Chambers v. Dist. of Columbia

1

MARY E. CHAMBERS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-2032 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 12, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

The plaintiff, Mary E. Chambers, brings this civil action against the defendant, the District of Columbia Office of Attorney General (the “District” or “the defendant”), alleging discrimination on the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -17 (2012).^[1] See Second Amended Complaint (“2d Am. Compl”) at 3, ¶¶ 9-10, ECF No. 16. Currently pending before the Court is the District's motion for summary judgment. See Defendant District of Columbia's Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief (“Def.'s Resp.”), ECF No 83. Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,^[2] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In addition to the facts referenced by the Circuit in its opinion in this case, Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870 (D.C. Cir. 2022), this Court previously set forth the factual background of this case in two prior Memorandum Opinions issued (1) on April 6, 2017 see Chambers v. District of Columbia, 249 F.Supp.3d 66, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2017), and (2) on July 24, 2019, see Chambers v. District of Columbia, 389 F.Supp.3d 77, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2019), and therefore, need not reiterate every fact contained in those opinions here. The Court will, however, set forth the relevant facts still at issue, as well as the procedural background of this case, which remains pertinent to the resolution of the pending motion.

The plaintiff “worked in the District of Columbia's Office of the Attorney General for more than twenty years before this litigation, first as a clerk and later as a Support Enforcement Specialist and investigator.” Chambers, 35 F.4th at 873; see also Plaintiff Mary Elizabeth Chambers' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dispute (“Pl.'s Facts”) at 1, ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 58-4; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue (“Def.'s Facts”) at 3, ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 60-1. The plaintiff “requested, on multiple occasions, a transfer to a Paralegal Specialist position within the Legal Unit, which were all denied.” Supplemental Brief (“Pl.'s Supp. Br.”) at 3, ECF No. 80. Early in 2011, the plaintiff filed “a charge of employment discrimination with the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] alleging sex discrimination and retaliation because a male co-worker was granted a transfer to another Unit, but she and another female co-worker were denied such a transfer.” Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.'s Opp'n”) at 4, ECF No. 58; see also Pl.'s Facts ¶ 6; Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue (”Def.'s Reply Facts”) at 3, ¶ 6, ECF No. 60-1.

Consequently, not having received the relief she sought from the defendant, on November 20, 2014, the plaintiff filed this civil action. See Complaint (“Compl”), ECF No. 1. In response, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on September 25, 2018. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the District of Columbia's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 51. After briefing concluded, the Court issued a memorandum opinion granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment “on the plaintiff's claim that the District allegedly discriminated and retaliated against her by denying her the opportunity to transfer.” Chambers, 389 F.Supp.3d at 90-91.

Following this Court's grant of summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed the ruling to the Circuit on August 21, 2019. See Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 65. The Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's retaliation claim, see Order 19-7098 (D.C. Cir. 2022), ECF No. 67-1, but the en banc court reversed this Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's discrimination claim and a Circuit panel's affirmance of the dismissal, concluding that its ruling in Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999), “that the denial or forced acceptance of a job transfer is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only if the employee suffered ‘objectively tangible harm[,]'” Chambers, 35 F.4th at 872 (quoting Brown, 199 F.3d at 457), was “inconsistent with Title VII and . . . intervening Supreme Court authority[,]” Id. Accordingly, the en banc court held “that an employer that transfers an employee or denies an employee's transfer request because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Id. In other words, the Court concluded that “[o]nce it has been established that an employer has discriminated against an employee with respect to that employee's terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a protected characteristic, the analysis is complete. The plain text of Title VII requires no more.” Id. at 874-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).^[3]

Having overruled Brown, the Circuit remanded the case to this Court for further proceedings on the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim. Following the remand and with the Court's authorization, the plaintiff filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the defendant's summary judgment motion, see generally Pl.'s Supp. Br., and in response, the defendant filed its own supplemental memorandum in support of its motion, see generally Def.'s Resp. In her supplemental brief, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's “actions of (1) granting male colleagues transfers to other units, despite performance issues, while simultaneously denying [the p]laintiff's transfers to the similar units; (2) selective discipline for alleged work incidents; and (3) denial of proper training[,] are all indic[a]tive of discriminatory treatment.” Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 6. The defendant maintains that the “Court should grant the District's motion for summary judgment because [the p]laintiff has offered no evidence that the transfer denial was based on her sex.” Def.'s Resp. at 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The evidence must “be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “The burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Although the movant carries the burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The non-movant has met [her] burden of showing that a dispute about a material fact is genuine only ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party[.]'” Stoupakis v. Bros. Gourmet Coffees, Inc., 165 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir.1987)) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiff relies primarily on comparator evidence as support for her sex discrimination claim, and in response the defendant argues that “[the p]laintiff has not provided any evidence of pretext[,]” Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of The District of Columbia's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mem.”) at 15, ECF No. 51-1, because “[n]one of the male coworkers [the p]laintiff claims received transfers were similarly situated to [her,]” id.^[4] The plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that she “has shown [that the defendant's denial of her lateral transfer gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 2. In its supplemental response, the defendant alleges that the “[p]laintiff has offered no evidence that the transfer denial was based on her sex” and therefore summary judgment is required. Def.'s Resp. at 1. The plaintiff argues in response that summary judgment is inappropriate because the “[p]laintiff is similarly situated to the[ ] comparators[: (1) Reginald Robinson (“Robinson”), (2) Fernando Myrie (“Myrie”), and (3) J.S.,] and therefore, [she has] establish[ed] an inference of discrimination based on disparate treatment[.]” Pl.'s Supp. Br. at 4. “Although [the p]laintiff and comparators, J.S. and Myrie, at one point, worked under different unit and job titles, [she nonetheless argues that this] [ ] does not preclude [a] finding that [these] employees are proper comparators for [her] discrimination claim.” Id. As to Robinson, “the [p]laintiff [contends that she] and [ ] Robinson had nearly identical duties .... [and s...