Chapman v. Varela

213 P.3d 1109

2009 NMSC 041

In the Matter of the Estate of Gregoria C de Baca, Deceased Edwina CHAPMAN and Gilbert C de Baca, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. Viola A. VARELA and Vincent Varela, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 31,234.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 20, 2009.

Law Office of Ronald Boyd, J. Ronald Boyd, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioners.

Simons & Slattery, L.L.P., Thomas A. Simons, IV, Faith Kalman Reyes, Canepa & Vidal, P.A., Timothy J. Vidal, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondents.

Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Gregory W. MacKenzie, Roepke Law Firm, L.L.C., Karl H. Roepke, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae N.M. Trial Lawyers Association.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice.

{1} When Gregoria C de Baca died on May 11, 2004, she was survived by nine children: Rosina Villa, Rudy C de Baca, Viola Varela, Simon C de Baca, Tom C de Baca, Daniel C de Baca, Gilbert C de Baca, Edwina Chapman, and Donna C de Baca. Gregoria's will, dated August 28, 2002, left one dollar to each of her children except Viola, who the will appointed as personal representative and to whom the will conveyed the remainder of Gregoria's estate via its residuary clause. Viola already had received much of Gregoria's real property via five inter vivos warranty deeds that had been signed and recorded about three years before Gregoria's death and about one year before the will was executed. Edwina and Gilbert, subsequently joined by Rudy, Daniel, Rosina, and Donna, brought actions in district court to set aside the will and deeds as the products of Viola's undue influence. After a trial, the district court voided the will and the deeds. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding of undue influence regarding the will, but did not reach the issue of the deeds. Chapman v. Varela (In re Estate of C de Baca), 2008-NMCA-108, ¶¶ 11, 47, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567.

{2} We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings of a confidential relationship between Gregoria and Viola and suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of her will. Accordingly, under our rules governing civil presumptions, we hold that sufficient evidence existed for the district court's ultimate conclusion that the will was void as the product of Viola's undue influence. Finally, because the Court of Appeals did not decide the validity of the deeds, and because this issue was not specifically briefed to the Supreme Court, we remand to the Court of Appeals for its determination of this issue.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Gregoria C de Baca died on May 11, 2004, at the age of 84. Edwina and Gilbert, claiming that Gregoria died intestate, submitted an application in district court for informal appointment as personal representatives. They were subsequently named personal representatives of Gregoria's estate. In a separate action that was later consolidated with the probate proceedings in district court, Edwina and Gilbert claimed that five inter vivos warranty deeds of Gregoria's real property to Viola were procured by forgery, misrepresentation, or undue influence.¹ Viola subsequently petitioned the district court to admit Gregoria's will into probate, and in accordance with the will, to remove Edwina and Gilbert as personal representatives and appoint her in their place. The will provided one dollar to each of Gregoria's children except for Viola and purported to detail Gregoria's grievances with several of them. In contrast, the will praised Viola, noted that Gregoria's bank accounts and real property had already been conveyed to her, and devised the residue of Gregoria's estate to her. Viola was appointed personal representative and made various counterclaims that are not relevant to this appeal. Edwina and Gilbert, joined by Rudy, Daniel, Rosina, and Donna (collectively "Siblings"), petitioned the district court to set aside the will as a product of Viola's undue influence. After a bench trial, the district court removed Viola as personal representative and set aside the deeds and the will, concluding that "[b]y clear and convincing evidence, [the deeds] and [the will] are the result of undue influence by Viola Varela."

{4} Viola sought review in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the will was the product of undue influence. Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 47, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that "[t]he evidence regarding old age, unnatural disposition, domination, and secrecy did not establish that Viola substituted her own intent for Gregoria's." Id. Given this shortfall and the Court's conclusion that Viola did not participate in procuring the will, but did provide "consideration in the form of love, friendship, and help with daily living[,]" id., the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court could not have found clear and convincing evidence of undue influence. Id. The Court of Appeals averred that it did not need to reach the question of whether the deeds were the product of undue influence, id. ¶ 11, presumably because even if they were invalid, Gregoria's real property would pass to Viola via the will's residuary clause. Siblings seek review on a number of issues that, taken together, amount to a challenge of the Court of Appeals' holding on the sufficiency of the evidence of undue influence. The New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association joins them as Amicus Curiae in criticizing the Court of Appeals' opinion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{5} To find sufficient evidence to support the district court's invalidation of Gregoria's will because of undue influence, we must be able to conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have found clear and convincing evidence of undue influence. Gersbach v. Warren (In re Estate of Gersbach), 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 31, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that would "instantly tilt[] the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition. . . ." In re Locatelli, 2007-NMSC-029, ¶ 7, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining sufficiency, we keep in mind that "[t]he duty to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in the evidence lies with the trial court, not the appellate court. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard any inferences and evidence to the contrary." Doughty v. Morris, 117 N.M. 284, 287, 871 P.2d 380, 383 (Ct.App.1994) (citation omitted). However, we give no deference to the district court's conclusions of law. See Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 1, 206 P.3d 112 ("We review these questions of law de novo, without deference to the district court's legal conclusions."). We are mindful of Viola's complaint that the district court's findings are "insufficient" and "are conclusions listed [as] factual findings." Although we disagree that the district court's findings are so insufficient that they necessitate a remand, we recognize that some of the district court's findings are conclusions of law, and we do not afford such conclusions any deference in our review.

B. DEFINING UNDUE INFLUENCE

{6} The first dispute between the parties concerns exactly what it is that the district court must have been able to find by clear and convincing evidence to set aside Gregoria's will because of undue influence. However, as a preliminary matter, the parties do not disagree over the most general outlines of this doctrine. Undue influence "means influence, improperly exerted, which acts to the injury of the person swayed by it or to the injury of those persons whom [he or] she would have benefited." Brown v. Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 172, 204 P.2d 264, 266 (1949). We have hesitated to provide precise elements for undue influence because "any attempt to define it may well suggest a clear path of evasion." Id. The contestant of a will (in this case, Siblings) bears the burden of persuading the finder of fact that undue influence occurred. NMSA 1978, § 45-3-407 (1975).

{7} Many years ago, we observed that the fundamental problem of proving undue influence was that:

In the nature of things it would be a rare case where the details of conversation or conduct could be shown indicating undue persuasion and influence. Such arts would be exercised only in the absence of witnesses, or, at most, in the presence of those whose interest and inclination would impel to their denial.

Cardenas v. Ortiz, 29 N.M. 633, 640, 226 P. 418, 421 (1924) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, New Mexico law has traditionally allowed the contestant of a will to meet certain procedural hurdles, detailed later in this opinion, by raising a presumption of undue influence. Moreover, "because of the difficulty in obtaining direct proof in cases where undue influence is alleged, proof sufficient to raise the presumption is inferred from the circumstances." Montoya v. Torres, 113 N.M. 105, 110, 823 P.2d 905, 910 (1991). "The presumption arises if a confidential or fiduciary relation with a donor is shown together with suspicious circumstances." Id. Such circumstances include:

(1) old age and weakened physical or mental condition of testator; (2) lack of consideration for the bequest; (3) unnatural or unjust disposition of the property; (4) participation of beneficiary in procuring the gift; (5) domination or control over the donor by a beneficiary; and (6) secrecy, concealment, or failure to disclose the gift by a beneficiary.²

Id. "This is not an exhaustive list, nor is it a list of circumstances that are always suspicious. Furthermore, the presence of any of these circumstances is not in itself dispositive." Gersbach, 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811.

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