Chamberlain v. U.S. Postal Serv.

CHERYL CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,MEGAN J. BRENNAN, POSTMASTER GENERAL,and NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS, Defendants.

1:16-cv-04 941-NLH-AMD

1:18-cv-01700-JBS-AMD¹ (consolidated)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 17, 2020

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

DAVID R. CASTELLANI

CASTELLANI LAW FIRM, LLC

450 TILTON ROAD

SUITE 245

NORTHFIELD, NJ 08225

On behalf of Plaintiff

JESSICA ROSE O'NEILL

OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

401 MARKET STREET

4TH FLOOR

P.O. BOX 2098

CAMDEN, NJ 08101

On behalf of USPS Defendants

JOSEPH J. VITALE

PETER D. DECHIARA

COHEN WEISS & SIMON LLP

900 THIRD AVENUE

21ST FLOOR

NEW YORK, NY 10022-4869

On behalf of National Association of Letter Carriers

HILLMAN, District Judge

This matter concerns claims by Plaintiff against her employer, the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), the Postmaster General, Megan J. Brennan, and Plaintiff's union, National Association of Letter Carriers ("NALC"), regarding Plaintiff's termination from employment at USPS. Presently before the Court are the motions of the USPS Defendants and the union for summary judgment in their favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' motions will be granted.

BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2015, Plaintiff, Cheryl Chamberlain, was driving a USPS vehicle when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff's driver's license had been suspended six days before for unpaid parking tickets. On September 28, 2015, USPS issued a notice of removal to Plaintiff for operating a postal vehicle without a valid driver's license.

Through her union's Local Branch 370, Plaintiff filed a grievance, which proceeded through the grievance process under the collective bargaining agreement between USPS and her union,Defendant NALC. On December 11, 2015, the dispute resolution team resolved the grievance by offering Plaintiff a last-chance agreement, which required her signature by December 24, 2015 or she would be removed from employment with USPS. Plaintiff signed the agreement on December 22, 2015, and returned to work the next day.

During the grievance process and while Plaintiff was in suspended status, but before she signed the last-chance agreement, Plaintiff was charged with driving while intoxicated. On November 4, 2015, she pleaded guilty to the charge, which resulted in a seven-month license suspension. Plaintiff claims that her union representative, Branch 370 steward Jason Ausborn, who is also a city letter carrier,² advised Plaintiff not to reveal her DUI and the seven-month license suspension to her immediate supervisors at USPS at that time. Plaintiff claims she followed his advice.³

Plaintiff alleges that a few days before she signed the last-chance agreement, Ausborn advised Plaintiff's supervisors of her DUI, and that Patricia Marin, Officer-in-Charge of the AtlanticCity office, who executed the agreement on behalf of USPS, knew of Plaintiff's license suspension when she met with Plaintiff to sign the agreement. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that when the September 28, 2015 grievance was resolved by way of the last-chance agreement, USPS knew of Plaintiff's license suspension due to the DUI. Plaintiff also claims that when she returned to work under the last-chance agreement on December 23, 2015, she informed the manager of the Margate branch, Carol Threatt, of her license suspension.

As a result of the November 4, 2015 driver's license suspension, USPS issued Plaintiff another notice of removal on January 4, 2016 for improper conduct. Plaintiff filed a grievance of that notice, and it was concluded that even though Plaintiff was not working when her license was suspended on November 4, 2015, she was still an employee of USPS and being paid, and she was therefore obligated to inform management immediately of her suspension. Plaintiff's notice of removal was upheld on February 17, 2016.⁴

Plaintiff has asserted claims against USPS for breach of the collective bargaining agreement for her improper termination. She also alleges that her termination was motivated by her gender inviolation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Plaintiff has also asserted claims against NALC for its violation of its duty of fair representation. All Defendants have moved for summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiff has opposed their motions.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject matter jurisdiction

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § l208(b), the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 301, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that the materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248(1986). A fact is "material" if, under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence "is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).

Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. A party opposing summary judgment must do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

C. Analysis

1. Plaintiff's claims against USPS and NALC for violation of the CBA and duty of fair representation

Plaintiff's claims against USPS and NALC are considered a"hybrid suit," in which an employee sues the employer under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of the collective bargaining contract ("CBA"),⁵ and the union for breach of its duty of fair representation ("DFR"), which is implied from section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 1990). The "Supreme Court has viewed the hybrid suit as consisting of two independent, albeit related, causes of action, and has stated that '[t]he employee may, if he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one, the other, or both.'" Id. (quoting DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983), and citing United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 n.2 (1981)). To prevail against the employer, the union, or both, the employee "must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating a breach of duty by the Union." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165 (citation omitted).

Thus, in order to be successful on her breach of CBA claim against USPS, Plaintiff must also show that NALC breached its DFR. The same holds true for Plaintiff's DFR claim against NALC - to be successful on that claim, Plaintiff must also prove that USPS breached the CBA. Failure to prove one claim is fatal to Plaintiff's hybrid suit against both. See Ahmad v. United Parcel Service, 281 F. App'x 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Felice v. Sever, 985 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining in a § 301 hybrid action, "the plaintiff will have to prove that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement in order to prevail on the breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union, and vice versa")).

a. Plaintiff's breach of CBA claim against USPS

The relationship between letter carriers such as Plaintiff and USPS is governed by a CBA called the National Association of Letter Carriers National Agreement ("National Agreement"). NALC negotiates that agreement with USPS and makes it available to its members. The National Agreement establishes a binding grievance procedure consisting of multiple steps: informal (Step A), formal (Step A), and a final stage entailing submission of the grievance to a "Step B" team.

The Step B team, which is composed of one member from NALC and one member from USPS management, considers the submissions of both sides. If the two members of the Step B team agree, theyissue a binding decision that resolves the grievance. Given the binding nature, there can be no appeal and no further ability to proceed to arbitration. If the Step B team does not agree on the resolution and is at an impasse, then further process, including arbitration, is potentially available to either side. As set forth in Article 16 of the National Agreement, USPS is permitted to remove an employee for "just cause," which includes a "violation of the terms of this Agreement."

The timeline of events leading to Plaintiff's termination is as follows. In 2015, Plaintiff was assigned to...