Chandler v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.

621 F.Supp.3d 568

Erica S. CHANDLER, Plaintiff, v. LA-Z-BOY, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 5:21-cv-05101-JMG

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Signed August 15, 2022

Briana Lynn Pearson, Law Offices of Eric A. Shore, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Michael A. Curley, Curley Hurtgen & Johnsrud LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALLAGHER, United States District Court Judge

Plaintiff Erica Chandler sues her former employer, Defendant La-Z-Boy, Inc., for discrimination based on her race under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 7.

This Court granted Defendant's first motion to dismiss but afforded Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff has since filed an amended complaint, and Defendant again moves to dismiss. Plaintiff's counsel also moves for leave to withdraw her representation. For the reasons explained below, both motions will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations¹

Chandler is an African American woman who, in March 2018, applied for a sales position with La-Z-Boy. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10. As part of the application, Chandler underwent a background check. Id. ¶ 11. Thereafter, a human resources representative from La-Z-Boy asked Chandler about a sixteen-year-old criminal conviction on her record. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Chandler alleges that La-Z-Boy "does not consider the irrelevant convictions of its Caucasian employees" in its hiring process. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. In any event, La-Z-Boy hired Chandler in April 2018. Id. ¶ 19.

Just three weeks into Chandler's employment, she was called a "colored girl" by her manager. Id. ¶ 21. Chandler alleges that, over the following year, she was "harassed, taunted and singled out on a daily basis." Id. ¶ 39. Her white colleagues would whisper "sick" and "lazy" as Chandler walked by. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. This taunting affected Chandler "physically and emotionally." Id. ¶ 43. Ultimately, it prompted Chandler to resign from her position in May 2019. Id. ¶ 45.

In sum, Chandler asserts that she "experienced discrimination during the entire duration of her employment with" La-Z-Boy and was subjected to a hostile work environment. See id. ¶¶ 49-66.

B. Motion to Withdraw

Attorney Briana Lynn Pearson has represented Chandler since the beginning of this litigation. Attorney Pearson now seeks leave to withdraw as Chandler's counsel because Chandler "insists upon taking action that [Attorney Pearson] considers repugnant and with which [Attorney Pearson] has a fundamental disagreement." Mot. for Leave 5, ECF No. 10.

II. STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

A complaint may be dismissed for failing to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive the motion, the complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff cannot rely on mere "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted).

Third Circuit courts use a three-step framework to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, we note "the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937). We then "identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' " Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937). Finally, we assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations "and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

In performing this analysis, we "accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we construe them in a light most favorable to the non-movant." Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010)).

B. Motion to Withdraw

"An attorney's appearance may not be withdrawn except by leave of court, unless another attorney of this court shall at the same time enter an appearance for the same party." E.D. PA. LOC. CIV. R. 5.1(c). "Whether to allow plaintiff's counsel to withdraw her appearance lies within the discretion of this Court." McCune v. First Jud. Dist. Prob. Dep't, 99 F. Supp. 2d 565, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citation omitted). This inquiry is guided, at least in part, by Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b),² which allows attorneys to withdraw from representation where "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." PA. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2021).

"Moreover, in determining whether to permit counsel to withdraw, district courts in the Third Circuit often weigh the following factors: (1) the reason for which the withdrawal is sought; (2) whether withdrawal will prejudice the parties; (3) whether withdrawal will interfere with the administration of justice; and (4) the degree to which withdrawal will delay the action." Ludwig v. Speedway LLC, No. 20-0824, 2021 WL 2223833, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

La-Z-Boy moves to dismiss Chandler's amended claims, again contending that: (1) Chandler cannot state a claim for hostile work environment under § 1981 because the alleged race-based conduct is neither severe nor pervasive; and (2) Chandler cannot state a claim for race discrimination under § 1981 because she fails to adequately plead an adverse employment action. As before, the Court agrees with La-Z-Boy and addresses its arguments in turn.

1. Hostile Work Environment

"A hostile work environment claim under Section 1981 is analyzed in the same manner as under Title VII." Miller v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 908 F. Supp. 2d 639, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2012). "To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination on the basis of race; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) there is a basis for employer liability, such as respondeat superior." Id. (citing Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Chandler's hostile work environment claim is primarily rooted in the aforementioned "colored girl" comment. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 58. The comment is offensive, but "[i]solated incidents and offhanded comments . . . are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim." Stucke v. City of Phila., 685 F. App'x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And "the fact that Plaintiff encountered an unpleasant isolated incident does not mean that the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment were altered." Hoff v. Spring House Tavern, No. 13-0662, 2013 WL 2434615, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 3d 42, 58 (E.D. Pa. 2020) ("For racist comments, slurs and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity[ ] . . . ." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Standing alone, the comment is not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim.

The taunts from Chandler's colleagues also do not support her claim because those taunts, on their face, were not racially based, and there are no facts alleged that otherwise suggest that they were racially motivated. Cf. Mudie v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 577 F.Supp.3d 375, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2021) ("[A]llegations . . . entirely untethered from . . . race . . . do not support a § 1981 claim."); Barber v. A&J Hometown Oil, Inc., No. 11-cv-3350, 2012 WL 13049677, at *5 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2012) ("[C]omments unrelated to race or ethnicity cannot form the basis of a Section 1981 claim."). Chandler has not alleged a plausible hostile work environment claim.³

2. Race Discrimination

"A plaintiff raising a claim of discrimination under § 1981 must allege facts showing '(1) that [she] belongs to a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in § 1981.' " Summers v. Child.'s Hosp. of Phila., No. 21-3479, 2021 WL 5789057, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2021) (quoting Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)). "In the context of employment discrimination claims, the Third Circuit has explained that 'the substantive elements of a claim under section 1981 are generally identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.' " Id. (quoting Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2009)).

Chandler attempts to plead race discrimination under the pretext theory provided by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Opp'n 6, ECF No. 9. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Chandler must show: "1) membership in a protected class; 2) qualification to hold the position; 3) an adverse employment action under 4) 'circumstances that could give rise to an inference of...