Chang v. Chang

197 Conn.App. 733

232 A.3d 1186

Melissa CHANG

v.David CHANG

AC 42175

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 16, 2020

Officially released June 2, 2020

Reuben S. Midler, Greenwich, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).

Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).

Alvord, Prescott and Bright, Js.

ALVORD, J.

In this postdissolution matter, the defendant, David Chang, appeals and the plaintiff, Melissa Chang, cross appeals from the judgment of the trial court resolving their postjudgment motions for contempt. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's October 25, 2017 motion for contempt regarding her proposed adjustment to the parties’ parenting access schedule. On cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied her November 15, 2017 motion for contempt regarding the timely return of the parties’ minor son to her by the defendant after school and (2) granted the defendant's November 19, 2017 motion for contempt regarding withheld consent by the plaintiff to procure private physical therapy for the parties’ minor daughter. ¹

We agree with the defendant. We also agree with the plaintiff as to her second claim, but disagree with her first claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal and cross appeal. On June 15, 2015, the court, Pinkus, J. , dissolved the parties’ eleven year marriage and imposed orders, some of which concerned their two minor children, a son and a daughter. See Chang v. Chang , 170 Conn. App. 822, 823, 155 A.3d 1272, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 910, 158 A.3d 321 (2017). Following the dissolution of their marriage, the parties each filed several postjudgment motions. In order to resolve the issues underlying some of their several postjudgment motions, the parties entered into a multiparagraph stipulation on August 31, 2017 (August 31, 2017 stipulation), which the court, Hon. Stanley Novack , judge trial referee, approved and entered as an order of the court on the same day. The August 31, 2017 stipulation and one of the orders from Judge Pinkus’ June 15, 2015 memorandum of decision underlie the parties’ postjudgment motions for contempt, which were ruled on by the court, Sommer, J. , in a September 13, 2018 memorandum of decision. The defendant appeals and the plaintiff cross appeals from the September 13, 2018 ruling. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We set forth the standard of review and relevant legal principles at the outset because they guide our analysis of the claims made in the appeal and cross appeal. "[O]ur analysis of a judgment of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. ...

This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. ... Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court's determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding. ...

"Civil contempt is committed when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series of acts. ... Whether an order is sufficiently clear and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is particularly harsh ... and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court. ... One cannot be placed in contempt for failure to read the court's mind. ... It is also logically sound that a person must not be found in contempt of a court order when ambiguity either renders compliance with the order impossible, because it is not clear enough to put a reasonable person on notice of what is required for compliance, or makes the order susceptible to a court's arbitrary interpretation of whether a party is in compliance with the order." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bolat v. Bolat , 191 Conn. App. 293, 297–98, 215 A.3d 736, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 918, 217 A.3d 634 (2019).

"To impose contempt penalties, whether criminal or civil, the trial court must make a contempt finding, and this requires the court to find that the offending party wilfully violated the court's order; failure to comply with an order, alone, will not support a finding of contempt. ... Rather, to constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful. ... A good faith dispute or legitimate misunderstanding about the mandates of an order may well preclude a finding of wilfulness. ...

Whether a party's violation was wilful depends on the circumstances of the particular case and, ultimately, is a factual question committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ... Without a finding of wilfulness, a trial court cannot find contempt and, it follows, cannot impose contempt penalties. ... The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies to civil contempt proceedings ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall , 182 Conn. App. 736, 747, 191 A.3d 182, aff'd, ––– Conn. ––––, ––– A.3d ––––, 2020 WL 1856087 (2020).

"It is ... necessary, in reviewing the propriety of the court's decision to [grant or] deny the motion for contempt, that we review the factual findings of the court that led to its determination. The clearly erroneous standard is the well settled standard for reviewing a trial court's factual findings. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by any evidence in the record or when there is evidence to support it, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach , 113 Conn. App. 318, 326–27, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 902, 971 A.2d 40 (2009).

"In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered in accordance with ... a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and construed as a contract. ... It is well established that [a] contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. ... [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. ... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity .... Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms. ... Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning ... concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion .... In contrast, an agreement is ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. ... Nevertheless, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bolat v. Bolat , supra, 191 Conn. App. at 298, 215 A.3d 736.

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's parenting access schedule adjustment motion for contempt because the relevant language of the August 31, 2017 stipulation underlying that motion is not sufficiently clear and unambiguous. We agree.²

The following additional facts, found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In paragraph 3 of the August 31, 2017 stipulation (paragraph 3), the parties agreed that they "shall work with the guardian ad litem to adjust the parenting access schedule, if necessary, to accommodate the academic calendars of the children, the holiday and vacation schedules and to establish synchronicity between the parties’ minor children and the members of the plaintiff's household." Immediately following Judge Novack's adoption of the August 31, 2017 stipulation as an order, during September and October, 2017, the plaintiff sought to adjust the parenting access schedule. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to have the defendant exchange with her the weekends that he was scheduled to spend parenting time with their children. The plaintiff sought this adjustment of the parenting access schedule so that she would have parenting time at the same time that her boyfriend had his parenting time with his son from a prior marriage. The parties agreed to mediate the issue with the assistance of the guardian ad litem, Attorney Bonnie Amendola, who scheduled a meeting between the parties for October 26, 2017 (October meeting). Prior to the October meeting, Amendola contacted the defendant by telephone. During their telephone conversation, the defendant expressed to Amendola that he did not believe it was necessary to adjust the parenting access schedule because the son of the plaintiff's boyfriend was not a member of the plaintiff's household. He further told Amendola that such a change was not necessary to the best interests of his children. Finally, he expressed his concern that the plaintiff's new boyfriend presented a safety risk for the parties’ daughter. For these reasons, the defendant did not want to participate in the October meeting and...