Chapman v. Md. Dep't of State Police

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DEREK CHAPMAN, Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, OFFICE OF THE STATE FIRE MARSHALL, Defendant.

Civil Action No. ADC-23-442

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 8, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A David Copperthite, United States Magistrate Judge

Defendant Maryland Department of State Police, Office of the State Fire Marshall, moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff Derek Chapman's Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 6. After considering the Motion and the responses thereto (ECF Nos. 6, 10, 13), the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.^[1] Loc.R. 105.6 (D.Md. 2023). For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a Black African American male who began working at the Maryland Department of State Police, Office of the State Fire Marshal (“OSFM”), in 1998.^[2] ECF No. 1, at ¶¶2, 14, 18, 19. He achieved the rank of Deputy Chief State Fire Marshal and was the highest-ranking Black employee at the OSFM. Id. at ¶19. In this role he was in charge of commanding and managing the Northeast Region of OSFM, which js the Department's busiest region and was responsible for “submitting origin and cause reports to Chief Deputy State Fire Marshal (“CDFM”) Gregory Der.” Id. at ¶20.

In or around February 2020, in recognition of Black History Month, Plaintiff sent his colleagues an email highlighting the work of a Black inventor who “pav[ed] the way for firefighters.” Id. at ¶27. In a meeting the following day, the Fire Marshal “drew a problematic comparison between black dogs and [the] celebrated inventor” and joked that “the Department could make a Facebook post about black Labrador retrievers, in honor of black history month.” Id. Plaintiff was “insulted” by this comment and “felt that the Fire Marshal saw him and other Black colleagues as more akin to dogs than as equals to White Officers.” Id. at ¶27.

Shortly after the Fire Marshal made this comment, Plaintiff went out on medical leave to recover from kidney cancer. Id. at ¶28. In March 2021, after Plaintiff returned to the OSFM, he and CDFM Der met to discuss Plaintiffs backlog of reports. Id. at ¶29. Although backlogged reports were a “department-wide issue,” CDFM Der singled out Plaintiff for failing to timely file his mandatoiy reports and refused to provide Plaintiff with additional resources to ensure that the reports were completed on time. Id. at ¶¶29-30.

Thereafter, Plaintiff was informed that the “Fire Marshal and Chief Deputy had planned to make unilateral changes to Plaintiff's [assigned] region[.]” Id. at ¶31. He met with CDFM Der for a second time on March 21,2021, at which time CDFM Der told Plaintiff that “he was removing' Cecil County from Plaintiff's purview and reassigning it to the Upper Shore Office ... due to his use of sick leave and his overdue reports.” Id. at ¶¶32-33. During this meeting, Plaintiff and CDFM Der also discussed that two OSFM Commanders had made race-related comments in Plaintiff's -presence. Id. at ¶32. While Plaintiff wished for this conversation to remain private, he later learned that CDFM Der immediately informed the Commanders, as well as several other Department employees, of these allegations. Id. at ¶¶34-35.

In June 2021, Plaintiff filed an internal harassment and discrimination complaint with the' Fair Practice Unit against CDFM Der and SFM Geraci. Id. at ¶38. The Director of the Fair Practice Unit, however, ultimately informed Plaintiff that “CDFM Der was not part of the harassment/discrimination allegations.” Id. That same month, Plaintiff was “relieved of his responsibilities and duties,” and transferred from his post to the CDFM headquarters “under the pretext of backlogged reports.” Id. at ¶36. After this transfer, he was counseled by CDFM Der for failing to submit 10 overdue reports. Id. at ¶37.

Plaintiff filed another internal complaint against CDFM Der for “violating the Core Values Policy, by lying, misrepresentation of facts, harassment, and bullying” on August 16, 2021. Id. at ¶39. Although Plaintiff had several meetings with members of the Personnel Administration Section of the Internal Affairs Division, he was ultimately informed that there was nothing that could be done about CDFM Der's behavior. Id. at ¶¶40-41. Shortly after this complaint was lodged, on September 3, 2021, Plaintiff again attempted to meet with CDFM Der to resolve his report backlog. Id. at ¶42. CDFM Der, however, reacted “harshly, coldly and focused not on the solutions or gains that Plaintiff had made.” Id. at ¶42.

On October 12, 2021, Plaintiff was suspended from his job at the OSFM. Id. at ¶43. While on suspension, Plaintiff met with the Deputy Director of the Office of Equity and Inclusion who advised Plaintiff to “keep his mouth shut and [that] this would cost him money.” Id. at ¶46. Plaintiff was reinstated on March 16,2022 after Internal Affairs completed its investigation into his failure to timely complete his reports. Id. at ¶50. Just days after he was reinstated, Plaintiff received an email from SFM Geraci accusing him of “being disgruntled and [giving] him a timeframe to get reports completed, no matter if he was on approved leave or not.” Id. at ¶51. Several months later, Plaintiff was involuntarily moved from OSFM's Elkton office to its Bel Air office. Id. at ¶52. Plaintiff was not given advanced notice of this transfer and his personal and work items were removed from the Elkton office without his knowledge or consent. Id. He was later told that he was transferred because his Elkton office needed to be converted into an evidence locker. Id.

On February 13, 2023, while on FMLA leave pending surgery, “Plaintiff received a letter containing a performance evaluation dated December 14, 2022 rating his performance as unsatisfactory, highlighting his reports as an ongoing area of concern and claiming that he was failing to follow orders.” Id. at ¶59. According to Plaintiff, his backlog was “the same” as his white predecessors. Id. at ¶60.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on February 18, 2022. Id. at ¶8. He received his right to sue letter on November 22, 2022 and filed the instant action in this Court on February 17, 2023. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9. Plaintiff asserts claims of Race Discrimination, Color Discrimination, and Retaliation in violation of Title VII (Counts I-III), violation of the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”) (Count IV), Retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (Count V), and violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count VI). Id. at ¶¶65-161. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 2023. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff responded in opposition on June 2,2023 and Defendant replied on June 15,2023; ECF Nos. 10,13.

Discussion

Standard of Review

Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the Complaint, not to “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206,214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Facial plausibility exists when Plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. An inference of a “mere possibility of misconduct” is not sufficient to support a plausible claim. Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true, but not legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id. (citations omitted). When deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) courts may, in addition to the complaint and matters of public record, “consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem 'I. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176,180 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Episcopal Church in S.C. v. Church Ins. Co. of Vt., 997 F.3d 149,154 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e may consider authentic, extrinsic evidence that is integral to the complaint, as well as matters of public record.”).

Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1)

This Court reviews the defense of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(1). “The F ourth Circuit has not decided whether sovereign immunity is grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but this Court favors analysis under Rule 12(b)(1) because immunity functions ‘as a block on the exercise of that jurisdiction.'” Kreil v. Queen Anne's Cnty., No. JKB-18-637,2018 WL 6523883, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 12,2018) (quoting Gross v. Morgan State Univ., 308 F.Supp.3d 861, 865 (D.Md. 2018)). The burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. Evansv. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). “Where defendants raise the defense of sovereign immunity, they make a facial challenge to the complaint.” Kreil, 2018 WL 6523883 at *3 (citing Weiss v. Price, No. ELH-17-1127,2018 WL 1156770, at *2 (D.Md. March 5, 2018)). Under a “facial challenge,” t...