Chandler v. United States

ZACHARY CHANDLER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

Case No. 19-cv-60853-BLOOM/Reid

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

August 21, 2020

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Zachary Chandler's ("Petitioner") Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, ECF No. [1] ("Petition"). The Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring the Government to respond to the Petition, ECF No. [4], which the Government filed, ECF No. [6] ("Response"). Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply, ECF No. [13] ("Reply"). The Court has carefully reviewed the Petition, all opposing and supporting submissions, the record in this case and Petitioner's underlying criminal case,¹ the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 1, 2015, Petitioner was arrested after attempting to rob a gas station with a firearm. CR ECF No. [1]. Petitioner was recognized by the gas station employee as the same individual who successfully robbed the same gas station on November 8, 2015. Id. On December 15, 2015, Petitioner was indicted for robbing six other gas stations in the previous six weeks, fora total of eight robberies, based on the certain evidence, including video camera footage at each gas station; Petitioner's articles of clothing; Petitioner's firearm; and the manner in which Petitioner brandished his firearm in each video recording. CR ECF No. [12].

On January 25, 2016, Petitioner pled guilty to the following charges: Hobbs Act robbery (Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (Count 10), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (Count 12), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). CR ECF No. [46]. Petitioner was thereafter adjudicated guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 480 months, consisting of 60 months as to counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 to run concurrent, a mandatory 120 months as to count 10 and a mandatory 300 months as to count 12, with counts 10 and 12 to run consecutive to each other and to all the other counts; and 3 years of supervised release as to all counts to run concurrent. CR ECF No. [69]. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, CR ECF No. [75], and, on June 22, 2017, the judgment was affirmed. United States v. Chandler, 699 F. App'x 863, 863 (11th Cir. 2017). Petitioner then filed a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on March 19, 2018. Chandler v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1281 (2018).

Petitioner now files the instant § 2255 Petition, which was mailed from Petitioner's prison facility to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on March 22, 2019,² and which the Clerk's Office docketed on April 1, 2019. ECF No. [1].

The Petition seeks relief premised upon four claims: (1) Petitioner's guilty plea "was not voluntary and intelligently [sic] due to the misrepresentation by Mr. Spivack [Petitioner's attorneyduring criminal case] in failing to file a motion in limine prohibiting Petitioner's roommate and Stepmother from giving their lay opinion"; (2) Petitioner's guilty plea "was not voluntary and intelligently [sic] due to the misrepresentation by Mr. Spivack in informing [Petitioner] that their trial strategy was sympathy"; (3) Petitioner's guilty plea "was not voluntary and intelligently [sic] due to Mr. Spivack failing to conduct a defense investigation"; and (4) A preservation argument that "Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the element clause and § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague." ECF No. [1].

The Government contends the Petition is untimely because it was filed past the one-year statute of limitations period applicable to § 2255 motions. Moreover, it claims that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and that, in any event, the Petition is meritless. ECF No [6].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if his or her sentence (1) violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) was not within the Court's jurisdiction to impose, (3) exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, relief under section 2255 is reserved for violations of constitutional rights, and "for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). If a court finds a claim under section 2255 valid, the court "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner bears the burden of proof. See Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2017).

A. Timeliness of the Petition

Pursuant to § 2255(f),

a 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Therefore, a petition must be filed within one-year of the latest date of these four points in time, otherwise the petition will be untimely and denied by the Court on its face. Id.

"Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's § 2255 motion is deemed filed on the date the prisoner delivers the motion to prison authorities for mailing." Houser v. United States, 808 F. App'x. 969, 971 (11th Cir. 2020); Daniels v. United States, 809 F.3d 588, 589 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jeffries, 748 F.3d at 1314 (the Court presumes, "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, . . . that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it")).

Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings states:

(d) Inmate Filing. A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution's internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. If an institution has a system designed for legal mail, the inmate must use that system to receive the benefit of this rule. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.

28 U.S.C. § 2255 R.3(d).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

When a petitioner challenges a guilty plea "based on ineffective assistance of counsel" the two-pronged test derived from Strickland v. Washington,³ is applied. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); see also Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two Strickland prongs). Strickland states that "[a] convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The first prong of deficiency, "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. Moreover, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; Weeks, 26 F.3d at 1036; Chandler v. United States, 218 F.2d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). Also, "a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. "And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." Id.; see also Chandler, 218 F.2d at 1318 ("[C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing or not pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a non-exhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense thoroughly.").

The prejudice prong "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691. In fact, "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694; but see Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 U.S. 1473, 1485 (2010) ("a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances"). Both prongs must be satisfied in order for an...