Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King

297 P.3d 619

729 Utah Adv. Rep. 4

CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Shane KING, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 20110618.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 8, 2013.

Perrin R. Love, Wendy Bowden Crowther, Joseph D. Kesler, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Robert G. Cummings, Gordon A. Madsen, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, Justice DURHAM, and Justice LEE joined.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This case presents the issue of whether petitioner, Shane King, properly appealed after the district court entered an order denying his motion for a new trial. The court of appeals dismissed Mr. King's appeal based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. It held that under rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and our decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corporation, 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, Mr. King's appeal was not ripe because it was not taken from a final, appealable order. Mr. King argues that the district court's order was sufficiently final to trigger the appeal period under rule 7(f)(2). He additionally argues that our holding in Giusti is inapplicable because he seeks only to preserve, rather than to bar, appellate jurisdiction. Respondent, Central Utah Water Conservancy District (District), does not take a position on the issue.

¶ 2 Because the district court's order was not a final, appealable order under rule 7(f)(2), we hold that Mr. King's appeal was premature and that the court of appeals therefore correctly dismissed it without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On April 20, 2006, the District filed an action to condemn six waterfront lots owned by Mr. King. The District appraised the valueof the lots at $28,400. Based on the appraisal and negotiations with Mr. King, the District offered $48,600 for the lots. Mr. King did not accept the offer. When negotiations reached an impasse, the District instituted the underlying condemnation proceeding.

¶ 4 The condemnation action was tried to a jury solely on the issue of valuation. The jury returned a verdict for Mr. King in the amount of $56,100, plus statutory interest on a portion of the judgment. On November 22, 2010, Mr. King filed a motion for a new trial. On February 8, 2011, after considering the motion, the district court prepared, signed, and filed an order entitled “RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,” (Ruling and Order) denying Mr. King's motion.

¶ 5 Mr. King filed a notice of appeal on March 9, 2011, less than thirty days after the entry of the district court's Ruling and Order. Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. On April 11, 2011, the court of appeals filed a sua sponte motion for summary disposition and subsequently issued a per curiam opinion dismissing Mr. King's appeal without prejudice “based upon lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final, appealable order.” Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist. v. King, 2011 UT App 200, ¶ 1, 258 P.3d 633 (per curiam).

¶ 6 We granted certiorari on the sole issue of “[w]hether the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals erred in dismissing [Mr. King]'s appeal without prejudice on the ground [that] the order denying [the] motion for new trial did not satisfy the requirements of [our] decision in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corporation, 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, and rule 7(f)(2) of the [Utah] Rules of Civil Procedure.”

¶ 7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 78A-3-102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision below.” Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶ 16, 982 P.2d 572.

ANALYSIS

I. RULE 7(f)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RULE 4(c) OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE SPECIFY THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR APPELLATE JURISDICTION

¶ 9 A party may appeal only from a final, appealable order. UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a). Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the point at which a district court's decision becomes final, triggering the appeal period. The rule is designed to “prevent[ ] the confusion that often leads—as it has here—to additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a court's decision has triggered the appeal period.” Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 36, 201 P.3d 966.Rule 7(f)(2) provides that “[u]nless the [district] court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.”

¶ 10 The plain language of rule 7(f)(2) makes clear that the rule is a mandatory prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. Under rule 7(f)(2), the default provision is that the “prevailing party shall ... serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.” Id. (emphasis added). This default provision applies “unless” the district court approves the proposed order submitted with a party's initial memorandum or when the district court explicitly directs that no additional order is required. Id. Rule 7(f)(2) therefore provides district courts with the flexibility to finalize their decisions depending on the cases before them.

¶ 11 A companion to rule 7(f)(2), rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows a party to save a prematurely-filed notice of appeal. Rule 4(c) states that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.” Under rule 4(c), a party may file its notice of appeal before the entry of the court's final order. See, e.g., Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133 (1994). However, such a notice is not treated as filed until after the entry of the final order in accordance with rule 7(f)(2). See id. Though rule 4(c) offers a safe harbor for prematurely-filed notices of appeal, it nonetheless “requires the preparation and filing of an order to trigger finality for purposes of appeal” absent a district court's explicit direction that no such order is necessary. Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 6, 162 P.3d 1097.

II. RULE 7(f)(2) APPLIES TO ALL FINAL JUDGMENTS

¶ 12 In Code v. Utah Department of Health, we faced the issue of whether a district court's final disposition contained in a memorandum decision needed to comply with rule 7(f)(2). 2007 UT 43, ¶¶ 1–2, 162 P.3d 1097. We held that rule 7(f)(2) applies to memorandum decisions and minute entries. Id. ¶ 9. We stated that “[w]here rule 7(f)(2) requires that an order [submitted by a party] be filed, unless a court explicitly directs that no order needs to be submitted, no finality will be ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute entry for purposes of triggering the running of the time for appeal.” Id.

¶ 13 Despite our intention to ensure the uniform application of rule 7(f)(2), our statements in paragraph eight of Code muddied the waters. In dicta, we noted that we had, “on occasion, determined that finality supporting appellate jurisdiction exists by looking to the content and effect of a signed memorandum decision or minute entry ... [when] they resulted in the preservation of the appeal rights of the parties.” Id. ¶ 8. We cited Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985), and Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), as examples of such situations.

¶ 14 Two years later, in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corporation, we stated that “our broad holding in Code is inclusive of all final district court decisions, regardless of how they are styled.” 2009 UT 2, ¶ 32, 201 P.3d 966. Because “[r]ule 7(f)(2) applies to every final decision issued by a district court,” we did not draw a distinction between those instances where the application of rule 7(f)(2) was used to preserve appellate jurisdiction and those where it was denied. Id. ¶ 38. Indeed, such a distinction does not “support[ ] the judicial policy favoring finality” and only creates uncertainty in determining the beginning of the appeal period. Id. ¶ 36.

¶ 15 Because our decision in Giusti did not explicitly disavow the distinction we recognized in Code between preserving and denying appellate jurisdiction, we now clarify the necessity of compliance with rule 7(f)(2) and reiterate that the rule applies to all final decisions of a district court. In other words, rule 7(f)(2) applies whether a party seeks to preserve or deny appellate jurisdiction. In either case, the appeal period begins only after one of three events occurs: (1) the court approves an order submitted with an initial memorandum; (2) the court enters an order prepared by counsel and served on opposing counsel pursuant to rule 7(f)(2); or (3) the court explicitly directs that no additional order is necessary.

¶ 16 To the extent that our holdings in Dove, 710 P.2d 170, and Cannon, 692 P.2d 740, do not abide by the bright-line standard articulated in rule 7(f)(2), we overrule those cases. Further, the distinction between preserving and denying appellate jurisdiction that we recognized in paragraph eight of Code does not provide a basis for excusing compliance with rule 7(f)(2).

III. MR. KING'S APPEAL WAS NOT RIPE BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING AND ORDER WAS NEITHER FINAL NOR APPEALABLE

¶ 17 The factual situation now before us is analogous to those presented in Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corporation, 2009 UT 2, 201 P.3d 966, and Code v. Utah Department of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 P.3d 1097. Our decision therefore mirrors our reasoning in those cases. In both Giusti, 2009 UT 2, ¶¶ 37–38, 201 P.3d 966, and Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 9, 162 P.3d 1097, we held that an appeal was ripe only after strict...