Chacon v. Wilkinson

988 F.3d 1131

Ricardo CHACON, Petitioner,

v.Robert M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 18-71515

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted November 19, 2020^* San Francisco, California

Filed February 18, 2021

Geraldine Escalante, Hawthorne, California, for Petitioner.

Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Leslie McKay and Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Andrew D. Hurwitz, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

The principal question in this case is whether a federal conviction for importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), is categorically an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). We hold that it is and that petitioner is consequently ineligible for asylum.

I

Petitioner Ricardo Chacon is a native and citizen of El Salvador who unlawfully entered the United States in 2001 when he was about seven years old. For a time, he was granted Temporary Protected Status. In 2016, Chacon pleaded guilty to dealing in firearms without a license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). The district court sentenced Chacon to 30 months in prison.

In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings. Chacon conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief. As relevant here, the IJ found that Chacon's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualified as an "aggravated felony" conviction that precluded asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed and dismissed Chacon's appeal. Chacon now timely petitions for review.¹

II

Under the INA, an alien is ineligible for asylum if he has been convicted of a "particularly serious crime," which includes any "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i). The statute defines "aggravated felony" as a long list of offenses, including "illicit trafficking in firearms." Id. § 1101(a)(43)(C). Chacon was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), which makes it unlawful for any person "except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce." The legal question we address here, which we review de novo, Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft , 382 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004), is whether Chacon's federal conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) is an "aggravated felony" under the INA.

Because the statutory term "illicit trafficking in firearms" refers to a "generic crime," Nijhawan v. Holder , 557 U.S. 29, 37, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), we apply the "categorical" approach from Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). See Ho Sang Yim v. Barr , 972 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020). Under this methodology (and contrary to Chacon's argument on appeal), we do not consider the particular facts underlying a conviction. Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 190, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013). Instead, we "compare the elements of the statute of conviction with a federal definition of the crime to determine whether conduct proscribed by the statute is broader than the generic federal definition." Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder , 733 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). If the statute of conviction "criminalizes the same amount of conduct (or less) as the generic offense," there is a categorical match and the conviction qualifies as an "aggravated felony." Ho Sang Yim , 972 F.3d at 1083. But if the statute of conviction is broader than the INA's generic definition, the conviction is not categorically an "aggravated felony," and the immigration consequences attendant to that classification do not automatically follow. Rodriguez-Castellon , 733 F.3d at 853.²

Here, both statutes define "firearms" identically, using the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) ; 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result, the only question is whether the INA's definition of "illicit trafficking" aligns with what 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) prohibits. "Illicit trafficking" is not defined in the INA. In that circumstance, "[w]e defer to the BIA's articulation of the generic federal definition if ... the BIA's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Ho Sang Yim , 972 F.3d at 1077 (quotations omitted).

In Matter of Davis , 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 (BIA 1992), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Cazarez-Gutierrez , 382 F.3d at 911–12, the BIA analyzed the aggravated felony of "illicit trafficking in any controlled substance," now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). The BIA adopted the definition of "trafficking" in Black's Law Dictionary : " ‘Trading or dealing in certain goods and commonly used in connection with illegal narcotic sales.’ " Id. (quoting Trafficking, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)). The BIA observed that "[e]ssential to the term [‘trafficking’] in this sense is its business or merchant nature, the trading or dealing of goods." Id. The BIA thus concluded that "a drug-related aggravated felony includes any state, federal, or qualified foreign felony conviction involving the unlawful trading or dealing of any controlled substance." Id.

Here, the BIA relied on Davis to conclude that "illicit trafficking in firearms" meant "any unlawful trading or dealing" in firearms. Although the BIA's decision was unpublished, the government argues it warrants deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), because the BIA relied on its prior published decision in Davis . See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder , 558 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that Chevron deference applies "regardless of whether the order under review is the precedential decision itself or a subsequent unpublished order that relies upon it"). But whether we apply Chevron or some lesser measure of deference, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), the BIA's interpretation of "illicit trafficking" is persuasive and would prevail.

The BIA's definition—"unlawful trading or dealing"—tracks the common understanding of the phrase "illicit trafficking." When Congress does not define a term, we "interpret the words consistent with their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute." Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070, 201 L.Ed.2d 490 (2018) (quotations and alterations omitted). Congress added illicit trafficking in firearms as an aggravated felony in 1988 and modified the provision to include its current language in 1994. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70; Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–21. "Trafficking" meant then, and means now, what Davis said it meant: the "trading or dealing in certain goods." Trafficking, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see also Trafficking, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("[t]he act of transporting, trading, or dealing, esp. in illegal goods or people"). "Trafficking," in other words, "means some sort of commercial dealing." Lopez v. Gonzales , 549 U.S. 47, 53, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006).

That is precisely how we interpreted "illicit trafficking" in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), which defines "aggravated felony" as "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." In Rendon v. Mukasey , 520 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008), we held that a Kansas conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute "contains a trafficking element" because such a conviction "necessarily means" that the defendant "possessed the [controlled substance] with the intent to engage in ‘some sort of commercial dealing.’ " Id. at 975–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lopez , 549 U.S. at 53, 127 S.Ct. 625 ); see also Cortes-Maldonado v. Barr , 978 F.3d 643, 650 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that under accepted definitions "controlled substance convictions qualify as ‘illicit trafficking’ if they require the transfer or exchange of money or other consideration").

We see no reason to depart from "the normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning." IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21, 34, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005). And here, "illicit trafficking in firearms" is in the very next sub-definition of "aggravated felony" after "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B)–(C). Because trading and dealing are basic forms of trafficking, the BIA permissibly relied on Davis to conclude that "illicit trafficking in firearms" means "any unlawful trading or dealing" in firearms. See Davis , 20 I. & N. Dec. at 541.

With the generic definition of "illicit trafficking" in place, we turn back to Chacon's statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A), to see if it is a categorical match. Again, § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any person "except a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, or licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or in the course of such business to ship, transport, or receive any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce" (emphasis added). The statute contains an extensive definition of what "engaged in the business" means. It requires that someone must "devote[ ] time, attention, and labor" to manufacturing, dealing, or importing...