Chapman v. City of Coos Bay, Or.

1

ALLISON KATE CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COOS BAY, OREGON, Defendant.

No. 6:23-cv-00907-MTK

United States District Court, D. Oregon

December 5, 2024

OPINION AND ORDER

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him) United States District Judge.

Self-represented party Allison Kate Chapman (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint against the City of Coos Bay, Oregon (“Defendant”), alleging Defendant violated Plaintiff's civil rights and her protections under federal data privacy laws. 3d Am. Compl. (“TAC”) at *1, *3-4, ECF No. 37. Plaintiff seeks declaratory injunctive, and monetary relief. TAC at *4-5. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No 85. For the below reasons, Defendant's Motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is resident of North Bend, Oregon. TAC at *1. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury as a child and receives social security benefits for a disability resulting from the injury. TAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff is transgender. TAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her based on her disability in a 2017 arrest and based on her gender in repeatedly pulling her over. Plaza Decl. Ex. 2 “Chapman Dep.” 32:20-25, 105:11-106:21, ECF No 86-2.

The Coos Bay Police Department has issued Plaintiff multiple citations for traffic violations for driving without privileges or driving while suspended. Plaza Decl., ECF No. 86, Exs. 3-7. Oregon state courts have convicted and fined Plaintiff for these violations. Id. Plaintiff appealed her convictions in Oregon state court, and some appeals are pending. Plaza Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. 8. In December 2022, former Oregon Governor Kate Brown excused Plaintiff's outstanding financial obligations to pay her fees associated with her violations from January 2021 and earlier. Plaza Decl. Ex. 10, at *4. Governor Brown's letter did not authorize Plaintiff to drive without a license. Id. at ¶ 4. Coos Bay Police Officer Pete Kirk (“Officer Kirk”) cited Plaintiff for driving with a suspended license or driving without privileges violations in September 2021, October 2021, March 2022, and February 2023. Plaza Decl. Exs. 3-7. On several occasions, Defendant's officers told Plaintiff her car could be impounded if she continued to drive while suspended or without a license. Esperance Decl. Exs. 1-7, ECF No. 89. Defendant never towed Plaintiff's car. Chapman Dep. 91:17-21. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's arrests, citations, and towing policies violate her due process and fourth amendment rights. Chapman Dep. 92:9-13, 107:17-109:20, 109:23-110:18.

Defendant has access to Plaintiff's vehicle and personal information via its Law Enforcement Data System. Cupp Decl. 2-3, ECF No. 88. Defendant accessed Plaintiff's personal information multiple times since January 2022. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant impermissibly accessed her personal information. Chapman Dep. 116:14-117:3.

Defendant moved for summary judgment on September 9, 2024. Def's Mot. Summ. J. 19, ECF No. 85. The Court ordered Plaintiff to respond by October 11, 2024. ECF No. 91. Plaintiff did not file a response.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs.,Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T. W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630-31. Even where a summary judgment motion is unopposed, summary judgment is improper if “the [moving party's] papers are insufficient to support that motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact.” Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). The court must still examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff on several grounds. Defendant argues (1) the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's discrimination claims; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge Defendant's tow policy; (3) Plaintiff's evidence fails to establish an official municipal policy; and (4) Plaintiff cannot show Defendant accessed her information for an impermissible purpose.

I. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff alleges^[1] that Defendant violated federal laws under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and 28 U.S.C. § 794 by discriminating against her in places of public accommodation because she is disabled and transgender. Chapman Dep. 32:3-24, 105:11-106:22. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claims are barred under the statute of limitations.

A. Whether Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims Are Time Barred

Where, as is the case here, federal law does not have an express statute of limitations, the appropriate statute of limitations is that “applicable to the most analogous state-law claim” absent conflicting federal law or policy. Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 2015).

The most applicable state law claims here are those for discrimination in places of public accommodation, ORS 659A.885(2)(a), discrimination against disabled persons in places of public accommodation, id.; ORS 659A.142, or for allegations of personal injury against a public body, ORS 30.275(9). SeeSharkey, 778 F.3d at 770-71 (deciding whether to apply California's limitations for claims alleging discrimination against disabled persons or for claims alleging personal injury). In any event, the latest limitations period here would be two years from the date of occurrence. Compare ORS 659A.875(4) (providing a one-year limitation for types of discrimination in public accommodation listed in ORS 659A.403 but not discrimination based on disability) with ORS 12.110(1) (providing a two-year limitation period for actions against injury of a person's rights without a specified statute of limitation) and ORS 30.275(9) (providing a two-year limitation for actions against a public body).

Plaintiff testified that her discrimination claims mostly arise from her arrest for trespass at Walmart in May 2017. Chapman Dep.105:11-106:22. Plaintiff filed her first complaint in June 2023-more than five years after her two arrests and the incident at Walmart. Compl. at *6, ECF No. 1. The Court need not decide which statute of limitations applies because Plaintiffs claims arising from events in 2017 are barred in all cases.

B. Plaintiff's Remaining Allegations of Discrimination

Plaintiff also alleges discrimination based on other events. Plaintiff testified that Officer Kirk “antagonizes and challenges people to fight” and that “it's common information that [Plaintiff] [has] a head injury” resulting in Plaintiff's “problems dealing with the public,” Chapman Dep. 105:11-106:22, and that Defendant discriminates against her because of her gender by “terrorizing her” and pulling her over, id. 32:3-25.

General and conclusory evidence alone does not defeat a summary judgment motion. Angel v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Klopfenstein v. Pargeter, 597 F.2d 150, 151-52 (9th Cir. 1979) (conclusory affidavit inadequate)). No evidence in the record supports Plaintiff's allegations. As a result, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff.

II. Whether the Court Has Jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Section 1983 Claims

Before proceeding to the merits of the § 1983 claims, the Court must assess whether it has jurisdiction. See Mendoza v. Strickler, 51 F.4th 346, 352 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly, the Court first addresses Defendant's argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims because (A) Plaintiff's claims implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and (B) Plaintiff lacks standing.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Because the Supreme Court is the only federal court with “authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings[,]” federal district courts lack jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers inviting . . . review and rejection of the state court's judgments.” D.C. Ct. of Appeals v Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Mendoza, 51 F.4th at 353 (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011)). This rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,^[2] is applied narrowly and “is not triggered simply by entry of judgment in state court.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Instead, the court must first assess whether the action...