Chapman v. United States

480 F.Supp.3d 601

Douglas CHAPMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 3:19-CV-00797

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed August 19, 2020

Caroline Munley, Marion K. Munley, Munley, Munley & Cartwright, P.C., Scranton, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Timothy S. Judge, U.S. Attorney's Office - Civil Litigation Units, Scranton, PA, for Defendant United States Of America.

Catherine N. Walto, John H. McCarthy, Rawle & Henderson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant Maria Pavlicka.

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON, United States District Court Judge

Before the court is Defendant United States of America's ("United States") motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. In this litigation, Plaintiff Douglas Chapman alleges that Defendant Maria Pavlicka, an employee of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), is liable for the injuries he suffered due to her negligent driving while delivering mail. Plaintiff Douglas Chapman further claims that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 – 80, Defendant United States, through its agency the USPS, is subject to liability for Defendant Pavlicka's negligence through respondeat superior, and for its own negligence in its hiring, supervising, training, and retaining Defendant Pavlicka. Plaintiff Susan Chapman, the wife of Plaintiff Douglas Chapman, also brings a loss of consortium claim against Defendants Pavlicka and United States. Defendant Pavlicka filed a cross claim against Defendant United States for indemnification as her employer. Defendant United States now seeks to dismiss all of the claims against the United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA. For the reasons that follow, the court grants Defendant United States’ motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Douglas Chapman filed suit against Defendant Pavlicka for her negligent driving, and Defendant United States, through its agency the USPS, for respondeat superior liability and for its own negligence in hiring, supervising, training, and retaining Defendant Pavlicka. (Doc. 1, at 7–15.)¹ Plaintiff Susan Chapman joins in her husband's suit, claiming that Defendants Pavlicka and United States are liable to her for loss of consortium. (Id. at 15–16.)

The following factual background is gleaned from Plaintiffs’ complaint, Id. , and the sealed exhibits attached to Defendant United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for summary judgment, Doc. 19.² Plaintiffs have had an opportunity to review the sealed exhibits, Docs. 20, at 17–18; 23, at 6–7, and have not objected to the court considering these exhibits as previously stated in the court's order, Doc. 27, at 3, granting Defendant United States’ motion to seal such exhibits, Doc. 18.

Plaintiffs Douglas and Susan Chapman are spouses who reside in Wayne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 1–2.) Defendant Pavlicka served as a "supplier" for the USPS. (Doc. 19, at 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 20.)

On August 8, 2017, Plaintiff Douglas Chapman was driving his motorcycle when he collided with Defendant Pavlicka's vehicle, while she was on her scheduled mail delivery route. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 17–19.) As a result, Plaintiff Douglas Chapman suffered severe and permanent injuries. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

At the time of the collision, Defendant Pavlicka was operating a postal service route in Goldsboro, Pennsylvania pursuant to a six-year highway contract route ("HCR"), HCR 184B3, with the USPS. (Doc. 19, at 17, 19.) According to Mario Perales, a purchasing and supply maintenance specialist and contracting officer for the USPS, the USPS uses employees to distribute mail in certain parts of the country and independent contractors to distribute mail in other parts, particularly in rural places. (Id. at 3.) The independent contractors hired by the USPS are referred to as contract delivery service ("CDS") suppliers. (Id. ) To clarify, a "CDS" contract is a subset of "HCR" contracts where the USPS hires an individual or an entity for delivery and collection of mail for certain customers. United States Postal Service, Contract Delivery Service Costs, CP-AR-19-002, at 1 (August 20, 2019), available at https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2019/CP-AR-19-002.pdf.

Pursuant to Defendant Pavlicka's HCR contract, she was responsible for providing services under the contract personally or supervising her own representatives. (Doc. 19, at 54.) Her HCR contract set forth her mail delivery route, including the precise order of turns down different streets, the time in which certain tasks should be completed, and the manner in which she must distribute the mail to protect its "sanctity." (Id. at 19–24, 25.) Under her HCR contract, Defendant Pavlicka was also required to wear a specific uniform and submit to various security clearances and background checks. (Id. at 23–24, 27.)

With respect to her transportation equipment, Defendant Pavlicka's HCR contract required her to provide her own vehicles in accordance with certain design specifications and maintenance requirements. (Id. at 21–23.) Her HCR contract also required Defendant Pavlicka to maintain sufficient stand-by equipment for extra trips, mechanical failures, and vehicle maintenance. (Id. at 21.) Additionally, she was "solely liable" for any loss, damage, maintenance, or repairs to her equipment, and was required to comply with specific equipment safety standards and insure her equipment at certain levels. (Id. at 26, 28–29.) Not only was Defendant Pavlicka responsible for maintaining the safety of her own equipment and subcontractors, but she was also responsible for any damage to the persons or property of others that occurred as a result of her negligence; this was in addition to the requirement that she take proper safety precautions to ensure the health of the public and environment. (Id. at 26, 28, 54.)

Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies by filing a claim for damages with the USPS, which was subsequently denied. (Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 9–11.) Plaintiffs then filed suit against Defendants Pavlicka and United States in this court. (See id. ) On July 15, 2019, Defendant Pavlicka filed a cross claim for indemnification against Defendant United States. (Doc. 4.) On March 6, 2020, Defendant United States filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or for summary judgment. (Doc. 15.) Defendant United States subsequently filed a brief in support of its motion, Doc. 16, a statement of facts, Doc. 17, and a file of sealed exhibits, including the declaration of Mario Perales and various sections of Defendant Pavlicka's HCR contract with the USPS at the time of the collision, Doc. 19. On April 3, 2020, Plaintiffs Susan and Douglas Chapman filed a brief in opposition to Defendant United States’ motion, Doc. 20, and an answer to its statement of facts, Doc. 21. On April 10, 2020, Defendant Pavlicka filed a brief in opposition to Defendant United States’ motion, Doc, 23, and an answer to its statement of facts, Doc, 22.³ On April 17, 2020, Defendant United States filed a reply brief. (Doc. 24.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.

JURISDICTION

Under the FTCA, this court has jurisdiction over any claims that arise against the United States due to certain types of negligent governmental conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this court has supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action" over which the court has original jurisdiction, such that all claims "form part of the same case or controversy."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As an initial matter, the court will address Defendant United States’ motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) rather than under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment because Defendant United States raises a subject matter jurisdiction issue. See Norman v. United States, 111 F.3d 356, 357 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's decision in an FTCA case to analyze a motion for relief under 12(b)(1), though the government moved for summary judgment, because the motion concerned subject matter jurisdiction); see also CNA v. United States , 535 F.3d 132, 144 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Sept. 29, 2008) (when addressing FTCA claims the Third Circuit's "approach has been to make disputes over the scope-of-employment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) jurisdictional.").

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may treat a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction either as a facial or a factual attack. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States , 220 F.3d 169, 189 (3d Cir. 2000). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court may only consider the allegations contained in the complaint and exhibits attached to the complaint. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc. , 998 F.2d 1192, 1196–97 (3d Cir. 1993). On the other hand, if the defendant submits evidence that controverts the plaintiff's allegations, by way of an answer or competing factual averments, the court may treat the motion to dismiss as a factual challenge. Long v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority , 903 F.3d 312, 320 (3d Cir. 2018). In these cases, a presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the plaintiff's allegations and the "the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). The court is not restricted to considering the allegations in the complaint. Turicentro, S.A., 303 F.3d at 300 n.4, overruled on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods. , 654 F.3d 462. Instead, the district court "must weigh the evidence relating to jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, documents, and even limited evidentiary hearings." Id.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant United States is liable for (1) injuries caused by Defen...