Chandler v. State

621 S.W.3d 52

Kevin T. CHANDLER, Appellant,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. ED 108792

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION THREE.

FILED: April 13, 2021

For Appellant: Jedd C. Schneider, 1000 W. Nifong Blvd., Bldg. 7, Ste. 1000, Columbia, MO 65203, Steven J. Alagna, One Metropolitan Square, 221 N. Broadway, Ste. 3600, St. Louis, MO 63102.

For Respondent: Evan J. Buchheim, 221 W. High St., Jefferson City, MO 65102.

KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge

Introduction

Kevin T. Chandler ("Chandler") appeals from the motion court's denial of his Rule 24.035¹ motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Chandler raises two points on appeal. In Point One, Chandler maintains that the plea court exceeded its authority when imposing his sentences of restitution. Specifically, Chandler argues that allowing the orders of restitution to stand is clearly erroneous because restitution was imposed in conjunction with a term of imprisonment, in violation of Section 557.011.² In Point Two, Chandler asserts the motion court clearly erred in upholding his sentences of restitution because they exceeded the maximum sentence in that no evidence supported the amounts of restitution. We do not reach the substantive merits of Chandler's points on appeal. Chandler waived his claims challenging the restitution orders in his sentencing by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty pursuant to negotiated plea agreements that provided for restitution and specified their amounts. Accordingly, we deny both points on appeal and affirm the motion court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural History

The offenses underlying this case involve two burglary incidents committed in 2015 that were consolidated for appeal. The State separately charged Chandler in each incident with second-degree burglary and receiving stolen property.

Chandler entered into plea agreements with the State. The plea agreements provided for a term of incarceration as well as restitution in the amounts of $3709.66 and $3975.00 for the two cases, respectively.

At his plea hearing, Chandler told the plea court that he wished to plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreements. Chandler testified that he agreed with the factual bases supporting his guilty pleas, in which the State orally estimated restitution in the amounts of fifteen hundred and eighteen hundred dollars respectively, and the plea court found that Chandler understood the nature of the charges and that his pleas were voluntary and unequivocal. Chandler acknowledged that he was waiving certain rights by pleading guilty, and he denied any threats or promises induced his guilty plea. The plea court accepted Chandler's guilty pleas.

Chandler further testified he understood the range of punishment and that the State's recommendation in the plea agreements included standard court costs and Crime Victims’ Compensation, as well as restitution in both cases. The signed plea agreements were submitted to the plea court. Chandler asked about the manner in which the restitution would be collected because he did not want the restitution deducted from his prison account. Chandler asked how the restitution amounts were calculated. The State explained that the amount of restitution included both the value of the stolen property and damage to the victims.

The plea court inquired into Chandler's satisfaction with plea counsel's representation. Chandler testified he had sufficient time to consult with plea counsel and he had no complaints about how she handled his cases. Chandler waived a sentencing assessment report, and the plea court announced it would sentence Chandler in accordance with the plea agreements he had negotiated and signed with the State. The plea court then sentenced Chandler as a prior and persistent offender to ten years in one case and eight years in the other case. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another and with any sentences Chandler was already serving. The judgments reflected orders of restitution in the amounts of $3709.66 and $3975.00 pursuant to the plea agreements.

Chandler then moved for post-conviction relief. In his Rule 24.035 amended motions, Chandler alleged ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Specifically, Chandler alleged his guilty plea was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent because the amended information reflected an incorrect charge,³ plea counsel failed to advise Chandler that he would not receive credit for cases still awaiting disposition, and plea counsel failed to adequately investigate a motion to suppress evidence. Chandler also alleged that the plea court's sentences exceeded the authorized range of punishment under Section 557.011 by ordering restitution and a term of imprisonment, that the plea court failed to orally pronounce the restitution at sentencing, and that insufficient evidence supported the amount of restitution.

The motion court consolidated the two cases and held an evidentiary hearing on the Rule 24.035 amended motions. At the evidentiary hearing, the motion court took judicial notice of both case files and accepted into evidence the plea agreements, plea hearing transcript, and sentencing with restitution orders. Chandler struck his claims concerning the amended information and suppression motion, and he proceeded solely on the claims concerning restitution and credit for time served. Plea counsel testified it was her understanding that the plea court could impose a prison sentence and restitution concurrently and that within thirty days Chandler could have challenged the restitution amounts. Plea counsel acknowledged there were written plea agreements in both Chandler's cases and that generally the defendant and the State discuss and settle upon the amount of restitution to be stipulated in the plea agreement. Chandler denied that the plea agreements he signed specified restitution or denoted the amounts of restitution. The plea agreements were shown to Chandler and he identified his signatures on those agreements. Chandler further testified that he was not claiming he would have gone to trial but rather that he would have pleaded sooner. The motion court denied Chandler's motions for post-conviction relief. Chandler now appeals.

Points on Appeal

Chandler raises two points on appeal. Point One contends the motion court clearly erred in upholding the sentences of restitution because the sentences exceeded the maximum sentencing allowed under Section 557.011, which does not authorize the payment of restitution in addition to the imposition of an immediate prison sentence. Point Two argues the motion court clearly erred in upholding the sentences of restitution because the amounts of restitution were not linked to the amounts of the victims’ losses due to the offenses as required by Section 559.105.

Standard of Review

Our review of the denial of a post-conviction motion following a guilty plea is limited to a determination of whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal citation omitted). "In reviewing the overruling of a motion for post-conviction relief, the motion court's ruling is presumed correct." Greene v. State, 585 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation omitted). We will only find that a motion court has clearly erred when we are left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Johnson, 580 S.W.3d at 900 (internal citation omitted). Where the motion court granted an evidentiary hearing, in our review of the testimony presented, we will "defer[ ] to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 901 (internal quotation omitted). We will affirm the judgment if it is sustainable on any legal ground supported by the record. Swallow v. State, 398 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Mo. banc 2013).

Discussion

Preliminarily, the State asks us to deny Chandler's points on appeal because Chandler waived his claims challenging the restitution portions of his sentences when he voluntarily pleaded guilty pursuant to negotiated agreements. We must be guided by Missouri law and precedent in our appellate review. Here, the State correctly argues that Missouri precedent requires a finding Chandler waived both restitution claims as in Borneman v. State, 573 S.W.3d 83 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019).

In Borneman, the movant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, then sought post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035, alleging the plea court exceeded the maximum sentence allowed by Section 557.011 by sentencing him to both a term of imprisonment and ordering him to pay restitution. Id. at 85–86. Borneman held the movant waived his claim for relief from the order of restitution in a post-conviction proceeding because any sentencing error by the plea court was self-invited by movant's voluntary, knowing, and intelligent guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement in which he agreed to the terms of imprisonment and restitution. Id. at 87. Given the similarity between the factual and procedural postures in Borneman and here, we find Borneman guides the outcome of Chandler's appeal. See id.

Rule 24.035 allows a movant to bring claims "that the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, including claims ... that the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law[.]" Rule 24.035(a). "A guilty plea waives, however, all constitutional and statutory claims except jurisdictional defects and claims that the guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Mo. banc 2014) (citing Garris v. State, 389 S.W.3d 648, 651–52 (Mo. banc 2012) ).

Here, as in Borneman, Chandler seeks only to strike the restitution component from his sentences. See Borneman, 573 S.W.3d at 88. Because the points on appeal challenge the...