Chang v. Cnty. of Santa Clara

SHIOW-HUEY CHANG, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-02502-RMW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION

October 24, 2016

ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

Re: Dkt. Nos. 133, 140

In this case involving excessive force by police, before the court are a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) filed by defendants Deputy Rachel Strickland ("Strickland") and the County of Santa Clara ("County"), Dkt. No. 133, and a motion for attorneys' fees¹ filed by plaintiff Shiow-Huey Chang, Dkt. No. 140. Having considered the motions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the motion for JMOL is GRANTED as to defendant County and DENIED as to defendant Strickland, and the motion for attorneys' fees is GRANTED, but in an amount significantly less than the amount plaintiff requested.

I. BACKGROUND

This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises from a traffic stop the early evening of June 11, 2014. Plaintiff Chang, a female, Chinese-American, was driving her car alone on Foothill Expressway when defendant Forest, a Santa Clara County Sheriff's Deputy who was driving a police car at the time, observed her pull to a stop on the right-hand side of the road. See TX 1014 at 0:38-0:58 (video).² Plaintiff testified that she pulled to a stop because she saw the police car coming up behind her at a high rate of speed and assumed that the police were "going somewhere in a hurry." Trial Tr. vol. 3, 32:5-33:3. Forest initially pulled alongside plaintiff and stopped in the left lane. After a brief pause, plaintiff then slowly drove forward in the right-hand lane. TX 1014 at 0:51-1:05.

Forest followed and activated his lights to commence a traffic stop. Plaintiff pulled over to the side of the road. Forest got out of the police car, approached plaintiff's driver's side window, and apparently asked her for identification. No audio is available for that portion of the stop. A few minutes later, Strickland, a female Sheriff's deputy, arrived on the scene and walked to the passenger side window of plaintiff's car. TX 1014 at 4:10-4:20. Both deputies walked back away from Chang's car and retrieved information on Chang. They found that her driver's license was valid and that she had no active warrants. Trial Tr. vol. 2 49:14-20.

Several minutes later, the deputies walked back to plaintiff's car, with Forest on the driver's side and Strickland on the passenger side. Strickland activated the microphone on her uniform. TX 1014 at 11:16. Forest told Chang that he was issuing a citation to her for impeding traffic, and Forest asked that she sign the bottom of the ticket. TX 1013 at 2:24-25. Chang refused to sign the ticket and became upset. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 125:6-15; see generally TX 1014 at 11:16-13:12. Plaintiff asked the deputies how much she would have to pay for the ticket, TX 1013 at 2:30; said that the deputies had scared her, id. at 2:35-3:42; and asked why she needed to spendher time explaining the situation to a judge, id. at 3:44-49. Plaintiff also accused the deputies of racial profiling. Id. at 3:52. Plaintiff began gesturing with her hand outside of her driver's side window and hit Forest's clipboard and hand. TX 1014 at 12:21-13:12; Trial Tr. vol. 3, 68:13-15, 68:18-23. Strickland warned plaintiff twice to be careful with her hand, and then, in a final warning, said that if plaintiff hit Forest one more time she would be going to jail. TX 1013 at 3:58, 4:62, 4:67-68. Around the same time, plaintiff demanded to talk to Forest's supervisor. Id. at 4:71. Forest responded, gesturing to Strickland, "How do you know she's not here? How do you know that's not my supervisor?" Id. at 4:73-74; Trial Tr. vol. 2, 61:4-7; TX 1014 at 13:00-13:02. Strickland was not Forest's supervisor. Plaintiff responded, extremely agitated, "She's not. I want a supervisor. Right now." TX 1013 at 4:75. Two more times, Forest asked plaintiff if she was going to sign the citation, and two more times, plaintiff yelled that she wanted to see Forest's supervisor and hit his clipboard or his hand. Id. at 4:76-80; TX 1014 at 13:02-13:13.

