Chapell v. State

107 So.3d 1003

Jeffrey Dale CHAPELL, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2011–CA–00336–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

June 19, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 2012.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 21, 2013.

James D. Franks Jr., attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Laura Hogan Tedder, attorney for appellee.

Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and MAXWELL, JJ.

MAXWELL, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Jeffrey Dale Chapell filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) to challenge his sentence. Chapell had pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery of a child and two counts of fondling a child and was sentenced to three concurrent twenty-five-year terms in prison, followed by two concurrent fifteen-year terms of post-release supervision. In his PCR motion he argued the sentencing court: (1) lacked jurisdiction to impose his sentence; (2) imposed a grossly disproportional sentence, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; and (3) failed to credit him time served under house arrest while out on bond. The circuit court dismissed his PCR motion without a hearing. On appeal, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 2006, the mother of two of Chapell's minor victims discovered him molesting one her daughters. During the ensuing investigation, Chapell admitted to molesting eight different victims. Four were identified, and the grand jury returned a ten-count indictment charging seven counts of sexual penetration of a child under fourteen (sexual battery) ¹ and three counts of gratification of lust by touching a child under sixteen (fondling). ² Chapell was arrested. He was later released on a ten-percent bond conditioned on his placement under house arrest.

¶ 3. Chapell pled guilty to three of the counts of sexual battery and two of the counts of fondling. At the plea hearing, Chapell's counsel proffered that Chapell had been examined by a psychologist who is an expert in evaluating defendants regarding competency and legal insanity. While Chapell did have a diminished mental capacity, Chapell's counsel admitted he was competent to stand trial and enter a plea. Taking into consideration the information about Chapell's low intelligence quotient (IQ), which indicated some mental retardation, the circuit judge found Chapell was competent and accepted his plea of guilty.

¶ 4. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested Chapell be sentenced to forty years in prison. Chapell's counsel asked the circuit judge to sentence Chapell to continued house arrest, arguing such a sentence would be more appropriate than jail in light of Chapell's childlike mental capacity. Counsel also relied on the circuit court's recent sentencing of another defendant convicted of child molestation to house arrest, claiming the circumstances were similar.

¶ 5. In issuing Chapell's sentence, the circuit judge distinguished the case in which the court had ordered house arrest. That case involved one victim over a three-day period. And everyone interested in the case—the State, the defendant, and the victim's family—agreed to the sentence. But Chapell's case involved multiple victims over multiple years, and the State and the victims' families requested forty years in jail. The circuit judge, noting on the record he had reviewed the information presented about Chapell's diminished mental capacity, sentenced him to twenty-five years in jail and fifteen years of post-release supervision. The circuit judge gave Chapell sixty-four days' credit for time served in jail before being released on bond.

¶ 6. Following the July 31, 2007 entry of the judgment against him, Chapell did not directly appeal his sentence. See Hamilton v. State, 44 So.3d 1060, 1065 (¶ 15) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (citing Trotter v. State, 554 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1989)) (explaining that, while a guilty plea could not be directly appealed under Mississippi Code Annotated § 99–35–101 (Rev.2007), a sentence resulting from a guilty plea could be appealed). But seeMiss.Code Ann. § 99–35–101 (Supp.2011) (effective July 1, 2008) (amending the statute so that a defendant who “enters a plea of guilty and is sentenced” is not allowed to directly appeal from the circuit court to the Mississippi Supreme Court). But Chapell did file a PCR motion collaterally attacking his sentence within the three-year statutory time limit. SeeMiss.Code Ann. § 99–39–5(2) (Supp.2011). The circuit court dismissed this motion without a hearing, and Chapell timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. We review the dismissal of a PCR motion for abuse of discretion. Burrough v. State, 9 So.3d 368, 371 (¶ 6) (Miss.2009) (citing Billiot v. State, 655 So.2d 1, 12 (Miss.1995)). The circuit court may summarily dismiss a PCR motion “if it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Id. (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–11(2) (Rev.2007)).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

¶ 8. Chapell first argues he was entitled to relief because the circuit judge who imposed his sentence failed to make an on-the-record finding of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Like the circuit court, we are confused about the jurisdictional error Chapell is asserting. The only authority Chapell cites is a completely irrelevant civil case. “Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court's obligation to review such issues.” Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 853 (¶ 35) (Miss.2003) (citing Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 487 (¶ 90) (Miss.2001)).

