Chain v. Puerto Rico Fed. Affairs Admin.

RUBEN CHAIN, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO FEDERAL AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATION (PRFAA), ET AL., Defendants.

CIV. NO. 15-1012(PG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 31, 2016

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is defendants Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration ("PRFAA") and Juan Eugenio Hernandez-Mayoral's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2015, plaintiff Ruben Chain (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff" or "Chain"), a resident of Maryland, filed the above-captioned claim against defendants PRFAA and Juan Eugenio Hernandez-Mayoral (Hernandez-Mayoral) in his official and individual capacity. See Docket No. 1. Chain alleges that Hernandez-Mayoral, the newly-appointed Executive Director of PRFAA, discharged him from his position as Driver to the Executive Director at the PRFAA offices in Washington D.C., where the Plaintiff had been working since 1989. According to Chain, he was dismissed from his employment on January 11, 2013 in alleged retaliation for testifying against former Governor Anibal Acevedo Vilá ("Acevedo") in March of 2009 during federal criminal proceedings against Acevedo. Like co-defendant Hernandez-Mayoral, former Governor Acevedo was affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party (PPD). Notwithstanding, the Plaintiff alleges he is not affiliated with any political party in Puerto Rico, and has never voted in any election in Puerto Rico.

The Plaintiff now brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights to free speech and due process under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Docket No. 1. The Plaintiff additionally invokes the court's supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims brought pursuant to Puerto Rico Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194a; Puerto Rico Whistleblowers Protection Act ("Law 426"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 601; and, Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico ("Articles 1802 and 1803"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141 and 5142. See Docket No. 1. Finally, Plaintiff sets forth in his complaint that he tolled the statute of limitations by letter one year prior to filing the above-captioned claim.

The defendants now move to dismiss the claims on account that his claims are time barred. See Docket No. 10. Defendants also raise the defense of sovereign immunity and request the dismissal of the supplemental state law claims on different grounds. See id. The Plaintiff opposed the dismissal of his claims. See Docket No. 14.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. "To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Garcia-Catalan v. U.S., 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must "ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir.2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, courts "may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.2013) (citing Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011)).

"To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must 'plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ... , on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

"In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court should employ a two-pronged approach. It should begin by identifying and disregarding statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions from the complaint or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 2 63, 2 66 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). "A complaint 'must contain more than a rote recital of the elements of a cause of action,' but need not include 'detailed factual allegations.'" Rodriguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps, 743 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir.2014) (citing Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2013)). "Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664-664. Nevertheless, when evaluating the plausibility of a legal claim, a court may not "attempt to forecast a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if ... a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Ocasio-Hernandez, 640 F.3d at 12-13 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) . As a result, courts should read the complaint "as a whole" and be cautious not to apply the plausibility standard "too mechanically." See Rodriguez - Vives, 743 F.3d at 283 (citing Garcia-Catalan, 734 F.3d at 101, 103).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

In their motion to dismiss, the defendants first argue that Chain's claims are time barred insofar as the extrajudicial claim he sent the defendants was delivered to them outside of the applicable one-year statute of limitations.¹ According to the defendants, Chain's claim began to accrue on January 11, 2013, the date he was informed of his termination, but his letter or extrajudicial claim was delivered on January 13, 2014, outside of the one-year period. Therefore, the statute of limitations was not timely tolled, according to the defendants. See Docket No. 10 at page 8.

"Because section 1983 does not have its own statute of limitations (i.e., a provision intended to protect defendants from having to defend against stale claims), courts use the personal-injury limitations period adopted by the state where the injury supposedly occurred - in Puerto Rico, one year." Martinez-Rivera v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding public employee's § 1983 claim accrued, and one-year statute of limitations under Puerto Rico law began to run, on date employee learned of her termination and the reason for it, despite employer's letter making the ouster effective on a later date). "But just as we borrow the state's limitations period in section-1983 cases, so too we borrow the state's tolling rulings ... ." Id. at 74-75. "Puerto Rico's tolling rules provide three ways that a plaintiff can interrupt the statute of limitations, which, as relevant here, include the sending of an 'extrajudicial' letter." Santana-Castro v. Toledo-Davila, 579 F.3d 109, 114 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5303). "The prescriptive term is interrupted on the date on which the defendant receives the extrajudicial claim." Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Perez & Cia., De Puerto Rico, Inc., 142 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Diaz De Diana v. A.J.A.S. Ins. Co., 110 P.R. Dec. 471, 477 (1980)).

Here, the limitations countdown began on January 11, 2013 - the day Chain learned authoritatively of his termination - but the defendants claim they received his extrajudicial letter 2 days after its expiration. However, in his response, Chain sets forth that in addition to sending the extrajudicial claimvia mail, he sent it by messenger. See Docket No. 14 at page 2. To that effect, he attaches confirmation of the hand delivery of the letter on January 10, 2014, which the defendants did not refute in reply. See Docket No. 14-1. Drawing all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor, and in light of the facts alleged at this stage, the court must conclude that the Plaintiff effectively interrupted the statute of limitations one day shy of its expiration.

"[W]hen the prescriptive period is successfully interrupted, the full period begins to run again." Tokyo Marine, 142 F.3d at 4 (citations omitted). The Plaintiff filed the above-captioned claim on January 8, 2015, that is, 3 days before the term that had begun to run anew expired. Accordingly, the court finds that the Plaintiff's claim is not time barred, and the defendants' motion is DENIED on those grounds.

B. Sovereign Immunity

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims against defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and thus, Chain cannot maintain claims for monetary damages against the PRFAA and the individual defendants in their official capacities. See Docket No. 10 at pages 9-13.

The Eleventh Amendment proscribes that "[t]he Judicial...