At this point, Forest grabbed plaintiff's arm, opened the car door, and pulled plaintiff out of her car without telling Strickland that he intended to do so or warning plaintiff. TX 1014 at 13:13-13:17; Trial Tr. vol. 3, 68:24-69:13. Strickland told plaintiff she was going to jail. TX 1013 at 4:80. Strickland came around to the driver's side of the vehicle to assist, although by the time she got there Chang was already being pulled from her vehicle. TX 1014 at 13:13-13:17. Plaintiff is approximately five feet, two inches tall and weighs just over 100 pounds. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 27:19-28:2. Forest is approximately six feet, three inches tall and weighs around 225 pounds. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 54:19-25. Video of the incident shows that Strickland is also larger than plaintiff. See TX 1014 at 13:12-13:45. Plaintiff was pushed up against her car by Forest and by Strickland who was by then assisting Forest. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 13:19-13:40. The deputies handcuffed plaintiff and took her to a patrol car. At one point, Chang said to the deputies, "You are hurting me," at which point Forest responded, "Yeah, I know; you are gonna go to jail too now." TX 1013 at 5:94-95. During the arrest, plaintiff's face was pressed against her car, and she injured her cheek. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 25:18-24. She also suffered minor bruises to her wrists. Id. at 80:18-81:2. Plaintiff's glasses were also broken, though the parties dispute whether this occurred because her face was pressedagainst her car or because plaintiff stepped on her glasses, which had fallen off around the time she was placed in the patrol car. See Trial Tr. vol. 2, 100:22-25, 137:15-25.

Plaintiff was arrested and charged criminally with battery on a police officer, resisting arrest, and impeding traffic. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 95:23-96:7. These charges were subsequently dismissed. Id. at 98:25-96:3. Later on the evening of her arrest, plaintiff was released from jail.

Plaintiff went to the hospital for treatment of her minor injuries and, while at the hospital, plaintiff made a complaint to the Internal Affairs division of the Sheriff's Department. She spoke with a Sergeant Roberts while at the hospital, and she later spoke with a female deputy in Internal Affairs. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 48:21-49:1. Chang later received a letter from the Sheriff's department regarding the outcome of the investigation. TX 30 (Dkt. No. 134-6). The letter stated, in relevant part:

Dear Ms. Chang:

The complaint you lodged with this office has been investigated. It has been determined that the proper findings in this matter were:

Exonerated.

• Exonerated: The investigation indicates the act occurred but the act was justified, lawful and proper.

The Sheriff's Office Administration reviewed this and concurs in with these findings.

Id. The letter was signed by Sergeant Paula McAllister of Internal Affairs, with Sgt. McAllister's name appearing below the printed name of Sheriff Laurie Smith. Id.

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on June 5, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. She asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant deputies for excessive use of force during her arrest. She also sued the County of Santa Clara based on her assertion that "defendants were acting in accordance with a custom, policy, and practice of the County and the SCCSO in violating plaintiff's constitutional rights." Id. ¶ 43. Following discovery, the case proceeded to trial on July 18, 2016. The jury heard two days of testimony, and the only witnesses to testify were defendant Forest and plaintiff Chang. The jury heard evidence that plaintiff paid approximately $37,000 to the same law firm pursuing her civil case to defend against the criminal charges that were later dismissed, in addition to several hundred dollars in related expenses. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 51:8-52:24.Following the close of plaintiff's case in chief, defendants County, Forest, and Strickland moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). Dkt. No. 108. Plaintiff filed an opposition. Dkt. No. 113. The court took the motion under submission. The jury reached a verdict in favor of plaintiff against all three defendants and awarded her $40,000 on July 27, 2016. Dkt. No. 122. The court entered judgment on July 28, 2016, Dkt. No. 125.

Defendants Strickland and County (but not defendant Forest) filed the instant renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) on August 25, 2016. Dkt. No. 133. Plaintiff filed an opposition on September 8, 2016, Dkt. No. 142, and defendants Strickland and County filed a reply on September 15, 2016, Dkt. No. 143. Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys' fees on September 6, 2016. Dkt. No. 140. Defendants Forest, Strickland, and County filed an opposition on September 29, 2016, Dkt. No. 150, and plaintiff filed a reply on October 6, 2016, Dkt. No. 154. Plaintiff filed a notice of errata and a corrected exhibit in support of her fee motion on October 11, 2016. Dkt. No. 156. The parties also submitted supplemental briefs in response to the court's questions. Dkt. Nos. 160, 161.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) provides:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No later than 28 days after the entry of judgment . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . .

A court reviews "a jury's verdict for substantial evidence in ruling on a properly made motion under Rule 50(b)." E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). "The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one...