification of a recorded title transaction?" Blackstone v. Moore , 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 12. The Court also provided the following definitions of general and specific references:

Because the term "general reference" is not defined in the act, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term. Stewart v. Vivian , 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 26. "General" is defined as "marked by broad overall character without being limited, modified, or checked by narrow precise considerations: concerned with main elements, major matters rather than limited details, or universals rather than particulars: approximate rather than strictly accurate." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 944 (2002).

Our caselaw distinguishes between a general reference and a specific reference: if a reference is specific, it is not a general reference. SeeToth [v. Berks Title Ins. Co., ] 6 Ohio St.3d at 341, 453 N.E.2d 639 [1983]. "Specific" is defined as "characterized by precise formulation or accurate restriction (as in stating, describing, defining, reserving): free from such ambiguity as results from careless lack of precision or from omission of pertinent matter." Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2187.

Id. at ¶ 13-14.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The trial court erred in finding Defendants, Linda Lee Ragsdale, Alisa M. Ottaviano, and

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