Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki

Page 266

165 F.Supp.2d 266

THE CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK, et al., Plaintiffs and The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma and the United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. George E. PATAKI, as Governor of the State of New York, et. al., Defendants.

No. 80-CV-930.

No. 80-CV-960.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

October 2, 2001.

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Rubinbaum LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Cayuga Indian Nation of New York, New York, NY, Martin R. Gold, Esq., Raymond J. Heslin, Esq., Of Counsel.

Mariscal Weeks McIntryre & Friedlander, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenors The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma, Phoenix, AZ, Glenn M. Feldman, Esq., Brian Mueller, Esq., Of Counsel.

Hank Meshorer, Esq., Special Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Division, Attorney for Plaintiff-Invenor United States, Special Litigation Section, Washington, D.C., Roger R. Martella, Jr., Asst. Section Chief Indian Resources Section, Of Counsel.

Hon. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Attorney for State Defendants, Albany, NY, David B. Roberts, Howard L. Zwickel, Christopher Hall, John Pickett, Assistant Attorneys General, Of Counsel.

Huber Lawrence & Abell, Attorneys for Def. New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, New York, NY, Theodore F. Duver, Esq., Of Counsel.

Goodwin Procter & Hoar, Attorneys for Miller Brewing and Def. Class, Boston, Mass., Anthony M. Feeherry, Esq., Of Counsel.

Harris Beach & Wilcox, Attorneys for Def. Counties, Rochester, NY, Brian Laudadio, Esq., Of Counsel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

MCCURN, Senior District Judge.

                               Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................... 271
Background ............................................................. 272
      I. Pre-Trial Motions ............................................. 272
     II. Jury Instructions ............................................. 273
    III. Verdict ....................................................... 273
Discussion ............................................................. 275
      I. Verdict ....................................................... 275
     II. Pre-Judgment Interest ......................................... 284
         A. Wickham Analysis ........................................... 286
            1. Full Compensation ....................................... 286

              2. Nature of Statute ................................................ 288
              3. "Other General Principles" ....................................... 291
              4. Fairness of Relative Equities .................................... 293
                 a. Burden of Proof ............................................... 297
Historical Evidence ............................................................... 300
       I. Pre-Revolutionary War ................................................... 304
      II. American Revolution ..................................................... 305
          A. Wyoming Valley ....................................................... 305
          B. Sullivan-Clinton Campaign ............................................ 306
          C. Articles of Confederation ............................................ 309
          D. Cayuga Factions ...................................................... 309
          E. 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaties ........................................... 310
          F. Livingston Lease ..................................................... 312
          G. 1789 Treaty at Albany ................................................ 314
          H. Nonintercourse Act ................................................... 321
          I. Richardson Lease ..................................................... 322
          J. 1793 State Statute ................................................... 324
             1. Aftermath of the 1793 Statute ..................................... 327
          K. 1794 Federal Treaty of Canandaigua ................................... 328
          L. New York State's 1795 Act and the Council of Revision ................ 330
          M. 1795 Treaty of Cayuga Ferry .......................................... 331
             1. State's Awareness of Nonintercourse Act ........................... 332
                 a. Pre-1795 Awareness ............................................ 332
                 b. 1795 Awareness ................................................ 334
             2. Negotiation Process ............................................... 340
             3. Commissioners' Conflicts of Interests ............................. 343
             4. Sale of Former Cayuga Lands ....................................... 346
             5. Adequacy of Consideration ......................................... 347
          N. 1807 Treaty .......................................................... 351
          O. 1807 Onward .......................................................... 353
             1. "Bad Faith" ....................................................... 355
             2. Delay ............................................................. 356
Economic Evidence ................................................................. 358
Conclusion ........................................................................ 366

Introduction

On January 18, 2000, the court commenced with jury selection in this historic land claim litigation. The court's resolution of the liability issues,¹ left only one issue for the jury's consideration — the amount of compensation, if any, to which the tribal plaintiffs, the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma ("the Cayuga"),² were entitled for the loss of their tribal lands over two centuries ago. Nineteen days, six witnesses, whose testimony comprises the nearly 3,000 page trial transcript, and approximately 130 exhibits later, on February 17, 2000, the jury rendered its verdict. It found the State of New York ("the State")³ liable to the Cayuga in the total amount of $36,911,672.62. Those damages were divided into two categories: (1) $1,911,672.62 for the fair rental value of the Cayuga's former homeland for 204 years; and (2) an additional $35,000,000.00 in damages for future loss use and possession of that same land.

Background

No less than twenty years of litigation preceded that jury verdict. Assuming familiarity with the protracted and at times convoluted history of this action, the court will not repeat that entire history herein. To place the issue of prejudgment interest which now dominates this litigation in context, however, an overview of some of this court's rulings in recent years, especially as to remedies, is in order.

I. Pre-Trial Motions

Faced with several motions in limine seeking to "severely limit the remedies available to the Cayugas[,]" in Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, No. 80-CV-930, 80-CV-960, 1999 WL 224615, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. April 15, 1999) ("Cayuga VIII"), the issue of prejudgment interest first arose. Holding that federal rather than state law governs the issue of the availability of prejudgment interest, this court recognized its "sweeping discretion to decide whether to award prejudgment interest ..., as well as [its] considerable latitude in establishing both the rate of interest and the accrual date." Id. at *17 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court declined to decide whether the Cayuga were entitled to recover prejudgment interest because at that time the record was not sufficiently developed.

The court also was operating in a "legal vacuum" because the parties had not addressed the factors which the Second Circuit in Wickham Contracting v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 955 F.2d 831 (2d Cir.1992), had identified as relevant in deciding "whether to award prejudgment interest[.]" See id. at *19 and *21. After reciting the Wickham factors, the court stressed that an award of prejudgment interest was not a foregone conclusion. Id. at *16.

With a date for jury selection looming, the parties sought further clarification on a variety of issues including, yet again, prejudgment interest. The court held that it would not receive proof of present day value during Phase I. In a final round of motions in limine made in anticipation of Phase I, the U.S. sought, inter alia, to have the court "reserv[e] to [itself] all issues of law and equity, leaving only fact issues as to the amount of damages for the jury[.]" Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 79 F.Supp.2d 78, 86 (N.D.N.Y.1999) ("Cayuga XII"). Adopting this approach, the court held that equitable issues such as laches would "be reserved to [it], and if necessary, the same may be the subject of post-trial motions and/or additional post-trial proceedings before the court, without a jury." Id. at 92.

II. Jury Instructions

At various points during Phase I the court instructed the jury in conformity with the pre-trial rulings outlined above. Among other things, in its preliminary instructions the court briefly explained the respective roles of the jury and the court, i.e., the court decides legal issues and the jury decides fact issues. Consistent with those different roles, the court further explained that the trial would occur in two phases. In Phase I the jury's task was to resolve the issue of the amount of damages, if any, to which the Cayuga would be entitled. The court then explained that there would be another proceeding after the jury trial where the Court would resolve certain equitable issues, such as interest.

At the close of the proof the court reiterated these points, explaining that "interest on the amount of any damages you may award, conversion to present day value of any past damages you may award," and "a possible...