¶ 9. Clearly, the DeSoto County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to sentence Chapell. Mississippi's circuit courts have general jurisdiction “to hear and determine all prosecutions in the name of the state for treason, felonies, crimes, and misdemeanors[.]” Miss.Code. Ann. § 9–7–81 (Rev.2002). And a circuit court obtains “subject matter jurisdiction over the subject of a particular offense” when “[a]n indictment charging the essential elements of a crime [is] served on a defendant[.]” Neal v. State, 936 So.2d 463, 466 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (citing Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1021 (Miss.1989)).

¶ 10. The DeSoto County Circuit Court served Chapell with a ten-count indictment that included the five counts to which he pled guilty. Thus, the court had the jurisdiction to accept his plea and impose his sentence. See Jefferson, 556 So.2d at 1020 (noting that a court that has jurisdiction to adjudge the defendant guilty of the charges in his indictment certainly has “jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea, adjudge him guilty, and impose sentence”). We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of this claim.

II. Chapell's Sentence

¶ 11. Chapell next argues he is entitled to relief because: (1) his sentence is grossly disproportionate to sentences imposed in the same and surrounding jurisdictions for similar crimes; and (2) the trial court did not take into account mitigation evidence of his low IQ.

A. Procedural Bar

¶ 12. The circuit court, relying on this court's opinion in Hamilton, found Chapell's sentencing argument had been waived by not raising it on direct appeal. In Hamilton, we found the failure to challenge the proportionality of a sentence following a guilty plea barred raising the issue in a PCR motion. Hamilton, 44 So.3d at 1065–66 (¶ 15) (citing Dennis v. State, 873 So.2d 1045, 1049 (¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2004)); see also Johnson v. State, 39 So.3d 14, 21–22 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (holding the defendant's challenge to constitutionality of his sentence raised in his PCR motion was barred by failure to directly appeal the sentence). We note Hamilton,Dennis, and Johnson all relied on the Mississippi Supreme Court's interpretation of section 99–35–101 in Trotter, 554 So.2d at 315.See Hamilton, 44 So.3d at 1065 (¶ 15);Dennis, 873 So.2d at 1049 (¶ 13);Johnson, 39 So.3d at 22 (¶ 16). Subsequent to the entry of Chapell's guilty plea and sentence, section 99–35–101 was amended to make not only a plea of guilty but also the sentence that followed ineligible for direct appeal. SeeMiss.Code Ann. § 99–35–101 (Supp.2011). So while we apply Trotter and the cases relying on Trotter, such as Hamilton, to Chapell's guilty plea and sentence, we point out this line of cases would not apply to a defendant who has pled guilty after July 1, 2008.

¶ 13. Chapell argues this court made an “illogical jump” in Hamilton by reasoning that, because a sentence following a guilty plea may be appealed, it must be appealed. He also argues this holding “completely ignores” Mississippi's Uniform Post–Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA), which provides:

Any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi ... may file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence ... if the person claims ... [t]hat the conviction or the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of Mississippi[.]

Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–5(1)(a) (Supp.2011). But the UPCCRA also instructs:

Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi or of the United States, shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred[.]

Miss.Code. Ann. § 99–39–21(1) (Rev.2007). See Payton v. State, 845 So.2d 713, 717 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (citing Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–21(1)) (holding failure to raise issue of illegal sentence at sentencing hearing waived raising issue in PCR motion).

¶ 14. The stated purpose of the UPCCRA is “to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39–3(2) (Rev.2007...