Chandler v. Chapdelaine

Michael CHANDLER v. Carol CHAPDELAINE

No. HHDCV165042771S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

June 11, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

ROBERT B. SHAPIRO, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

This action arises from a dispute between the self-represented plaintiff, Michael Chandler, an inmate at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield (correctional institution), and the defendant, Carol Chapdelaine, the warden of the correctional institution,^[1] regarding the defendant’s alleged refusal to permit the plaintiff to attend his mother’s wake in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[2] On September 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint,^[3] which is the operative complaint against the defendant. In his complaint, the plaintiff essentially alleges that the defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected rights by denying his request to attend his mother’s wake, and, in so doing, violated § 1983.

On October 17, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A supporting memorandum of law accompanies the motion. The plaintiff did not file a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On May 29 2018, the motion to dismiss appeared on the short calendar. The motion was submitted on the papers.

Standard of Review

The legal standard governing motions to dismiss is well settled. [A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "[l]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 326, 780 A.2d 98 (2001).

Discussion

The defendant’s principal argument is that the court should grant her motion and thereby dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of this argument, the defendant advances four contentions. First, the defendant asserts that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because the plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Second, the defendant argues that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s § 1983 action. The defendant’s third contention is twofold. In this regard, the defendant asserts that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because she is being sued in her official- rather than individual- capacity and, consequently, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s cause of action; however, even assuming that the defendant is being sued individually, she is statutorily immune under General Statutes § 4-165.^[4] Lastly, the defendant claims that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because, as a matter of federal law, the doctrine of qualified immunity bars the plaintiff’s § 1983 action. Each claim is addressed below.

I

The defendant first claims that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because the plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts to state a claim for relief under § 1983.

"The motion to dismiss is governed by Practice Book § § 10-30 through 10-34. Properly granted on jurisdictional grounds, it essentially asserts that, as a matter of law and fact, a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that is properly before the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulcahy v. Mossa, 89 Conn.App. 115, 128, 872 A.2d 453, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 917, 879 A.2d 894 (2005). "By contrast, the motion to strike attacks the sufficiency of the pleadings. Practice Book § 10-39 ... There is a significant difference between asserting that a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action and asserting that a plaintiff has not stated a cause of action, and therein lies the distinction between the motion to dismiss and the motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pecan v. Madigan, 97 Conn.App. 617, 621, 905 A.2d 710 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 919, 918 A.2d 271 (2007).

In the present case, the court concludes that the defendant’s first contention is procedurally misplaced because the defendant has employed the improper procedural vehicle to challenge the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. Thus, the defendant’s first contention does not support the granting of her motion to dismiss.

II

Next, the defendant contends that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s § 1983 action.

The following legal principles guide the court’s analysis of this claim. "The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 456, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). The doctrine of sovereign immunity "protects the state against lawsuits as well as protecting against liability, and in effect, [it protects] against having to litigate at all." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 620, 787 A.2d 666, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 929, 793 A.2d 253 (2002). "Not only [has] [our Supreme Court] recognized the state’s immunity as an entity, but [the court] [has] also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 456-57. Thus, as a practical matter, "[s]overeign immunity is invoked as a shield by the sovereign defendant against suits from parties allegedly injured by its wrongful conduct or that of its agents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. 412, 429, 54 A.3d 1005 (2012).

In accordance with Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980), the Supreme Court has held that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133-34, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). This rule is a corollary to the principle that "[t]he Supremacy Clause of the Constitution guarantees that state law will not preempt or otherwise erode [federal] causes of action ..." Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2005).

With these principles in mind, the court concludes that the defendant’s second claim is unpersuasive. The relevant case law makes clear that an immunity defense grounded solely in state law, e.g., sovereign immunity, cannot- as a matter of law- defeat a federal cause of action, e.g., a § 1983 claim.

III

As previously mentioned, the defendant’s third contention is twofold. In particular, the defendant argues that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because (1) she is being sued in her official-rather than individual-capacity and, consequently, sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) however, even assuming that the defendant is being sued in her individual capacity, she is entitled to statutory immunity under § 4-165.

The court concludes that the defendant’s third contention is unpersuasive because even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant is being sued in her individual capacity, an immunity defense arising under state law, e.g., statutory immunity under § 4-165, cannot, as a matter of law, defeat a federal cause of action, e.g., a § 1983 claim. See part II of this memorandum. Thus, the defendant’s third contention does not support the granting of her motion to dismiss.

IV

Lastly, the defendant argues that the court should grant her motion to dismiss because, as a matter of federal law, the doctrine of qualified immunity bars the plaintiff’s § 1983 action.^[5] The court concludes that this argument is inadequately briefed.

It is axiomatic that a court is "not required to review issues that have been improperly presented ... through an inadequate brief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016). Under Connecticut case law, a claim is inadequately briefed if, for instance, there is no analysis connecting the governing principles to the legal conclusion on which the claim is predicated. See Getty Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 413, 107 A.3d 931 (2015); Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, 100 Conn.App. 63, 69-70 n.6, 918 A.2d 889 (2007), aff’d, 286 Conn. 548, 944 A.2d 329 (2008). In this respect, "[i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ...