Chan v. Curran

237 Cal.App.4th 601

188 Cal.Rptr.3d 59

Jessica CHAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants

v.Peter CURRAN, Defendant and Respondent.

A138234

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Filed June 9, 2015

Review Denied September 23, 2015

The Dolan Law Firm, Christopher B. Dolan, San Francisco, Mary C. Barnes ; Smith & McGinty, Daniel U. Smith, San Francisco, and Valerie T. McGinty for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Cole Pedroza, Curtis A. Cole, Pasadena, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Cassidy C. Davenport, Pasadena; Donnelly Nelson Depolo & Murray and Thomas J. Donnelly, Walnut Creek, for Defendant and Respondent.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for The Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Tucker Ellis, Rebecca A. Lefler and Lauren H. Bragin, Los Angeles, for California Medical Association, California Dental Association, California Hospital Association and American Medical Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Banke, J.

I. Introduction

After plaintiff and appellant Jessica Chan's mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued defendant and respondent Peter Curran for medical malpractice. Neither the sufficiency of the evidence to support the malpractice verdict, nor any other issue associated with the trial and the rendition of the jury verdict, is before us. Rather, the sole issue on appeal is the trial court's postverdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA; Stats. 1975, 2d Ex. Sess. 1975–1976, ch. 1, § 26.6, pp. 3975–3976; Civ.Code, § 3333.2.)¹ Chan attacks the MICRA cap on multiple constitutional grounds—as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial. All of her arguments, however, are ultimately grounded on the assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. No California court has ever endorsed such a proposition, and, as we discuss, it is contrary to many well-established legal principles.

Since MICRA's enactment in 1975, the cap on noneconomic damages has been before the California Supreme Court many times. In 1985, the high court upheld the cap against equal protection and due process challenges. (Fein v. Permanente (1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 (Fein ).) In 1994, the court ruled the cap also applies to actions for partial indemnity, voicing no criticism of the statute and reiterating MICRA “reflects a strong public policy to contain the costs of malpractice insurance by controlling or redistributing liability for damages, thereby maximizing the availability of medical services to meet the state's health care needs.” (Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 112, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062 (Western Steamship ).) In 1998, the court explained how the damages cap interacts with MICRA's provision for periodic payments, stating the cap is “an attempt to control and reduce medical malpractice insurance costs by placing a predictable, uniform limit on the defendant's liability for noneconomic damages.” (Salgado v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 19 Cal.4th 629, 641, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 967 P.2d 585 (Salgado ).) The following year, in 1999, the court held the cap applies to negligence-based claims under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ), discerning Congress incorporated state damages law to preserve damages limitations and to respond to concerns raised about the federal statute's impact on the medical malpractice insurance problem. (Barris v. County of Los Angeles (1999) 20 Cal.4th 101, 112, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 972 P.2d 966 [83 Cal.Ptr.2d 145, 20 Cal.4th 101, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 972 P.2d 966 ] (Barris ).) Most recently, in 2014, the court ruled the cap cannot be further diminished by setoffs for settlements attributable to noneconomic damages. The Legislature's focus in enacting the statute, the court stated, was “to address the problem of unpredictable jury awards,” the impact on settlements being only indirect. (Rashidi v. Moser (2014) 60 Cal.4th 718, 720–721, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 59, 339 P.3d 344 (Rashidi ).) Although asked to do so, the court declined to grant review in Rashidi on the continuing constitutional validity of the damages cap.

Chan nevertheless maintains Fein, which rejected equal protection and due process challenges, is no longer controlling, claiming she has shown there no longer is a medical malpractice insurance “crisis” and therefore the rationale for the cap (indeed, for all of MICRA) no longer exists. Thus, according to Chan, the time is ripe to re-examine the constitutionality of section 3333.2 under a “changed circumstances” analysis. She further contends the Supreme Court has never considered her claim the cap infringes on the right to jury trial.

As we explain, the courts are extremely chary of invalidating legislative acts that have previously been held constitutional. Our Supreme Court has done so only on rare occasion, and we conclude Chan has not shown there is no reasonably plausible purpose presently advanced by section 3333.2. The high court has also considered and rejected variations of Chan's right to jury trial argument, and, in any case, statutes defining the measure or limit of legally recoverable damages do not constitutionally interfere with the fundamental factfinding province of a jury. We therefore conclude the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA's noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate.²

II. Discussion

A. MICRA

“In May 1975, the Governor—citing serious problems that had arisen throughout the state as a result of a rapid increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums—convened the Legislature in extraordinary session to consider measures aimed at remedying the situation. In response, the Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) ..., a lengthy statute which attacked the problem on several fronts.” (American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984) 36 Cal.3d 359, 363, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 (American Bank ).) “In broad outline, the act (1) attempted to reduce the incidence and severity of medical malpractice injuries by strengthening governmental oversight of the education, licensing and discipline of physicians and health care providers,^{[ 3 ]} (2) sought to curtail unwarranted insurance premium increases by authorizing alternative insurance coverage programs and by establishing new procedures to review substantial rate increases,^{[ 4 ]} and (3) attempted to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of medical malpractice litigation by revising a number of legal rules applicable to such litigation.” (Id. at pp. 363–364, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670.)

In the Legislature's view, “[t]he continuing availability of adequate medical care depends directly on the availability of adequate insurance coverage, which in turn operates as a function of costs associated with medical malpractice litigation.” (Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 111, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062.) “Accordingly, MICRA includes a variety of provisions all of which are calculated to reduce the cost of insurance by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional negligence. (See Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6146 [limiting contingency fees in medical malpractice actions]; Civ.Code, § 3333.1 [admitting evidence of collateral source payments and precluding subrogation on behalf of collateral sources]; Code Civ. Proc., § 667.7 [authorizing periodic payments for future damages in excess of $50,000, with termination of benefits in the event of death]. ....)” (Western Steamship, at p. 112, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062.)

The cap on noneconomic damages set forth in section 3333.2 is one of these inter-related provisions.⁵ “The Legislature has enacted a comprehensive, multifaceted scheme designed to address a perceived threat to our state's health care system by reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance. Section 3333.2 constitutes a key component of this program.” (Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 114, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062. )

During the 1980's, the Supreme Court upheld many of MICRA's provisions against constitutional challenges, including section 3333.2. (Fein, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 159, 211 Cal.Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 [upholding § 3333.2 ]; Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 931–932, [211 Cal.Rptr. 77, 695 P.2d 164] (Roa ) [upholding Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6146, limiting contingency fees]; Barme v. Wood (1984) 37 Cal.3d 174, [207 Cal.Rptr. 816, 689 P.2d 446] (Barme ) [upholding § 3333.1, limiting collateral source recovery from malpractice defendants]; American Bank, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 372, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 [upholding Code Civ. Proc., § 667.7, governing periodic payouts of and imposing some limits on future damages].) As noted at the outset, the court has also subsequently addressed the noneconomic damages cap numerous times, without criticism of the statute and reiterating MICRA's public policy underpinnings. (Rashidi, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 726–727, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 59, 339 P.3d 344 ; Barris, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 108–116, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 972 P.2d 966 ; Salgado, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 638–645, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 46, 967 P.2d 585 ; Western Steamship, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 112, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062.)

As to section 3333.2, specifically, the Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[o]ne of the problems identified in the legislative hearings was the unpredictability of the size of large noneconomic damage awards, resulting from the inherent difficulties in valuing such damages and the great disparity in the price tag which different juries placed on such losses. The Legislature could reasonably have determined that...