Chandler v. Forsyth Technical Cmty. Coll.

294 F.Supp.3d 445

Hannah CHANDLER, Plaintiff,

v.FORSYTH TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Forsyth Technical Community College Board of Trustees, Nancy Rapp, individually and in her official capacity, Warren Hodges, individually and in his official capacity, Joe McIntosh, individually and in his official capacity, Carla Crews, individually and in her official capacity, Deana Ray, individually and in her official capacity, and Conley Winebarger, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

1:17CV172

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

Signed February 15, 2018

Hannah Chandler, Winston–Salem, NC, pro se.

Robin E. Shea, Terry Allen Clark, Constangy Brooks & Smith, LLP, Winston–Salem, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District JudgePlaintiff Hannah Chandler ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against Defendants Forsyth Technical Community College ("FTCC"), FTCC Board of Trustees, Nancy Rapp, Warren Hodges, Joe McIntosh, Carla Crews, Deana Ray,¹ and Conley Winebarger in their individual and official capacities (collectively "Defendants"). (Complaint ("Compl.") (Doc. 1).)

This matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff has responded, (Doc. 12), and Defendants have replied, (Doc. 14). This matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons stated herein, this court will grant Defendants' motion.

Plaintiff has also filed an Emergency Motion for Expedited Ruling on Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) and a Motion to Set a Trial Date (Doc. 18). This court will deny both of these motions as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Previous Litigation

The present case arises from the same dispute and underlying facts addressed by this court in Chandler v. Forsyth Technical Community College ("Chandler I"), No. 1:15CV337, 2016 WL 4435227 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016). These underlying facts are extensively outlined in this court's prior opinion. See id. at *1–4. Plaintiff was a student at FTCC, where she was enrolled in Legal Research and Writing I, taught by Defendant Nancy Rapp ("Defendant Rapp"), in the fall of 2014. Id. at *1. The claims in Chandler I arose from an interaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Rapp on November 5, 2014, and the subsequent response by FTCC and its employees. Id.

In Chandler I, Plaintiff alleged (1) First Amendment violations; (2) discrimination; (3) Sixth Amendment violations; (4) right to privacy violations in contravention of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA") and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPPA"); (5) falsification of government records; (6) defamation; (7) equal protection violations; (8) conspiracy; (9) violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C–407.15 ; and (10) that Defendants' conduct caused her "humiliation, mental stress and anguish, delayed graduation, delayed earnings, reduction in earnings, reduction of retirement benefits, and loss of educational and employment opportunities." Id. at *4.

In Chandler I, individual Defendants asserted qualified immunity for each of the claims against them in their individual capacities. Id. at *6. This court accordingly considered each claim to determine: first, whether Plaintiff properly alleged a constitutional violation; and second, if a violation was properly alleged, whether the right was clearly established. Id. at *6–7 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 2007) ). In considering Plaintiff's pro se claims, this court engaged in a generous review of the Complaint, construing each claim liberally and taking care to discern Plaintiff's genuine concern behind each claim. See Id. at *5–24 ; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ; Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982) (requiring liberal construction of pro se filings). After said review, this court determined that each constitutional violation alleged in Chandler I was insufficiently pled and proceeded no further into the analysis. See Chandler I, 2016 WL 4435227, at *7–25. Consequently, the case was dismissed as to all Defendants.

B. The Instant Litigation

The case currently before the court is distinguishable from Chandler I in that (1) several Defendants named in the Chandler I Complaint were omitted in the present case; (2) Defendant Conley Winebarger ("Defendant Winebarger") and Defendant FTCC Board of Trustees, who were not named as Defendants in Chandler I, were named as Defendants in the present case; and (3) Plaintiff raises different claims in the present case. (Compare Complaint (" Chandler I Compl.") 1:15CV337 (Doc. 2) ¶¶ 67–89, Chandler I, 2016 WL 4435227, with Complaint ("Compl.") 1:17CV172 (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 96–130.)

As to the specific counts in the Complaint in the instant case, Plaintiff alleges the following:

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and violated Art. I, §§ 1 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution. (Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 96–102.)

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that individual Defendants in their personal capacities violated the above-cited federal and state constitutional provisions and are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶ 103–08.)

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached a contract to which she was a party, specifically Forsyth Tech's policies and procedures as outlined in the Student Academic Planner and Handbook. (Id. ¶¶ 109–18.)²

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that individual Defendants in their personal capacities violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 119–23.)

In Count V, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants FTCC and the FTCC Board of Trustees breached the same contract mentioned above, that is, Forsyth Tech's policies and procedures as outlined in the Student Academic Planner and Handbook. (Id. ¶¶ 124–30.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Filings by pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 ; Boag, 454 U.S. at 365, 102 S.Ct. 700. This standard is generous, as courts "impose on pro se litigants—even those who may be cantankerous or make extraneous and inappropriate assertions against their opponents or the court—'less stringent standards ....' " Sinclair v. Mobile 360, Inc., 417 Fed.Appx. 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Further, when employing this liberal construction, "where 'the context ... makes clear a litigant's essential grievance, the complainant's additional invocation of general legal principles need not detour the district court from resolving that which the litigant himself has shown to be his real concern.' " Id. (citation omitted). But see Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not, however, without limits. ... [They do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them. District judges are not mind readers. Even in the case of pro se litigants, they cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments ....").

With the principles governing construction of pro se complaints in mind, this court will review Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To be facially plausible, a claim must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable" and must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A court must accept a complaint's factual allegations as true when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. Further, the complaint is liberally construed, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014).

Nevertheless, sufficient factual allegations must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" so as to "nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court "cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set forth a claim." Estate of Williams–Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 646 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Consequently, even given the deferential standard allocated to pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

As in Chandler I, the present case is properly before this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal-question jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiff's federal law claims and corresponding supplemental jurisdiction with respect to her state common law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ; Chandler I, 2016 WL 4435227, at *6.

B. Defenses

In support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants assert that (1) the claims contained in the present Complaint are barred by res judicata; and alternatively, (2) that the Complaint fails to state claims for which relief may be grated. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") (Doc. 7) at 3.) The...