Chalkey v. Roush

757 A.2d 972

Mary CHALKEY a/k/a Mary Matula v. Franklin Delano ROUSH Jr., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 1, 1999.

Filed August 7, 2000.

H. Reginald Belden, Jr., Greensburg, for appellant.

Thomas W. Cartwright, Johnstown, for appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

FORD ELLIOTT, J.:

¶ 1 Franklin Delano Roush, Jr., ("Roush") appeals from the order that declared a contract for the sale of land between Roush and Mary Chalkey, a/k/a Mary Matula ("Matula") null and void and directed Roush to transfer the property in question back to Matula. We vacate and remand.

¶ 2 Matula, now deceased, was the owner of three adjacent parcels of land. Matula was in danger of losing one parcel due to a judgment entered against her in an unrelated lawsuit. A sheriff's sale was scheduled on this property, which caused a great deal of distress to the elderly Matula. Matula had been represented in connection with the unrelated lawsuit by attorney Rex McQuaide; but just days before the sheriff's sale was scheduled to take place, Matula retained Roush, who is also an attorney, to arrange for a stay of the sale. The trial court, apparently believing Matula was merely attempting to delay the proceedings, noted that Matula was represented by McQuaide and refused to permit Roush to enter an appearance or present his motion. Prior to the sheriff sale, Matula sold Roush the property in question for $76,000, the amount due and owing on the judgment against her. Matula subsequently filed a complaint in equity seeking to have the transfer declared null and void. Following a hearing, the court determined that Roush had exercised undue influence over Matula in obtaining the property. As a result, the court entered an opinion and order on August 11, 1998 declaring the sale null and void and requiring Roush to transfer the property to Matula. (R. at 33.) Roush did not file post-trial motions from this opinion and order; rather, he filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 1998.

¶ 3 Roush raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Where at hearing scheduled on merits of action the party having the burden of proof introduced no evidence, and did not incorporate any evidence from prior proceedings, was it error to deny a motion by the other party to dismiss the action?

2. Absent some special relationship, was it error for the court to find a confidential relationship, based upon one party occupying a position of advisor or counselor to the other, where neither party presented evidence that either of them considered the one to be an advisor or counselor to the other?

3. Where seller of real property was unwilling to move from her property, was there an absence of any bona fide offer, other than that of the purchaser, where purchaser's offer was only one which would permit her to stay on her property?

Appellant's brief at 4. Before reaching the merits of Roush's issues, we must decide whether he has waived his issues by failing to file post-trial motions, a position advocated by Matula.

¶ 4 Our supreme court recently reaffirmed the importance of post-trial motions in Lane Enterprises v. L.B. Foster Co., 551 Pa. 306, 710 A.2d 54 (1998), and L.B. Foster Co. v. Lane Enterprises, Inc., 551 Pa. 307, 710 A.2d 55 (1998) ("Lane Enterprises "). In Lane Enterprises, after a non-jury trial in a breach of contract action, the trial court issued an opinion disposing of issues the parties raised in trial memoranda. Following the trial court's decision, instead of filing post-trial motions, appellant Foster then filed a praecipe to enter judgment and a notice of appeal. A panel of this court reviewed the merits of the appeal despite the lack of post-trial motions, relying on Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm, 377 Pa.Super. 171, 546 A.2d 1212 (1988) (en banc), and Storti v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 331 Pa.Super. 26, 479 A.2d 1061 (1984), both actions in equity. Lane Enterprises, Inc. v. L.B. Foster Co., 700 A.2d 465, 469-470 (Pa.Super.1997), reversed, 551 Pa. 306, 710 A.2d 54 (1998) and reversed, L.B. Foster v. Lane Enterprises, Inc., 551 Pa. 307, 710 A.2d 55 (1998). In a one-paragraph per curiam order, the supreme court reversed this court. We set forth the supreme court's order in full:

AND NOW, this 15th day of April 1998, the Order of the Superior Court is reversed. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 requires parties to file post-trial motions in order to preserve issues for appeal. If an issue has not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived for appeal purposes. See Benson v. Penn Central Transportation Company, 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393 (1975) and Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341, 633 A.2d 125 (1993).

This matter is remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of the verdict.

Lane Enterprises, supra at 306, 710 A.2d at 54-55.

