Chapman v. State

368 Ga.App. 682

890 S.E.2d 313

CHAPMAN v. The STATE.

A23A0234

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 27, 2023

Review Denied July 11, 2023

Brandon A. Bullard, Charles Hudson Cauble, Atlanta, Megan M. Harrison, for Appellant.

David Jared Parrish, John Herbert Cranford Jr., Newnan, Jessica Leigh Williams-Vickery, for Appellee.

Doyle, Presiding Judge.

Joel Edward Chapman appeals from his conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, ¹ arguing that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, ² the record shows that law enforcement officers found 55 grams of methamphetamine in Chapman's car during a traffic stop. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that officers lacked probable cause to perform the traffic stop and that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda³ rights.

At the hearing on Chapman's motion to suppress, Officer Trent Hastings testified that on November 29, 2018, he was observing traffic on Highway 70. The Coweta County Sheriff's Office had received information that Chapman would be traveling southbound on Highway 70 in either a white Ford F-150 or silver Ford Mustang, carrying methamphetamine and heading for Roscoe General Store. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Hastings saw a silver Mustang traveling in the predicted direction, and he observed the car's passenger-side tires travel "well onto" the fog line. ⁴ Hastings began following the vehicle and activated his lights to initiate a traffic stop, and he recognized the driver to be Chapman because he had looked up Chapman's photo beforehand. According to Hastings, Chapman had ample time to pull over before Chapman encountered a sharp curve in the road, but he did not do so. Additionally, Hastings saw Chapman make a motion with his hands signaling that he would continue driving down the roadway, and based on his experience, Hastings recognized this as a sign that Chapman could be preparing to flee. Hastings notified other officers, and they pulled their vehicle in front of Chapman, forcing him to stop.

Officer Hasting's body camera recording was played during the hearing, and Hastings was questioned extensively about the events depicted in the recording. ⁵ After Chapman stopped his car, which occurred at approximately 52 seconds into the recording, Hastings and the two other officers on the scene exited their vehicles with their weapons drawn. Chapman put his hands outside the car window and told officers that he had not stopped because there was no place to pull over on the side of the road, and while he was talking an officer responded, "You had plenty of time to stop." Chapman complied with the officers’ instructions to exit his car and place his hands on top of the vehicle, and the officers re-holstered their weapons. Hastings asked Chapman if he had any weapons, Chapman answered that he did not, and Hastings guided Chapman toward the back of the car. Then, with Chapman's consent, Hastings began a pat-down search for weapons.

At 1 minute, 39 seconds into the recording, Hastings asked an officer to hand him gloves so he could continue his search of Chapman's pockets. As that officer stepped away to retrieve the gloves, and while Chapman was standing behind his car with his hands on the roof to accommodate Hasting's search, another officer walked closer to Chapman, confirmed that his name was Joel Chapman, and asked, "Do you have anything illegal on you[?]" At 1 minute, 45 seconds into the recording — less than a minute after Chapman stopped his car — Chapman answered "yes," then advised that he had methamphetamine on him. Hastings continued to search Chapman's pockets as Chapman again stated that he had not pulled over because there was no safe place to do so. One minute later, Hastings placed handcuffs on Chapman and told him that he was being "detained" because he admitted he had methamphetamine. When officers asked Chapman what pocket held the methamphetamine, he said he was not sure if it was in his pocket or in the car. At 3 minutes, 14 seconds into the recording, Hastings read Chapman the Miranda warnings. Officers subsequently searched Chapman's car and found approximately 55 grams of methamphetamine in the center console. They placed Chapman under arrest, and he stated he was trying to make money for Christmas.

The trial court denied Chapman's motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was valid in light of Chapman's failure to maintain a single lane of traffic, that the officers’ interaction with Chapman was a permissible tier-two encounter rather than a custodial interrogation, and that Chapman was advised of his Miranda rights before he was placed under arrest. The jury subsequently found Chapman guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 20 years to serve. This appeal ensued.

1. Chapman contends that the traffic stop was illegal because officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. He argues that driving on a fog line, but not over it, does not amount to failure to maintain one's lane and insists that officers had no reasonable basis to believe that a driver violated Georgia law by driving on a fog line.

In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, the evidence is construed most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court; the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility are adopted unless they are clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed if there is any evidence to support them. ⁶

The trial court's application of law to the facts, however, is subject to de novo review. ⁷

"To initiate a traffic stop, an officer must have specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct." ⁸ It is well-established that "a stop is authorized if the officer observes a traffic violation." ⁹

Here, Officer Hastings testified that he stopped Chapman because he saw Chapman drive on the white fog line, which Hastings believed constituted a failure to maintain his lane. That offense is codified at OCGA § 40-6-48 (1), which provides:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic ... [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety[.] ¹⁰

The Georgia Code does not define a "lane" for traffic, and although the term "roadway" is defined as excluding any "berm or shoulder," ¹¹ it is not clear whether various markings, including fog lines, should be considered part of the lane or outside the lane. Our law is clear that if a driver crosses a fog line, he violates OCGA § 40-6-48 (1). ¹² But the parties have not identified any case where a driver was convicted of violating OCGA § 40-6-48 (1) because he touched, but did not cross, a fog line or other painted boundary line. Indeed, in a recent case where the trial court found that the defendant "was weaving within his lane between lane line and fog line and touching the lines[,]" we concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for failure to maintain lane. ¹³ Additionally, a federal district court has determined that "lane touching," without weaving or other conduct that might suggest incapacity, did not constitute a Georgia traffic violation. ¹⁴ After considering the parties’ arguments on this issue, including the cases cited in their briefs, during oral arguments, and in the Appellant's supplemental brief, we hold today that under Georgia law, a motorist does not violate OCGA § 40-6-48 (1) when he drives on, but does not cross over, a fog line.

Our holding, however, does not resolve the question of whether Officer Hastings was authorized to stop Chapman. Again, "[i]n order to initiate a traffic stop, a law-enforcement officer must have specific and articulable facts that provide a reasonable suspicion that the individual being stopped is engaged in criminal activity." ¹⁵ Where an officer reasonably but mistakenly believes that certain conduct violates the law, the observation of that conduct can serve as reasonable suspicion if the officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable. ¹⁶ To determine whether an officer's mistake of law was reasonable, courts must engage in a "straightforward question of statutory construction[.]" ¹⁷ "[I]f the law in question is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake." ¹⁸

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that until our holdings in Lute and the instant case, Georgia law was genuinely ambiguous as to whether driving on a fog line, but not across that line, amounts to a failure to maintain one's lane in violation of OCGA § 40-6-48 (1). Crucially, our Code does not define many of the operative terms, including "lane." Chapman argues that Hastings's mistaken belief that driving on the fog line is a violation of Georgia law was not reasonable. He likens driving on the fog line to weaving within one's lane of traffic and emphasizes that, under well-established law, weaving within a single lane of traffic does not amount to failure to maintain one's lane. ¹⁹ But even considering that body of precedent, we conclude that, until our holdings in Lute and this case, Georgia's law was genuinely ambiguous as to whether driving on a fog line amounts to a failure to maintain one's lane. Consequently, Hastings's mistaken belief that such conduct violates the law was objectively reasonable, and the traffic stop in this case was justified.

2. Chapman next argues that, even if the initial stop was valid, the officers immediately abandoned any investigation into the traffic offense and pursued a drug investigation without reasonable articulable suspicion to do so.

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