In Tiburon Open Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 700, the First District Court of Appeal considered the adequacy of an EIR certified by Marin County (County) for a residential development. The Court rejected a number of arguments raised by opponents, most prominently the argument that the EIR erred in recognizing limits on the County’s discretion under two prior federal court stipulated judgments, and upheld the EIR. The opinion concludes with an acknowledgment that CEQA is manipulated to be a tool for obstruction of housing projects, and that the record in this case revealed extreme delay combined with local government animus, vindicating the worst fears of Supreme Court jurists and CEQA commentators.
The Martha Company (Martha) had sought for decades to develop housing on a 110-acre hilltop area (Project) in the County, overlooking the Town of Tiburon (Town) and the San Francisco Bay. The Project had long been controversial. It was repeatedly delayed due to intense local opposition and agency inaction, and was the subject of multiple lawsuits involving Martha and the County, as well as the Town and neighbors. The lawsuits resulted in two separate federal judgments entered pursuant to stipulated settlements, in 1976 and 2007, respectively. In both, the County agreed that Martha would be permitted to construct no less than 43 single-family homes on the property, and that the County would approve such a project. Though there were further delays, including another lawsuit alleging the County was not complying with the settlements, eventually the County certified an EIR and issued preliminary approvals for the Project in 2017. Tiburon Open Space Committee and other organizations (Petitioners) filed this suit soon after. The trial court granted the Town leave to intervene as well. The trial court denied the Petition and both Petitioners and the Town appealed.
Abdication of Authority
A central contention of the Town, which had also been raised in prior litigation, was that the County’s agreement to the settlements was akin to contracting away its police power. On this theory the Town argued that the settlements should be considered void and that the County’s approval of the 43-unit project, and rejection of a lower density alternative, was an abuse of discretion due to the limiting terms of the settlement agreements. In essence, the Town’s position was that the County never truly exercised its lawful discretion, considering itself to be constrained by the settlements, and instead its administrative proceedings “were a lengthy and pointless kabuki performance where every official knew what the final result would be.”
However, the Court found the argument to be meritless. First, it noted that the County had in fact exercised discretion in preparing the...