¶ 5 Shortly after the supreme court decided Lane Enterprises, a panel of this court addressed a motion to quash filed in response to an appeal from a judgment following a non-jury trial in an action to recover attorney's fees. Plowman, Spiegel & Lewis, P.C. v. Straub, 723 A.2d 1060 (Pa.Super.1999). In Plowman, the appellee law firm claimed that appellant waived his issues by failing to file post-trial motions and this court agreed, following Lane Enterprises. Plowman, 723 A.2d at 1061. Although the issue before the Plowman court involved the appealability of an order in an action at law, the Plowman court opined that Lane Enterprises called into question the continuing viability of Storti, supra, and its progeny. Storti is one of a long line of equity cases decided by both this court and our supreme court refusing to find waiver despite the lack of post-trial motions under certain limited circumstances. Although we agree that the panel in Plowman properly dismissed the appeal under the authority of Lane Enterprises, we granted reargument in this case to address the viability of Storti and its progeny after Lane Enterprises. We conclude that our supreme court did not intend to abrogate its holdings in either Commonwealth v. Derry Township, 466 Pa. 31, 351 A.2d 606 (1976), or Community Sports, Inc. v. The Oakland Oaks, 429 Pa. 412, 240 A.2d 491 (1968), when it entered its per curiam order in Lane Enterprises, supra. Our reasons follow.

¶ 6 Under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1517, following an equity trial "[t]he court shall make an adjudication.... The adjudication shall consist of (1) a statement of the issues; (2) a closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form or in separate findings, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the issues; (3) a discussion of the questions of law involved and the court's conclusions of law and (4) a decree nisi." Pa.R.Civ.P. 1517(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A.¹ A decree nisi is a non-appealable interlocutory order which gives the parties an opportunity to examine and object to the proposed disposition of the case before the court enters a final order. Goodrich-Amram 2d § 1517:11.

¶ 7 "After the adjudication and decree nisi have been filed, the parties may then challenge the decree and the factual findings by filing appropriate post-trial motions." Winkelman v. Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan [PFRACP], 418 Pa.Super. 439, 614 A.2d 717, 718 (1992), overruled on other grounds in Swartz v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. of Westmoreland County, 547 Pa. 632, 692 A.2d 1058 (1997). Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c)(2), post-trial motions must be filed within ten days of the adjudication. After the court addresses these motions, pursuant to Rule 227.4 it enters a final decree from which the parties may appeal. Winkelman, supra.

¶ 8 Grounds not specified by post-trial motion are, however, waived on appeal. Rule 227.1(b)(2). The purpose of this rule is "to provide the trial court the first opportunity to review and reconsider its earlier rulings and correct its own error." Soderberg v. Weisel, 455 Pa.Super. 158, 687 A.2d 839, 845 (1997) (citations omitted).

¶ 9 Prior to 1984, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1518 governed the procedure to be followed in an equity action after the chancellor filed an adjudication and decree nisi pursuant to Rule 1517. Rule 1518 provided, "Within twenty (20) days after notice of the filing of the adjudication, exceptions may be filed by any party...." Pa.R.Civ.P. 1518 (rescinded). That Rule further provided, "Matters not covered by exceptions are deemed waived, unless, prior to final decree, leave is granted to file exceptions raising these matters." Id. See also Logan v. Cherrie, 444 Pa. 555, 282 A.2d 236 (1971) (per curiam); Copes v. Williams, 412 Pa. 452, 454, 194 A.2d 899, 900 (1963).² Rule 1519, also rescinded, provided additionally that a court en banc shall pass upon the exceptions or, if none are filed, the prothonotary on praecipe shall enter the decree as final. Community Sports, supra at 413, 240 A.2d at 492.

¶ 10 Effective January 1, 1984, however, Rules 1518 and 1519 were rescinded and new Rules 227.1 through 227.4 were adopted. Rule 227.1 was enacted to abolish the distinctions in post-trial practice between actions at law and equity and actions tried with or without a jury. Pa. R.Civ.P. 227.1, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Explanatory Comment—1983 Introduction. Under Rule 227.1, parties are to file a post-trial motion, rather than exceptions, following an equity trial, and are to include in their motion the specific grounds for seeking relief, the relief sought, and the manner in which the grounds were raised at trial. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(1), (2). "Grounds not specified in the motion are deemed waived unless leave is granted upon cause shown to specify additional grounds." Pa. R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(2).³

¶ 11 Thus, under both Rules 1518 and 227.1, a party seeking relief following an equity trial was required first to seek relief in the trial court; only then could that party file an appeal to this court. Additionally, under both sets of Rules,...